This CAIIB Risk Management MCQ set is for bankers preparing for the IIBF CAIIB Risk Management paper. Attempt all 10 questions below—tap an option to see whether you are right, then read the short explanation. These are SimplifyingFin practice questions, not official IIBF questions.
Part of the CAIIB Risk Management MCQ practice series. Previous: Day 2
CAIIB Risk Management MCQ Day 3 quiz: 10 questions
Show answer
Answer: B — Basis risk.
The idea: The bank was not caught by timing: both sides reset in the same quarter. It was caught because the two sides follow different reference rates that did not move by the same amount. That mismatch in how far rates move is basis risk.
- Interest rate risk in the banking book is usually split into repricing (gap) risk, yield curve risk, basis risk and option risk.
- Repricing risk comes from assets and liabilities resetting at different times. Here both reset in the same quarter, so timing is matched.
- Basis risk arises when assets and liabilities that reprice at the same time are priced off different benchmarks that are not perfectly correlated.
- Loan yield moved −50 bps (repo-linked); deposit cost moved −20 bps (card rate). Spread loss = 50 − 20 = 30 bps on the matched book.
- So the margin squeeze is basis risk.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Repricing (gap) risk): Repricing (gap) risk needs a timing mismatch between asset and liability resets; the stem says both sides fall in the same repricing bucket.
- C (Yield curve risk): Yield curve risk comes from a change in the slope or shape of the yield curve hitting positions at different maturities; here a single policy-rate cut moved two benchmarks by different amounts.
- D (Embedded option risk): Embedded option risk arises when customers exercise options such as loan prepayment or premature deposit withdrawal; no option exercise is described.
- E (Funding liquidity risk): Funding liquidity risk is the risk of being unable to raise cash to meet obligations; the bank’s problem is a narrower margin, not a shortage of funds.
Memory tip: Same timing, different benchmark → basis risk. Different timing → repricing (gap) risk.
Answer: B — Basis risk.
The idea: The bank was not caught by timing: both sides reset in the same quarter. It was caught because the two sides follow different reference rates that did not move by the same amount. That mismatch in how far rates move is basis risk.
- Interest rate risk in the banking book is usually split into repricing (gap) risk, yield curve risk, basis risk and option risk.
- Repricing risk comes from assets and liabilities resetting at different times. Here both reset in the same quarter, so timing is matched.
- Basis risk arises when assets and liabilities that reprice at the same time are priced off different benchmarks that are not perfectly correlated.
- Loan yield moved −50 bps (repo-linked); deposit cost moved −20 bps (card rate). Spread loss = 50 − 20 = 30 bps on the matched book.
- So the margin squeeze is basis risk.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Repricing (gap) risk): Repricing (gap) risk needs a timing mismatch between asset and liability resets; the stem says both sides fall in the same repricing bucket.
- C (Yield curve risk): Yield curve risk comes from a change in the slope or shape of the yield curve hitting positions at different maturities; here a single policy-rate cut moved two benchmarks by different amounts.
- D (Embedded option risk): Embedded option risk arises when customers exercise options such as loan prepayment or premature deposit withdrawal; no option exercise is described.
- E (Funding liquidity risk): Funding liquidity risk is the risk of being unable to raise cash to meet obligations; the bank’s problem is a narrower margin, not a shortage of funds.
Memory tip: Same timing, different benchmark → basis risk. Different timing → repricing (gap) risk.
Show answer
Answer: A — ₹88.2 lakh.
The idea: Expected loss (₹18 lakh) is the average cost the bank prices into the loan rate. Unexpected loss of about ₹88 lakh is the typical swing around that average in a bad year, and it is this swing that capital, not provisions, has to absorb.
- With fixed EAD and LGD and default as a yes/no event, unexpected loss UL = EAD × LGD × √[PD × (1 − PD)].
- PD × (1 − PD) = 0.04 × 0.96 = 0.0384.
- √0.0384 ≈ 0.196 (because 0.196 × 0.196 ≈ 0.0384).
- EAD × LGD = 10 × 0.45 = ₹4.5 crore.
- UL = 4.5 × 0.196 ≈ ₹0.882 crore = ₹88.2 lakh.
- Shortcut: for a small PD, √[PD(1 − PD)] is just under √PD (here 0.196 vs 0.20), so UL is a little below EAD × LGD × √PD.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (₹18.0 lakh): ₹18.0 lakh is the expected loss, EAD × LGD × PD = 10 × 0.45 × 0.04 crore; it is the average loss, not the standard deviation around it.
- C (₹17.3 lakh): ₹17.3 lakh is EAD × LGD × PD × (1 − PD) = 4.5 × 0.0384 crore: it forgets to take the square root, so it is a variance-type figure, not a standard deviation.
- D (₹90.0 lakh): ₹90.0 lakh is EAD × LGD × √PD = 4.5 × 0.20 crore; it drops the (1 − PD) term.
- E (₹196.0 lakh): ₹196.0 lakh is EAD × √[PD(1 − PD)] = 10 × 0.196 crore; it leaves out LGD, as if nothing would be recovered after default.
Check:
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| EAD × LGD = 10 × 45% | ₹4.50 crore |
| PD × (1 − PD) = 0.04 × 0.96 | 0.0384 |
| √0.0384 | ≈ 0.196 |
| UL = 4.50 × 0.196 | ≈ ₹0.882 crore (₹88.2 lakh) |
Expected loss for comparison: 4.50 × 0.04 = ₹0.18 crore (₹18 lakh).
Memory tip: EL = EAD × LGD × PD (priced and provided). UL = EAD × LGD × √[PD(1 − PD)] (covered by capital).
Answer: A — ₹88.2 lakh.
The idea: Expected loss (₹18 lakh) is the average cost the bank prices into the loan rate. Unexpected loss of about ₹88 lakh is the typical swing around that average in a bad year, and it is this swing that capital, not provisions, has to absorb.
- With fixed EAD and LGD and default as a yes/no event, unexpected loss UL = EAD × LGD × √[PD × (1 − PD)].
- PD × (1 − PD) = 0.04 × 0.96 = 0.0384.
- √0.0384 ≈ 0.196 (because 0.196 × 0.196 ≈ 0.0384).
- EAD × LGD = 10 × 0.45 = ₹4.5 crore.
- UL = 4.5 × 0.196 ≈ ₹0.882 crore = ₹88.2 lakh.
- Shortcut: for a small PD, √[PD(1 − PD)] is just under √PD (here 0.196 vs 0.20), so UL is a little below EAD × LGD × √PD.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (₹18.0 lakh): ₹18.0 lakh is the expected loss, EAD × LGD × PD = 10 × 0.45 × 0.04 crore; it is the average loss, not the standard deviation around it.
- C (₹17.3 lakh): ₹17.3 lakh is EAD × LGD × PD × (1 − PD) = 4.5 × 0.0384 crore: it forgets to take the square root, so it is a variance-type figure, not a standard deviation.
- D (₹90.0 lakh): ₹90.0 lakh is EAD × LGD × √PD = 4.5 × 0.20 crore; it drops the (1 − PD) term.
- E (₹196.0 lakh): ₹196.0 lakh is EAD × √[PD(1 − PD)] = 10 × 0.196 crore; it leaves out LGD, as if nothing would be recovered after default.
Check:
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| EAD × LGD = 10 × 45% | ₹4.50 crore |
| PD × (1 − PD) = 0.04 × 0.96 | 0.0384 |
| √0.0384 | ≈ 0.196 |
| UL = 4.50 × 0.196 | ≈ ₹0.882 crore (₹88.2 lakh) |
Expected loss for comparison: 4.50 × 0.04 = ₹0.18 crore (₹18 lakh).
Memory tip: EL = EAD × LGD × PD (priced and provided). UL = EAD × LGD × √[PD(1 − PD)] (covered by capital).
Show answer
Answer: E — Eligible Tier 1 capital.
The idea: The large-exposure limit is meant to make sure that the failure of one borrower cannot wipe out the bank’s going-concern capital. That is why it is measured against Tier 1 capital, the capital that absorbs losses while the bank keeps operating.
- RBI’s Large Exposures Framework (applicable from 1 April 2019) follows the Basel large exposures standard.
- The sum of all exposures to a single counterparty must not exceed 20% of the bank’s eligible capital base; the board may allow up to 25% in exceptional cases.
- For a group of connected counterparties the limit is 25%.
- The eligible capital base for these limits is the bank’s Tier 1 capital (CET1 plus AT1), not total capital.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Total capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2)): Total capital includes Tier 2 (gone-concern) instruments; the large-exposure framework moved away from this older base and uses Tier 1 only.
- B (CET1 capital alone): CET1 alone is too narrow; the eligible base is Tier 1, which also includes Additional Tier 1 capital.
- C (Total risk-weighted assets): Risk-weighted assets measure the bank’s risk, not its capital; a concentration limit is set as a share of capital.
- D (Net worth as per the last audited balance sheet): Accounting net worth is not the regulatory base; the limit uses Tier 1 capital as defined in the Basel III capital rules.
Memory tip: Large exposures: 20% single, 25% group — both measured on Tier 1.
Answer: E — Eligible Tier 1 capital.
The idea: The large-exposure limit is meant to make sure that the failure of one borrower cannot wipe out the bank’s going-concern capital. That is why it is measured against Tier 1 capital, the capital that absorbs losses while the bank keeps operating.
- RBI’s Large Exposures Framework (applicable from 1 April 2019) follows the Basel large exposures standard.
- The sum of all exposures to a single counterparty must not exceed 20% of the bank’s eligible capital base; the board may allow up to 25% in exceptional cases.
- For a group of connected counterparties the limit is 25%.
- The eligible capital base for these limits is the bank’s Tier 1 capital (CET1 plus AT1), not total capital.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Total capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2)): Total capital includes Tier 2 (gone-concern) instruments; the large-exposure framework moved away from this older base and uses Tier 1 only.
- B (CET1 capital alone): CET1 alone is too narrow; the eligible base is Tier 1, which also includes Additional Tier 1 capital.
- C (Total risk-weighted assets): Risk-weighted assets measure the bank’s risk, not its capital; a concentration limit is set as a share of capital.
- D (Net worth as per the last audited balance sheet): Accounting net worth is not the regulatory base; the limit uses Tier 1 capital as defined in the Basel III capital rules.
Memory tip: Large exposures: 20% single, 25% group — both measured on Tier 1.
Show answer
Answer: C — About ₹1.20 crore.
The idea: A loss of about ₹1.2 crore on a ₹50 crore book from a 0.40% yield move shows why treasury watches duration: each extra year of duration adds roughly 0.4% of value at risk for this size of rate move.
- First convert Macaulay duration to modified duration: modified duration = Macaulay duration ÷ (1 + yield).
- Modified duration = 6.5 ÷ 1.08 ≈ 6.02.
- Approximate price change = − modified duration × change in yield × market value.
- 40 bps = 0.40% = 0.004. So change = 6.02 × 0.004 × 50 = 0.02408 × 50 ≈ ₹1.20 crore (a fall, because yields rose).
- Shortcut: modified duration × yield change gives the % price change: 6.02 × 0.40% ≈ 2.41%, and 2.41% of ₹50 crore ≈ ₹1.20 crore.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (About ₹12.04 crore): ₹12.04 crore reads 40 bps as 4% (0.04) instead of 0.40%; it overstates the loss ten times.
- B (About ₹1.30 crore): ₹1.30 crore uses Macaulay duration 6.5 directly (50 × 6.5 × 0.004) without dividing by 1.08 to get modified duration.
- D (About ₹0.12 crore): ₹0.12 crore reads 40 bps as 0.04% (0.0004) instead of 0.40%; it understates the loss ten times.
- E (About ₹48.80 crore): ₹48.80 crore is the portfolio’s value after the fall (50 − 1.20), not the size of the fall.
Check:
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| Modified duration = 6.5 ÷ 1.08 | ≈ 6.02 |
| % price change = 6.02 × 0.40% | ≈ 2.41% |
| Fall in value = 2.41% × ₹50 crore | ≈ ₹1.20 crore |
Duration gives a first-order estimate; convexity makes the actual fall slightly smaller for a rise in yields.
Memory tip: Macaulay ÷ (1 + y) = modified. Modified × Δy = % price change. 100 bps = 1%.
Answer: C — About ₹1.20 crore.
The idea: A loss of about ₹1.2 crore on a ₹50 crore book from a 0.40% yield move shows why treasury watches duration: each extra year of duration adds roughly 0.4% of value at risk for this size of rate move.
- First convert Macaulay duration to modified duration: modified duration = Macaulay duration ÷ (1 + yield).
- Modified duration = 6.5 ÷ 1.08 ≈ 6.02.
- Approximate price change = − modified duration × change in yield × market value.
- 40 bps = 0.40% = 0.004. So change = 6.02 × 0.004 × 50 = 0.02408 × 50 ≈ ₹1.20 crore (a fall, because yields rose).
- Shortcut: modified duration × yield change gives the % price change: 6.02 × 0.40% ≈ 2.41%, and 2.41% of ₹50 crore ≈ ₹1.20 crore.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (About ₹12.04 crore): ₹12.04 crore reads 40 bps as 4% (0.04) instead of 0.40%; it overstates the loss ten times.
- B (About ₹1.30 crore): ₹1.30 crore uses Macaulay duration 6.5 directly (50 × 6.5 × 0.004) without dividing by 1.08 to get modified duration.
- D (About ₹0.12 crore): ₹0.12 crore reads 40 bps as 0.04% (0.0004) instead of 0.40%; it understates the loss ten times.
- E (About ₹48.80 crore): ₹48.80 crore is the portfolio’s value after the fall (50 − 1.20), not the size of the fall.
Check:
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| Modified duration = 6.5 ÷ 1.08 | ≈ 6.02 |
| % price change = 6.02 × 0.40% | ≈ 2.41% |
| Fall in value = 2.41% × ₹50 crore | ≈ ₹1.20 crore |
Duration gives a first-order estimate; convexity makes the actual fall slightly smaller for a rise in yields.
Memory tip: Macaulay ÷ (1 + y) = modified. Modified × Δy = % price change. 100 bps = 1%.
Show answer
Answer: A — Expected shortfall: the average loss on the days when losses exceed the VaR threshold.
The idea: VaR only tells you where the bad tail starts; it says nothing about how deep the tail goes. Expected shortfall averages the losses beyond that point, so the portfolio with ₹25 crore tail days shows a much bigger number.
- VaR at 97.5% is a cut-off: losses should exceed it on only 2.5% of days, but VaR does not measure how large those excess losses are.
- Expected shortfall (ES) is the average of the losses in that worst tail, given that the VaR level is breached.
- The Basel Committee’s revised market risk framework (FRTB) replaced 99% VaR with 97.5% expected shortfall for internal models to capture tail risk better.
- Here both portfolios have the same VaR, but the second has far larger tail losses, so its ES is clearly higher.
- ES is also subadditive (diversification never increases it), a property VaR does not always have.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (A higher-confidence VaR: the largest loss that could ever occur on the portfolio): Raising the VaR confidence level still gives a single cut-off point, and no VaR is the largest possible loss; it does not average the tail.
- C (Stressed VaR: the most likely loss on a normal trading day): Stressed VaR is VaR calibrated to a period of significant market stress; it is still a cut-off, and it is not the most likely loss on a normal day.
- D (Standard deviation of daily P&L: the average loss in the tail of the distribution): Standard deviation measures the spread of all daily P&L around the mean, gains and losses alike; it is not an average of tail losses.
- E (Marginal VaR: the total loss of the portfolio in a crisis scenario): Marginal VaR is the change in portfolio VaR from adding a little more of one position; it is not a crisis loss.
Memory tip: VaR = where the tail starts. Expected shortfall = how bad the tail is on average.
Answer: A — Expected shortfall: the average loss on the days when losses exceed the VaR threshold.
The idea: VaR only tells you where the bad tail starts; it says nothing about how deep the tail goes. Expected shortfall averages the losses beyond that point, so the portfolio with ₹25 crore tail days shows a much bigger number.
- VaR at 97.5% is a cut-off: losses should exceed it on only 2.5% of days, but VaR does not measure how large those excess losses are.
- Expected shortfall (ES) is the average of the losses in that worst tail, given that the VaR level is breached.
- The Basel Committee’s revised market risk framework (FRTB) replaced 99% VaR with 97.5% expected shortfall for internal models to capture tail risk better.
- Here both portfolios have the same VaR, but the second has far larger tail losses, so its ES is clearly higher.
- ES is also subadditive (diversification never increases it), a property VaR does not always have.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (A higher-confidence VaR: the largest loss that could ever occur on the portfolio): Raising the VaR confidence level still gives a single cut-off point, and no VaR is the largest possible loss; it does not average the tail.
- C (Stressed VaR: the most likely loss on a normal trading day): Stressed VaR is VaR calibrated to a period of significant market stress; it is still a cut-off, and it is not the most likely loss on a normal day.
- D (Standard deviation of daily P&L: the average loss in the tail of the distribution): Standard deviation measures the spread of all daily P&L around the mean, gains and losses alike; it is not an average of tail losses.
- E (Marginal VaR: the total loss of the portfolio in a crisis scenario): Marginal VaR is the change in portfolio VaR from adding a little more of one position; it is not a crisis loss.
Memory tip: VaR = where the tail starts. Expected shortfall = how bad the tail is on average.
Show answer
Answer: C — A size-based Business Indicator Component, adjusted by an Internal Loss Multiplier drawn from the lender’s own past loss data.
The idea: The new approach starts from the size of the bank’s business (a financial-statement measure called the Business Indicator) and then adjusts it up or down depending on how much the bank has actually lost to operational events in the past.
- Basel III (December 2017) replaced all earlier operational risk approaches (Basic Indicator, Standardised and AMA) with a single standardised approach.
- Business Indicator (BI): a proxy for business volume built from interest, leases and dividends, services, and financial components of the income statement.
- Business Indicator Component (BIC): BI multiplied by marginal coefficients (12%, 15%, 18%) that rise with the size of the BI.
- Internal Loss Multiplier (ILM): a factor based on the bank’s average annual operational losses over the past years relative to its BIC; supervisors may set ILM equal to 1.
- Operational risk capital = BIC × ILM.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Three-year average gross income times a flat alpha of 15%): 15% of average gross income is the old Basic Indicator Approach, the one the bank is moving away from.
- B (Each of eight business lines’ gross income times that line’s beta): Business-line gross income × beta is the old Basel II Standardised Approach, also replaced in 2017.
- D (A 99.9% one-year loss quantile from the lender’s own advanced model): Internal-model operational VaR at 99.9% was the Advanced Measurement Approach, which the finalised Basel III framework withdrew.
- E (Credit RWA times a flat percentage surcharge): Operational risk capital is not an add-on to credit RWA; it is calculated separately from the Business Indicator.
Memory tip: New op-risk SA = BIC × ILM: how big you are × how much you have lost.
Answer: C — A size-based Business Indicator Component, adjusted by an Internal Loss Multiplier drawn from the lender’s own past loss data.
The idea: The new approach starts from the size of the bank’s business (a financial-statement measure called the Business Indicator) and then adjusts it up or down depending on how much the bank has actually lost to operational events in the past.
- Basel III (December 2017) replaced all earlier operational risk approaches (Basic Indicator, Standardised and AMA) with a single standardised approach.
- Business Indicator (BI): a proxy for business volume built from interest, leases and dividends, services, and financial components of the income statement.
- Business Indicator Component (BIC): BI multiplied by marginal coefficients (12%, 15%, 18%) that rise with the size of the BI.
- Internal Loss Multiplier (ILM): a factor based on the bank’s average annual operational losses over the past years relative to its BIC; supervisors may set ILM equal to 1.
- Operational risk capital = BIC × ILM.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Three-year average gross income times a flat alpha of 15%): 15% of average gross income is the old Basic Indicator Approach, the one the bank is moving away from.
- B (Each of eight business lines’ gross income times that line’s beta): Business-line gross income × beta is the old Basel II Standardised Approach, also replaced in 2017.
- D (A 99.9% one-year loss quantile from the lender’s own advanced model): Internal-model operational VaR at 99.9% was the Advanced Measurement Approach, which the finalised Basel III framework withdrew.
- E (Credit RWA times a flat percentage surcharge): Operational risk capital is not an add-on to credit RWA; it is calculated separately from the Business Indicator.
Memory tip: New op-risk SA = BIC × ILM: how big you are × how much you have lost.
Show answer
Answer: D — 4.50%.
The idea: The leverage ratio is a simple backstop: it ignores risk weights and asks how much going-concern capital the bank holds for every rupee of total exposure. At 4.5% the bank holds ₹4.50 of Tier 1 capital per ₹100 of exposure.
- Leverage ratio = Tier 1 capital ÷ total exposure measure (not risk-weighted).
- Tier 1 = CET1 + AT1 = 4,000 + 1,400 = ₹5,400 crore. Tier 2 is left out.
- Leverage ratio = 5,400 ÷ 1,20,000 = 0.045 = 4.50%.
- Shortcut: 1% of ₹1,20,000 crore is ₹1,200 crore; 5,400 ÷ 1,200 = 4.5, so 4.5%.
- RBI’s minimum is 4% for D-SIBs and 3.5% for other banks, so this bank is above its minimum.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (5.50%): 5.50% divides total capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2 = ₹6,600 crore) by the exposure measure; Tier 2 does not count in the leverage ratio.
- B (7.50%): 7.50% is Tier 1 ÷ risk-weighted assets (5,400 ÷ 72,000), the Tier 1 capital ratio, not the leverage ratio.
- C (3.33%): 3.33% uses CET1 alone (4,000 ÷ 1,20,000); the numerator is the whole of Tier 1, including AT1.
- E (9.17%): 9.17% is total capital ÷ risk-weighted assets (6,600 ÷ 72,000), the capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR).
Check:
| Ratio | Working | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Leverage ratio | 5,400 ÷ 1,20,000 | 4.50% |
| Tier 1 capital ratio | 5,400 ÷ 72,000 | 7.50% |
| CRAR | 6,600 ÷ 72,000 | 9.17% |
Same capital, different denominators: exposure measure for leverage, RWA for capital ratios.
Memory tip: Leverage ratio = Tier 1 ÷ exposure (no risk weights). Minimum in India: 4% D-SIB, 3.5% others.
Answer: D — 4.50%.
The idea: The leverage ratio is a simple backstop: it ignores risk weights and asks how much going-concern capital the bank holds for every rupee of total exposure. At 4.5% the bank holds ₹4.50 of Tier 1 capital per ₹100 of exposure.
- Leverage ratio = Tier 1 capital ÷ total exposure measure (not risk-weighted).
- Tier 1 = CET1 + AT1 = 4,000 + 1,400 = ₹5,400 crore. Tier 2 is left out.
- Leverage ratio = 5,400 ÷ 1,20,000 = 0.045 = 4.50%.
- Shortcut: 1% of ₹1,20,000 crore is ₹1,200 crore; 5,400 ÷ 1,200 = 4.5, so 4.5%.
- RBI’s minimum is 4% for D-SIBs and 3.5% for other banks, so this bank is above its minimum.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (5.50%): 5.50% divides total capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2 = ₹6,600 crore) by the exposure measure; Tier 2 does not count in the leverage ratio.
- B (7.50%): 7.50% is Tier 1 ÷ risk-weighted assets (5,400 ÷ 72,000), the Tier 1 capital ratio, not the leverage ratio.
- C (3.33%): 3.33% uses CET1 alone (4,000 ÷ 1,20,000); the numerator is the whole of Tier 1, including AT1.
- E (9.17%): 9.17% is total capital ÷ risk-weighted assets (6,600 ÷ 72,000), the capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR).
Check:
| Ratio | Working | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Leverage ratio | 5,400 ÷ 1,20,000 | 4.50% |
| Tier 1 capital ratio | 5,400 ÷ 72,000 | 7.50% |
| CRAR | 6,600 ÷ 72,000 | 9.17% |
Same capital, different denominators: exposure measure for leverage, RWA for capital ratios.
Memory tip: Leverage ratio = Tier 1 ÷ exposure (no risk weights). Minimum in India: 4% D-SIB, 3.5% others.
Show answer
Answer: B — Pillar 2 — Supervisory review process.
The idea: Pillar 1 gives a formula-based minimum for credit, market and operational risk. Pillar 2 asks the bank to look at everything else it is exposed to, decide how much capital it really needs, and then lets the supervisor challenge that view.
- The bank’s own assessment is the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP).
- The supervisor’s review of the ICAAP is the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP).
- ICAAP + SREP together form Pillar 2 of the Basel framework.
- Pillar 2 covers risks not captured, or not fully captured, under Pillar 1 — for example concentration risk, IRRBB, liquidity, reputational and strategic risk.
- RBI requires banks to have a board-approved ICAAP and can set capital above the Pillar 1 minimum after SREP.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Pillar 1 — Minimum capital requirements): Pillar 1 sets the minimum capital for credit, market and operational risk by prescribed methods; it does not ask the bank for its own assessment of other risks.
- C (Pillar 3 — Market discipline): Pillar 3 is about public disclosure so that markets can judge the bank’s risk and capital; it is not a supervisory review of an internal capital plan.
- D (The leverage ratio backstop): The leverage ratio is a non-risk-based minimum (Tier 1 ÷ exposure); it is not a bank-wide internal assessment.
- E (The liquidity coverage ratio framework): The LCR is a liquidity standard requiring high-quality liquid assets for 30 days of stressed outflows; it is not a capital assessment.
Memory tip: ICAAP (bank) + SREP (supervisor) = Pillar 2.
Answer: B — Pillar 2 — Supervisory review process.
The idea: Pillar 1 gives a formula-based minimum for credit, market and operational risk. Pillar 2 asks the bank to look at everything else it is exposed to, decide how much capital it really needs, and then lets the supervisor challenge that view.
- The bank’s own assessment is the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP).
- The supervisor’s review of the ICAAP is the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP).
- ICAAP + SREP together form Pillar 2 of the Basel framework.
- Pillar 2 covers risks not captured, or not fully captured, under Pillar 1 — for example concentration risk, IRRBB, liquidity, reputational and strategic risk.
- RBI requires banks to have a board-approved ICAAP and can set capital above the Pillar 1 minimum after SREP.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Pillar 1 — Minimum capital requirements): Pillar 1 sets the minimum capital for credit, market and operational risk by prescribed methods; it does not ask the bank for its own assessment of other risks.
- C (Pillar 3 — Market discipline): Pillar 3 is about public disclosure so that markets can judge the bank’s risk and capital; it is not a supervisory review of an internal capital plan.
- D (The leverage ratio backstop): The leverage ratio is a non-risk-based minimum (Tier 1 ÷ exposure); it is not a bank-wide internal assessment.
- E (The liquidity coverage ratio framework): The LCR is a liquidity standard requiring high-quality liquid assets for 30 days of stressed outflows; it is not a capital assessment.
Memory tip: ICAAP (bank) + SREP (supervisor) = Pillar 2.
Show answer
Answer: D — Net stable funding ratio: available stable funding ÷ required stable funding, at least 100%.
The idea: Long loans funded by short wholesale money are a classic structural mismatch: the funding can disappear well before the loans repay. The NSFR checks whether stable funding over the next year is enough for the assets that need it.
- Basel III has two liquidity standards: the LCR (short-term, 30-day stress) and the NSFR (structural, one-year horizon).
- NSFR = available stable funding (ASF) ÷ required stable funding (RSF), and it must be at least 100%.
- ASF weights funding by how stable it is over one year (capital and long-term funding count fully; short-term wholesale funding counts little).
- RSF weights assets by how much stable funding they need (long-term loans need a lot).
- RBI’s NSFR guidelines came into effect from 1 October 2021.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Liquidity coverage ratio: high-quality liquid assets ÷ net cash outflows over 30 days, at least 100%): The LCR tests survival through a 30-day stress with liquid assets; the stem is about funding structure over one year.
- B (Leverage ratio: Tier 1 capital ÷ total exposure, at least 3.5%): The leverage ratio is a capital measure, not a liquidity ratio.
- C (Statutory liquidity ratio: approved securities as a share of NDTL, at the rate RBI prescribes): SLR is a statutory reserve requirement in India, not the Basel III structural funding ratio.
- E (Cash reserve ratio: balances with RBI as a share of NDTL, at the rate RBI prescribes): CRR is a reserve requirement with RBI; it does not measure the match between loan tenors and funding stability.
Memory tip: LCR = 30 days (survive). NSFR = 1 year (structure). Both ≥ 100%.
Answer: D — Net stable funding ratio: available stable funding ÷ required stable funding, at least 100%.
The idea: Long loans funded by short wholesale money are a classic structural mismatch: the funding can disappear well before the loans repay. The NSFR checks whether stable funding over the next year is enough for the assets that need it.
- Basel III has two liquidity standards: the LCR (short-term, 30-day stress) and the NSFR (structural, one-year horizon).
- NSFR = available stable funding (ASF) ÷ required stable funding (RSF), and it must be at least 100%.
- ASF weights funding by how stable it is over one year (capital and long-term funding count fully; short-term wholesale funding counts little).
- RSF weights assets by how much stable funding they need (long-term loans need a lot).
- RBI’s NSFR guidelines came into effect from 1 October 2021.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Liquidity coverage ratio: high-quality liquid assets ÷ net cash outflows over 30 days, at least 100%): The LCR tests survival through a 30-day stress with liquid assets; the stem is about funding structure over one year.
- B (Leverage ratio: Tier 1 capital ÷ total exposure, at least 3.5%): The leverage ratio is a capital measure, not a liquidity ratio.
- C (Statutory liquidity ratio: approved securities as a share of NDTL, at the rate RBI prescribes): SLR is a statutory reserve requirement in India, not the Basel III structural funding ratio.
- E (Cash reserve ratio: balances with RBI as a share of NDTL, at the rate RBI prescribes): CRR is a reserve requirement with RBI; it does not measure the match between loan tenors and funding stability.
Memory tip: LCR = 30 days (survive). NSFR = 1 year (structure). Both ≥ 100%.
Show answer
Answer: E — Wrong-way risk.
The idea: The same market move that makes the counterparty owe the bank more also makes that counterparty weaker. Exposure and default probability rise together, which is the worst combination for a lender.
- Counterparty credit risk on a derivative depends on the exposure (mark-to-market owed to the bank) and the counterparty’s chance of default.
- Wrong-way risk exists when exposure to a counterparty is positively correlated with that counterparty’s probability of default.
- Here a weaker rupee raises the bank’s claim and also worsens the unhedged company’s ability to pay.
- Banks control it by limits, collateral and careful pricing (credit valuation adjustment) on such trades.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Right-way risk): Right-way risk is the opposite case: exposure rises when the counterparty’s credit quality improves, for example when the counterparty is naturally hedged.
- B (Settlement (Herstatt) risk): Settlement (Herstatt) risk is the risk that one leg of an exchange is paid but the other is not, because of time-zone gaps; the stem is about mark-to-market exposure over the swap’s life.
- C (Basis risk): Basis risk is about two related rates or prices moving by different amounts; it says nothing about the link between exposure and default.
- D (Market liquidity risk): Market liquidity risk is the risk of not being able to exit a position at a fair price; the problem here is credit quality worsening as exposure grows.
Memory tip: Wrong-way: you are owed more exactly when they can pay less.
Answer: E — Wrong-way risk.
The idea: The same market move that makes the counterparty owe the bank more also makes that counterparty weaker. Exposure and default probability rise together, which is the worst combination for a lender.
- Counterparty credit risk on a derivative depends on the exposure (mark-to-market owed to the bank) and the counterparty’s chance of default.
- Wrong-way risk exists when exposure to a counterparty is positively correlated with that counterparty’s probability of default.
- Here a weaker rupee raises the bank’s claim and also worsens the unhedged company’s ability to pay.
- Banks control it by limits, collateral and careful pricing (credit valuation adjustment) on such trades.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Right-way risk): Right-way risk is the opposite case: exposure rises when the counterparty’s credit quality improves, for example when the counterparty is naturally hedged.
- B (Settlement (Herstatt) risk): Settlement (Herstatt) risk is the risk that one leg of an exchange is paid but the other is not, because of time-zone gaps; the stem is about mark-to-market exposure over the swap’s life.
- C (Basis risk): Basis risk is about two related rates or prices moving by different amounts; it says nothing about the link between exposure and default.
- D (Market liquidity risk): Market liquidity risk is the risk of not being able to exit a position at a fair price; the problem here is credit quality worsening as exposure grows.
Memory tip: Wrong-way: you are owed more exactly when they can pay less.
Topics covered today
- Module A — Risk and Risk Management Framework: ALM and interest rate risk in the banking book — Basis risk
- Module B — Credit Risk: Measurement of credit risk — Unexpected loss; Credit concentration risk — Large exposures framework
- Module C — Market Risk: Market risk — Modified duration and price sensitivity; Value at Risk — Expected shortfall
- Module D — Operational Risk: Operational risk — Basel III standardised approach
- Module E — Basel and RBI Guidelines on Risk Management: Basel III leverage ratio; Basel framework — Pillar 2 and ICAAP; Basel III liquidity standards — Net Stable Funding Ratio
- Module F — Derivatives and Risk Management: Counterparty credit risk — Wrong-way risk
Tomorrow’s post continues the series with another fresh set of 10 CAIIB Risk Management practice questions. Bookmark SimplifyingFin and revise one set a day.
Disclaimer: This quiz is an independent practice aid for educational purposes. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or published by IIBF. Always cross-check regulations and circulars from official RBI/IIBF sources before relying on any figure in an exam or at work.

