This CAIIB BFM MCQ set is for bankers preparing for the IIBF CAIIB Bank Financial Management paper. Attempt all 10 questions below—tap an option to see whether you are right, then read the short explanation. These are SimplifyingFin practice questions, not official IIBF questions.
Part of the CAIIB BFM MCQ practice series.
CAIIB BFM MCQ Day 1 quiz: 10 questions
Show answer
Answer: A — 4.00%.
The idea: Forward premium (or discount) annualises how far the outright forward sits from spot. When the dollar’s forward is above spot in INR terms, the dollar is at a premium.
- Formula: Premium % p.a. = [(F − S) ÷ S] × (12 ÷ n) × 100, where n is the forward tenor in months.
- Identify inputs: S = 82.50, F = 84.15, n = 6.
- Points away from spot: F − S = 84.15 − 82.50 = 1.65.
- Scale by spot: 1.65 ÷ 82.50 = 0.02 (exactly 2%).
- Annualise for a 6-month contract: multiply by 12 ÷ 6 = 2 → 0.02 × 2 × 100 = 4.00%.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (2.00%): 2.00% is only (F − S) ÷ S × 100 — the premium before annualising.
- C (8.00%): 8.00% wrongly uses 12 ÷ 3 (as if the tenor were 3 months) instead of 12 ÷ 6.
- D (3.92%): 3.92% puts F in the denominator: [(F − S) ÷ F] × (12 ÷ 6) × 100.
- E (1.65%): 1.65% restates the raw 1.65 point gap as a percent and skips both ÷ S and annualisation.
Check:
| Input / step | Value |
|---|---|
| Spot S | 82.50 |
| 6-m forward F | 84.15 |
| F − S | 1.65 |
| (F − S) ÷ S | 0.02 |
| × (12 ÷ 6) × 100 | 4.00% |
F > S in INR/USD → dollar at premium; use S (not F) in the denominator.
Memory tip: Premium % p.a. = [(F−S)/S] × (12/months) × 100 — never skip the annualisation factor.
Answer: A — 4.00%.
The idea: Forward premium (or discount) annualises how far the outright forward sits from spot. When the dollar’s forward is above spot in INR terms, the dollar is at a premium.
- Formula: Premium % p.a. = [(F − S) ÷ S] × (12 ÷ n) × 100, where n is the forward tenor in months.
- Identify inputs: S = 82.50, F = 84.15, n = 6.
- Points away from spot: F − S = 84.15 − 82.50 = 1.65.
- Scale by spot: 1.65 ÷ 82.50 = 0.02 (exactly 2%).
- Annualise for a 6-month contract: multiply by 12 ÷ 6 = 2 → 0.02 × 2 × 100 = 4.00%.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (2.00%): 2.00% is only (F − S) ÷ S × 100 — the premium before annualising.
- C (8.00%): 8.00% wrongly uses 12 ÷ 3 (as if the tenor were 3 months) instead of 12 ÷ 6.
- D (3.92%): 3.92% puts F in the denominator: [(F − S) ÷ F] × (12 ÷ 6) × 100.
- E (1.65%): 1.65% restates the raw 1.65 point gap as a percent and skips both ÷ S and annualisation.
Check:
| Input / step | Value |
|---|---|
| Spot S | 82.50 |
| 6-m forward F | 84.15 |
| F − S | 1.65 |
| (F − S) ÷ S | 0.02 |
| × (12 ÷ 6) × 100 | 4.00% |
F > S in INR/USD → dollar at premium; use S (not F) in the denominator.
Memory tip: Premium % p.a. = [(F−S)/S] × (12/months) × 100 — never skip the annualisation factor.
Show answer
Answer: B — NOSTRO account.
The idea: NOSTRO and VOSTRO are mirror labels for the same correspondent relationship, seen from opposite sides. The home bank’s foreign-currency account abroad is its NOSTRO.
- NOSTRO literally means “our account with you”: the Indian bank’s USD account held at the New York correspondent.
- VOSTRO means “your account with us”: how that New York bank would describe an INR account the Indian bank holds for it in India.
- EEFC is an Indian exporter’s foreign-currency account in India — not a correspondent nostro.
- Therefore, from the Indian bank’s viewpoint, the New York USD account is a NOSTRO account.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (VOSTRO account): VOSTRO is the correspondent’s label for an account it holds with us, not our account abroad.
- C (EEFC account of the New York correspondent): EEFC accounts are maintained by eligible Indian exporters with AD banks in India, not by the New York correspondent for this purpose.
- D (CRR balances with the Reserve Bank of India): CRR is cash reserve with RBI in India; it is not a USD correspondent account.
- E (Domestic INR mirror ledger with no nostro link): A domestic INR ledger alone does not settle dollar payments through a foreign correspondent.
Check: Memory hook: NOSTRO = Our account abroad; VOSTRO = Your account on our books.
Memory tip: If the account is in foreign currency at a bank abroad, from your bank’s view it is NOSTRO.
Answer: B — NOSTRO account.
The idea: NOSTRO and VOSTRO are mirror labels for the same correspondent relationship, seen from opposite sides. The home bank’s foreign-currency account abroad is its NOSTRO.
- NOSTRO literally means “our account with you”: the Indian bank’s USD account held at the New York correspondent.
- VOSTRO means “your account with us”: how that New York bank would describe an INR account the Indian bank holds for it in India.
- EEFC is an Indian exporter’s foreign-currency account in India — not a correspondent nostro.
- Therefore, from the Indian bank’s viewpoint, the New York USD account is a NOSTRO account.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (VOSTRO account): VOSTRO is the correspondent’s label for an account it holds with us, not our account abroad.
- C (EEFC account of the New York correspondent): EEFC accounts are maintained by eligible Indian exporters with AD banks in India, not by the New York correspondent for this purpose.
- D (CRR balances with the Reserve Bank of India): CRR is cash reserve with RBI in India; it is not a USD correspondent account.
- E (Domestic INR mirror ledger with no nostro link): A domestic INR ledger alone does not settle dollar payments through a foreign correspondent.
Check: Memory hook: NOSTRO = Our account abroad; VOSTRO = Your account on our books.
Memory tip: If the account is in foreign currency at a bank abroad, from your bank’s view it is NOSTRO.
Show answer
Answer: C — ₹0.80 crore.
The idea: Expected Loss is the average credit loss the bank prices for over a horizon. Under the standard credit-risk identity it is the product PD × LGD × EAD.
- Write PD and LGD as decimals: PD = 2.5% = 0.025; LGD = 40% = 0.40.
- Apply EL = PD × LGD × EAD.
- First PD × LGD = 0.025 × 0.40 = 0.010 (a 1% expected loss rate on EAD).
- Then × EAD: 0.010 × ₹80 crore = ₹0.80 crore.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹2.00 crore): ₹2.00 crore is PD × EAD (0.025 × 80) and omits LGD.
- B (₹32.00 crore): ₹32.00 crore is LGD × EAD (0.40 × 80) and omits PD.
- D (₹8.00 crore): ₹8.00 crore treats PD as 25% (0.25 × 0.40 × 80) instead of 2.5%.
- E (₹1.00 crore): ₹1.00 crore does not equal 0.025 × 0.40 × 80.
Check:
| Component | Value |
|---|---|
| PD | 0.025 |
| LGD | 0.40 |
| EAD | ₹80 crore |
| PD × LGD | 0.010 |
| EL | ₹0.80 crore |
EL is covered by pricing/provisions; unexpected loss is a capital concern.
Memory tip: EL = PD × LGD × EAD — convert percentages to decimals before multiplying.
Answer: C — ₹0.80 crore.
The idea: Expected Loss is the average credit loss the bank prices for over a horizon. Under the standard credit-risk identity it is the product PD × LGD × EAD.
- Write PD and LGD as decimals: PD = 2.5% = 0.025; LGD = 40% = 0.40.
- Apply EL = PD × LGD × EAD.
- First PD × LGD = 0.025 × 0.40 = 0.010 (a 1% expected loss rate on EAD).
- Then × EAD: 0.010 × ₹80 crore = ₹0.80 crore.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹2.00 crore): ₹2.00 crore is PD × EAD (0.025 × 80) and omits LGD.
- B (₹32.00 crore): ₹32.00 crore is LGD × EAD (0.40 × 80) and omits PD.
- D (₹8.00 crore): ₹8.00 crore treats PD as 25% (0.25 × 0.40 × 80) instead of 2.5%.
- E (₹1.00 crore): ₹1.00 crore does not equal 0.025 × 0.40 × 80.
Check:
| Component | Value |
|---|---|
| PD | 0.025 |
| LGD | 0.40 |
| EAD | ₹80 crore |
| PD × LGD | 0.010 |
| EL | ₹0.80 crore |
EL is covered by pricing/provisions; unexpected loss is a capital concern.
Memory tip: EL = PD × LGD × EAD — convert percentages to decimals before multiplying.
Show answer
Answer: D — As a fixed percentage (alpha) of average annual positive gross income over a prescribed multi-year window.
The idea: The Basic Indicator Approach is the simplest Basel operational-risk method: capital is a set percentage of a gross-income proxy, not of credit RWA, VaR or HQLA.
- Identify the approach: BIA uses a single bank-wide indicator — gross income.
- Take average annual gross income over the prescribed window, counting only positive years as required by the rules.
- Multiply that average by the fixed alpha factor (15% under the classical Basel BIA formulation taught in CAIIB).
- The product is the operational-risk capital charge — distinct from credit RWA, market VaR or liquidity ratios.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (As a fixed share of the bank’s credit risk-weighted assets only): Credit RWA drive credit-risk capital, not the BIA operational-risk charge.
- B (As a multiple of the previous day’s 99% trading VaR): VaR-based charges belong to market-risk frameworks, not BIA operational risk.
- C (As the stock of Level-1 HQLA required under the LCR rules): HQLA stocks are an LCR liquidity concept, not an operational-risk capital formula.
- E (As the sum of all customer complaint payouts in the last quarter): Complaint payouts may feed loss data in advanced approaches but are not the BIA formula.
Check: BIA memory line: Operational risk capital ≈ α × average positive gross income (classical α = 15%).
Memory tip: BIA = alpha × average gross income; do not mix it with CRAR, VaR or LCR formulae.
Answer: D — As a fixed percentage (alpha) of average annual positive gross income over a prescribed multi-year window.
The idea: The Basic Indicator Approach is the simplest Basel operational-risk method: capital is a set percentage of a gross-income proxy, not of credit RWA, VaR or HQLA.
- Identify the approach: BIA uses a single bank-wide indicator — gross income.
- Take average annual gross income over the prescribed window, counting only positive years as required by the rules.
- Multiply that average by the fixed alpha factor (15% under the classical Basel BIA formulation taught in CAIIB).
- The product is the operational-risk capital charge — distinct from credit RWA, market VaR or liquidity ratios.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (As a fixed share of the bank’s credit risk-weighted assets only): Credit RWA drive credit-risk capital, not the BIA operational-risk charge.
- B (As a multiple of the previous day’s 99% trading VaR): VaR-based charges belong to market-risk frameworks, not BIA operational risk.
- C (As the stock of Level-1 HQLA required under the LCR rules): HQLA stocks are an LCR liquidity concept, not an operational-risk capital formula.
- E (As the sum of all customer complaint payouts in the last quarter): Complaint payouts may feed loss data in advanced approaches but are not the BIA formula.
Check: BIA memory line: Operational risk capital ≈ α × average positive gross income (classical α = 15%).
Memory tip: BIA = alpha × average gross income; do not mix it with CRAR, VaR or LCR formulae.
Show answer
Answer: E — A decline of about ₹1.28.
The idea: Modified duration converts a small parallel yield shift into an approximate percentage (and then rupee) price change. Yields up → prices down, hence the minus sign.
- Convert 20 basis points to a decimal yield change: Δy = 0.20% = 0.0020.
- Apply ΔP ≈ −D_mod × Δy × Price = −6.25 × 0.0020 × 102.40.
- First 6.25 × 0.0020 = 0.0125.
- Then 0.0125 × 102.40 = 1.28, so ΔP ≈ −₹1.28 (a decline of about ₹1.28).
Why the others are wrong:
- A (A decline of about ₹0.20): ₹0.20 merely restates the 20 bp move as rupees and ignores duration and price.
- B (A decline of about ₹2.56): ₹2.56 doubles the shock (uses 40 bp instead of 20 bp): 6.25 × 0.0040 × 102.40.
- C (A decline of about ₹6.25): ₹6.25 copies the duration figure and is not the rupee price change.
- D (A decline of about ₹0.64): ₹0.64 is half of the correct 1.28 (for example using half the duration).
Check:
| Input / step | Value |
|---|---|
| Price | 102.40 |
| D_mod | 6.25 |
| Δy | 0.0020 |
| D_mod × Δy | 0.0125 |
| ΔP ≈ −D_mod × Δy × P | −1.28 |
First-order (linear) approximation; convexity would add a small positive offset for a parallel shift.
Memory tip: ΔP ≈ −D_mod × Δy × P; keep Δy as a decimal (20 bp = 0.002).
Answer: E — A decline of about ₹1.28.
The idea: Modified duration converts a small parallel yield shift into an approximate percentage (and then rupee) price change. Yields up → prices down, hence the minus sign.
- Convert 20 basis points to a decimal yield change: Δy = 0.20% = 0.0020.
- Apply ΔP ≈ −D_mod × Δy × Price = −6.25 × 0.0020 × 102.40.
- First 6.25 × 0.0020 = 0.0125.
- Then 0.0125 × 102.40 = 1.28, so ΔP ≈ −₹1.28 (a decline of about ₹1.28).
Why the others are wrong:
- A (A decline of about ₹0.20): ₹0.20 merely restates the 20 bp move as rupees and ignores duration and price.
- B (A decline of about ₹2.56): ₹2.56 doubles the shock (uses 40 bp instead of 20 bp): 6.25 × 0.0040 × 102.40.
- C (A decline of about ₹6.25): ₹6.25 copies the duration figure and is not the rupee price change.
- D (A decline of about ₹0.64): ₹0.64 is half of the correct 1.28 (for example using half the duration).
Check:
| Input / step | Value |
|---|---|
| Price | 102.40 |
| D_mod | 6.25 |
| Δy | 0.0020 |
| D_mod × Δy | 0.0125 |
| ΔP ≈ −D_mod × Δy × P | −1.28 |
First-order (linear) approximation; convexity would add a small positive offset for a parallel shift.
Memory tip: ΔP ≈ −D_mod × Δy × P; keep Δy as a decimal (20 bp = 0.002).
Show answer
Answer: A — Pay fixed, receive floating.
The idea: An interest-rate swap can synthetically convert floating-rate debt into fixed-rate debt. The borrower that fears higher floating coupons wants to pay fixed and receive floating.
- Risk: floating-rate loan coupons rise when the benchmark rises.
- In a pay-fixed / receive-floating IRS, higher floating receipts offset higher loan coupons.
- Net effect: the borrower economically pays a fixed swap rate (plus any spread on the loan), hedging rate-rise risk.
- The opposite swap (pay floating / receive fixed) would increase exposure to rising rates for this borrower.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Pay floating, receive fixed): Pay floating / receive fixed increases (does not hedge) rate-rise risk for a floating-rate borrower.
- C (Buy a credit default swap on its own name): A CDS hedges credit risk of a reference name, not the borrower’s own interest-rate reset risk.
- D (Sell an equity futures contract on the Nifty): Equity futures hedge equity-market risk, not loan coupon resets.
- E (Enter a gold forward solely to lock the loan EMI): A gold forward hedges gold price risk and does not fix INR loan interest.
Check: Rule of thumb: floating-rate debtor fearing higher rates → pay fixed / receive floating.
Memory tip: Pay fixed + receive floating ≈ turn floating debt into synthetic fixed-rate debt.
Answer: A — Pay fixed, receive floating.
The idea: An interest-rate swap can synthetically convert floating-rate debt into fixed-rate debt. The borrower that fears higher floating coupons wants to pay fixed and receive floating.
- Risk: floating-rate loan coupons rise when the benchmark rises.
- In a pay-fixed / receive-floating IRS, higher floating receipts offset higher loan coupons.
- Net effect: the borrower economically pays a fixed swap rate (plus any spread on the loan), hedging rate-rise risk.
- The opposite swap (pay floating / receive fixed) would increase exposure to rising rates for this borrower.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Pay floating, receive fixed): Pay floating / receive fixed increases (does not hedge) rate-rise risk for a floating-rate borrower.
- C (Buy a credit default swap on its own name): A CDS hedges credit risk of a reference name, not the borrower’s own interest-rate reset risk.
- D (Sell an equity futures contract on the Nifty): Equity futures hedge equity-market risk, not loan coupon resets.
- E (Enter a gold forward solely to lock the loan EMI): A gold forward hedges gold price risk and does not fix INR loan interest.
Check: Rule of thumb: floating-rate debtor fearing higher rates → pay fixed / receive floating.
Memory tip: Pay fixed + receive floating ≈ turn floating debt into synthetic fixed-rate debt.
Show answer
Answer: B — A USD call option (right to buy USD).
The idea: Options grant rights without obligations. An importer who may need dollars hedges by securing the right to buy USD (a USD call); a put would be the right to sell USD.
- Identify the exposure: future USD payable → hurt if USD/INR rises (rupee weakens).
- Needed right: buy USD at a capped INR cost → that is a USD call (INR put on the cross).
- A USD put is the right to sell USD, which suits an exporter receiving dollars, not this importer.
- Swaps, CLNs and reverse repo are different instruments and do not create that FX optionality alone.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (A USD put option (right to sell USD)): A USD put is the right to sell USD — typical for an exporter, opposite of this importer’s need.
- C (A pay-fixed interest-rate swap): A pay-fixed IRS hedges interest-rate risk, not the USD purchase rate.
- D (A credit-linked note on the exporter): A credit-linked note transfers credit risk; it is not an FX call on USD.
- E (A reverse-repo auction with RBI): RBI reverse repo is a rupee liquidity operation, not a USD call hedge.
Check: Importer (USD payable) → buy USD call; exporter (USD receivable) → buy USD put.
Memory tip: Call = right to buy the underlying; put = right to sell. Importers buy USD calls.
Answer: B — A USD call option (right to buy USD).
The idea: Options grant rights without obligations. An importer who may need dollars hedges by securing the right to buy USD (a USD call); a put would be the right to sell USD.
- Identify the exposure: future USD payable → hurt if USD/INR rises (rupee weakens).
- Needed right: buy USD at a capped INR cost → that is a USD call (INR put on the cross).
- A USD put is the right to sell USD, which suits an exporter receiving dollars, not this importer.
- Swaps, CLNs and reverse repo are different instruments and do not create that FX optionality alone.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (A USD put option (right to sell USD)): A USD put is the right to sell USD — typical for an exporter, opposite of this importer’s need.
- C (A pay-fixed interest-rate swap): A pay-fixed IRS hedges interest-rate risk, not the USD purchase rate.
- D (A credit-linked note on the exporter): A credit-linked note transfers credit risk; it is not an FX call on USD.
- E (A reverse-repo auction with RBI): RBI reverse repo is a rupee liquidity operation, not a USD call hedge.
Check: Importer (USD payable) → buy USD call; exporter (USD receivable) → buy USD put.
Memory tip: Call = right to buy the underlying; put = right to sell. Importers buy USD calls.
Show answer
Answer: C — It adds its own definite undertaking to honour or negotiate, in addition to the issuing bank’s undertaking.
The idea: Confirmation is a second bank’s independent undertaking on an irrevocable LC. The beneficiary can look to the confirming bank as well as the issuing bank when documents comply.
- An irrevocable LC already binds the issuing bank if complying documents are presented.
- When another bank confirms, it adds its own definite undertaking to honour/negotiate against complying documents.
- Advice without confirmation does not create that second undertaking.
- Confirmation does not make the credit revocable, nor does it simply substitute the applicant as payer.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (It only advises the LC and never adds its own payment undertaking): Describes an advising bank without confirmation, not a confirming bank.
- B (It may refuse payment even if documents comply, because confirmation is optional courtesy): False: once confirmed, complying presentation obliges the confirming bank to honour/negotiate per UCP terms.
- D (It replaces the applicant as the party that must reimburse the beneficiary in all cases): The applicant remains the customer of the issuing bank; confirmation is a bank-to-beneficiary undertaking, not a substitution of the applicant.
- E (It converts the LC into a freely revocable credit open to cancellation without notice): Confirmation does not turn an irrevocable credit into a revocable one.
Check: Confirmed irrevocable LC = issuing bank undertaking + confirming bank undertaking on complying documents.
Memory tip: Confirmation = second bank’s own promise; advising alone ≠ confirmation.
Answer: C — It adds its own definite undertaking to honour or negotiate, in addition to the issuing bank’s undertaking.
The idea: Confirmation is a second bank’s independent undertaking on an irrevocable LC. The beneficiary can look to the confirming bank as well as the issuing bank when documents comply.
- An irrevocable LC already binds the issuing bank if complying documents are presented.
- When another bank confirms, it adds its own definite undertaking to honour/negotiate against complying documents.
- Advice without confirmation does not create that second undertaking.
- Confirmation does not make the credit revocable, nor does it simply substitute the applicant as payer.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (It only advises the LC and never adds its own payment undertaking): Describes an advising bank without confirmation, not a confirming bank.
- B (It may refuse payment even if documents comply, because confirmation is optional courtesy): False: once confirmed, complying presentation obliges the confirming bank to honour/negotiate per UCP terms.
- D (It replaces the applicant as the party that must reimburse the beneficiary in all cases): The applicant remains the customer of the issuing bank; confirmation is a bank-to-beneficiary undertaking, not a substitution of the applicant.
- E (It converts the LC into a freely revocable credit open to cancellation without notice): Confirmation does not turn an irrevocable credit into a revocable one.
Check: Confirmed irrevocable LC = issuing bank undertaking + confirming bank undertaking on complying documents.
Memory tip: Confirmation = second bank’s own promise; advising alone ≠ confirmation.
Show answer
Answer: D — NII rises by about ₹1.50 crore.
The idea: The repricing gap equals RSA minus RSL. With a positive gap the bank is asset-sensitive: when rates rise, asset yields reprice up on a larger base than liability costs, so NII tends to rise.
- Gap = RSA − RSL = 4,800 − 4,200 = +₹600 crore.
- Convert +25 bp to a decimal: Δr = +0.0025.
- ΔNII ≈ Gap × Δr = 600 × 0.0025 = 1.50.
- Therefore NII rises by about ₹1.50 crore.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (NII falls by about ₹1.50 crore): Wrong sign: a positive gap with rising rates increases NII, it does not reduce it.
- B (NII rises by about ₹6.00 crore): ₹6.00 crore would require a 100 bp rise (600 × 0.01), not 25 bp.
- C (NII is unchanged because the bucket gap is under ₹1,000 crore): A non-zero gap still transmits rate moves into NII; there is no ‘under ₹1,000 crore freezes NII’ rule.
- E (NII falls by about ₹0.15 crore): ₹0.15 crore understates 600 × 0.0025 by a factor of 10.
Check:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| RSA | ₹4,800 crore |
| RSL | ₹4,200 crore |
| Gap | +₹600 crore |
| Δr | +0.0025 |
| ΔNII ≈ Gap × Δr | +₹1.50 crore |
Positive gap + rising rates → NII up (first-order gap model).
Memory tip: ΔNII ≈ (RSA − RSL) × Δr; positive gap benefits from rate increases.
Answer: D — NII rises by about ₹1.50 crore.
The idea: The repricing gap equals RSA minus RSL. With a positive gap the bank is asset-sensitive: when rates rise, asset yields reprice up on a larger base than liability costs, so NII tends to rise.
- Gap = RSA − RSL = 4,800 − 4,200 = +₹600 crore.
- Convert +25 bp to a decimal: Δr = +0.0025.
- ΔNII ≈ Gap × Δr = 600 × 0.0025 = 1.50.
- Therefore NII rises by about ₹1.50 crore.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (NII falls by about ₹1.50 crore): Wrong sign: a positive gap with rising rates increases NII, it does not reduce it.
- B (NII rises by about ₹6.00 crore): ₹6.00 crore would require a 100 bp rise (600 × 0.01), not 25 bp.
- C (NII is unchanged because the bucket gap is under ₹1,000 crore): A non-zero gap still transmits rate moves into NII; there is no ‘under ₹1,000 crore freezes NII’ rule.
- E (NII falls by about ₹0.15 crore): ₹0.15 crore understates 600 × 0.0025 by a factor of 10.
Check:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| RSA | ₹4,800 crore |
| RSL | ₹4,200 crore |
| Gap | +₹600 crore |
| Δr | +0.0025 |
| ΔNII ≈ Gap × Δr | +₹1.50 crore |
Positive gap + rising rates → NII up (first-order gap model).
Memory tip: ΔNII ≈ (RSA − RSL) × Δr; positive gap benefits from rate increases.
Show answer
Answer: E — LCR requires banks to hold HQLA against net cash outflows assumed over the next 30 calendar days, with a minimum ratio of 100%.
The idea: LCR is a short-term liquidity resilience ratio: high-quality liquid assets must cover stressed net cash outflows over a 30-day horizon, at or above 100%.
- Numerator: stock of High-Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) after haircuts.
- Denominator: total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days under the prescribed stress scenario.
- Regulatory minimum: LCR ≥ 100%.
- Do not confuse LCR with CRAR (capital ÷ RWA) or with NSFR (stable funding over a 1-year horizon).
Why the others are wrong:
- A (LCR equals total capital ÷ risk-weighted assets and must stay above 9%): That describes a capital ratio (CRAR-style), not LCR.
- B (LCR compares available stable funding to required stable funding over a one-year horizon): That describes the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), not LCR.
- C (LCR is computed only on trading-book VaR and ignores cash-flow stress): LCR is a cash-flow / HQLA metric, not a trading VaR capital charge.
- D (LCR replaces CRR and abolishes the need for any HQLA stock): LCR does not abolish CRR; it requires an HQLA stock rather than replacing reserve requirements.
Check:
| Ratio | Horizon | Core idea |
|---|---|---|
| LCR | 30 days | HQLA ÷ net outflows ≥ 100% |
| NSFR | 1 year | Available ÷ required stable funding ≥ 100% |
| CRAR | Going concern | Capital ÷ RWA |
Keep LCR (short liquidity) distinct from NSFR (structural funding) and CRAR (solvency).
Memory tip: LCR = HQLA / 30-day net outflows ≥ 100%; NSFR is the one-year twin.
Answer: E — LCR requires banks to hold HQLA against net cash outflows assumed over the next 30 calendar days, with a minimum ratio of 100%.
The idea: LCR is a short-term liquidity resilience ratio: high-quality liquid assets must cover stressed net cash outflows over a 30-day horizon, at or above 100%.
- Numerator: stock of High-Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) after haircuts.
- Denominator: total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days under the prescribed stress scenario.
- Regulatory minimum: LCR ≥ 100%.
- Do not confuse LCR with CRAR (capital ÷ RWA) or with NSFR (stable funding over a 1-year horizon).
Why the others are wrong:
- A (LCR equals total capital ÷ risk-weighted assets and must stay above 9%): That describes a capital ratio (CRAR-style), not LCR.
- B (LCR compares available stable funding to required stable funding over a one-year horizon): That describes the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), not LCR.
- C (LCR is computed only on trading-book VaR and ignores cash-flow stress): LCR is a cash-flow / HQLA metric, not a trading VaR capital charge.
- D (LCR replaces CRR and abolishes the need for any HQLA stock): LCR does not abolish CRR; it requires an HQLA stock rather than replacing reserve requirements.
Check:
| Ratio | Horizon | Core idea |
|---|---|---|
| LCR | 30 days | HQLA ÷ net outflows ≥ 100% |
| NSFR | 1 year | Available ÷ required stable funding ≥ 100% |
| CRAR | Going concern | Capital ÷ RWA |
Keep LCR (short liquidity) distinct from NSFR (structural funding) and CRAR (solvency).
Memory tip: LCR = HQLA / 30-day net outflows ≥ 100%; NSFR is the one-year twin.
Topics covered today
- Module A — International Banking: Foreign Exchange — Spot and Forward; NOSTRO / VOSTRO Accounts; Export / Import Finance — Letters of Credit
- Module B — Risk Management: Credit Risk — PD, LGD, EAD, EL; Operational Risk — Basic Indicator Approach; Market Risk — Duration
- Module C — Treasury Management: Derivatives — Interest Rate Swaps; Derivatives — Currency Options
- Module D — Balance Sheet Management: ALM — Gap and NII Sensitivity; Liquidity Risk — LCR
Tomorrow’s post continues the series with another fresh set of 10 CAIIB Bank Financial Management practice questions. Bookmark SimplifyingFin and revise one set a day.
Disclaimer: This quiz is an independent practice aid for educational purposes. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or published by IIBF. Always cross-check regulations and circulars from official RBI/IIBF sources before relying on any figure in an exam or at work.

