This CAIIB BRBL MCQ set is for bankers preparing for the IIBF CAIIB Banking Regulations and Business Laws paper. Attempt all 10 questions below—tap an option to see whether you are right, then read the short explanation. These are SimplifyingFin practice questions, not official IIBF questions.
Part of the CAIIB BRBL MCQ practice series. Previous: Day 1
CAIIB BRBL MCQ Day 2 quiz: 10 questions
Show answer
Answer: E — ₹150 crore.
The idea: The bank needs ₹3,330 crore of eligible liquid assets but holds ₹3,180 crore, so the treasury must add about ₹150 crore of eligible securities (or reduce liabilities) to be compliant.
- The statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) is maintained under section 24 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 as a percentage of NDTL.
- Required SLR assets = 18% × ₹18,500 crore = 0.18 × 18,500 = ₹3,330 crore.
- Hand check: 10% of 18,500 = 1,850; 8% = 1,480; total 1,850 + 1,480 = 3,330.
- Shortfall = Required − Held = 3,330 − 3,180 = ₹150 crore.
- Shortcut: holdings are 3,180 ÷ 18,500 ≈ 17.19% of NDTL, about 0.81 percentage point below 18%; 0.81% × 18,500 ≈ 150.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹3,330 crore): ₹3,330 crore is the full SLR requirement (18% of NDTL), not the gap still to be filled.
- B (₹4,220 crore): ₹4,220 crore is the gap if the 40% statutory ceiling were applied: 0.40 × 18,500 − 3,180. The exercise uses 18%.
- C (₹3,180 crore): ₹3,180 crore is what the bank already holds.
- D (₹15,320 crore): ₹15,320 crore is NDTL minus holdings (18,500 − 3,180), which has no SLR meaning.
Check:
| Item | ₹ crore |
|---|---|
| NDTL | 18,500 |
| Required at 18% | 3,330 |
| Held | 3,180 |
| Shortfall | 150 |
Memory tip: SLR gap = (SLR % × NDTL) − eligible holdings.
Answer: E — ₹150 crore.
The idea: The bank needs ₹3,330 crore of eligible liquid assets but holds ₹3,180 crore, so the treasury must add about ₹150 crore of eligible securities (or reduce liabilities) to be compliant.
- The statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) is maintained under section 24 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 as a percentage of NDTL.
- Required SLR assets = 18% × ₹18,500 crore = 0.18 × 18,500 = ₹3,330 crore.
- Hand check: 10% of 18,500 = 1,850; 8% = 1,480; total 1,850 + 1,480 = 3,330.
- Shortfall = Required − Held = 3,330 − 3,180 = ₹150 crore.
- Shortcut: holdings are 3,180 ÷ 18,500 ≈ 17.19% of NDTL, about 0.81 percentage point below 18%; 0.81% × 18,500 ≈ 150.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹3,330 crore): ₹3,330 crore is the full SLR requirement (18% of NDTL), not the gap still to be filled.
- B (₹4,220 crore): ₹4,220 crore is the gap if the 40% statutory ceiling were applied: 0.40 × 18,500 − 3,180. The exercise uses 18%.
- C (₹3,180 crore): ₹3,180 crore is what the bank already holds.
- D (₹15,320 crore): ₹15,320 crore is NDTL minus holdings (18,500 − 3,180), which has no SLR meaning.
Check:
| Item | ₹ crore |
|---|---|
| NDTL | 18,500 |
| Required at 18% | 3,330 |
| Held | 3,180 |
| Shortfall | 150 |
Memory tip: SLR gap = (SLR % × NDTL) − eligible holdings.
Show answer
Answer: A — It should decline: a banking company may not enter into any commitment to grant a loan or advance to, or on behalf of, any of its directors, subject only to the limited exclusions the Act and RBI allow..
The idea: To prevent insiders from using depositors’ money for themselves, the law bars a bank from lending to its own directors.
- Section 20(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 stops a banking company from entering into any commitment to grant a loan or advance to, or on behalf of, any of its directors.
- The ban also covers firms, companies and individuals in which a director is interested as partner, director, guarantor and so on, as set out in the section.
- The narrow exclusions RBI permits from the meaning of “loans and advances” (such as advances against government securities, life policies or fixed deposits) do not cover an unsecured personal loan.
- So the board cannot get around the ban by abstention, pricing or filings.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (It may sanction the loan if the director abstains from the board meeting that approves it.): Abstaining from the vote does not remove a statutory prohibition; it is a conflict-of-interest practice, not an exemption.
- C (It may lend freely because section 20 applies only to public sector banks.): Section 20 applies to banking companies generally, including private sector banks.
- D (It may lend as long as the interest rate is at least 1% above the bank’s base rate.): A higher interest rate does not convert a prohibited loan into a permitted one.
- E (It may lend after informing the Registrar of Companies within 30 days.): Filing with the Registrar of Companies concerns charges, not permission for a bank to lend to its director.
Memory tip: Bank money is not for the bank’s own directors — section 20.
Answer: A — It should decline: a banking company may not enter into any commitment to grant a loan or advance to, or on behalf of, any of its directors, subject only to the limited exclusions the Act and RBI allow..
The idea: To prevent insiders from using depositors’ money for themselves, the law bars a bank from lending to its own directors.
- Section 20(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 stops a banking company from entering into any commitment to grant a loan or advance to, or on behalf of, any of its directors.
- The ban also covers firms, companies and individuals in which a director is interested as partner, director, guarantor and so on, as set out in the section.
- The narrow exclusions RBI permits from the meaning of “loans and advances” (such as advances against government securities, life policies or fixed deposits) do not cover an unsecured personal loan.
- So the board cannot get around the ban by abstention, pricing or filings.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (It may sanction the loan if the director abstains from the board meeting that approves it.): Abstaining from the vote does not remove a statutory prohibition; it is a conflict-of-interest practice, not an exemption.
- C (It may lend freely because section 20 applies only to public sector banks.): Section 20 applies to banking companies generally, including private sector banks.
- D (It may lend as long as the interest rate is at least 1% above the bank’s base rate.): A higher interest rate does not convert a prohibited loan into a permitted one.
- E (It may lend after informing the Registrar of Companies within 30 days.): Filing with the Registrar of Companies concerns charges, not permission for a bank to lend to its director.
Memory tip: Bank money is not for the bank’s own directors — section 20.
Show answer
Answer: C — No person other than RBI may commence or operate a payment system except under an authorisation issued by RBI under the Act..
The idea: A payment system moves people’s money, so it needs the payment regulator’s permission before it starts, not just a company registration.
- Section 4(1) of the PSS Act, 2007: no person other than the Reserve Bank shall commence or operate a payment system except under an authorisation issued by RBI under the Act.
- Prepaid payment instruments and wallet networks are payment systems for this purpose.
- RBI is the designated authority for regulation and supervision of payment systems (sections 3 and 4).
- Therefore the start-up must obtain RBI authorisation before launch.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Registration with the Registrar of Companies alone is enough to run the system.): Incorporation gives the company legal existence; it does not authorise operating a payment system.
- B (Only the Ministry of Electronics and IT can authorise payment systems.): The Act names RBI as the authority; MeitY is not the authorising body for payment systems.
- D (Authorisation is needed only if the system handles cross-border payments.): The requirement applies to payment systems generally, domestic as well as cross-border.
- E (The company may start at once and apply to RBI within one year of operations.): The Act requires authorisation before a system commences, not a later application.
Memory tip: Payment system? RBI authorisation first, launch later.
Answer: C — No person other than RBI may commence or operate a payment system except under an authorisation issued by RBI under the Act..
The idea: A payment system moves people’s money, so it needs the payment regulator’s permission before it starts, not just a company registration.
- Section 4(1) of the PSS Act, 2007: no person other than the Reserve Bank shall commence or operate a payment system except under an authorisation issued by RBI under the Act.
- Prepaid payment instruments and wallet networks are payment systems for this purpose.
- RBI is the designated authority for regulation and supervision of payment systems (sections 3 and 4).
- Therefore the start-up must obtain RBI authorisation before launch.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Registration with the Registrar of Companies alone is enough to run the system.): Incorporation gives the company legal existence; it does not authorise operating a payment system.
- B (Only the Ministry of Electronics and IT can authorise payment systems.): The Act names RBI as the authority; MeitY is not the authorising body for payment systems.
- D (Authorisation is needed only if the system handles cross-border payments.): The requirement applies to payment systems generally, domestic as well as cross-border.
- E (The company may start at once and apply to RBI within one year of operations.): The Act requires authorisation before a system commences, not a later application.
Memory tip: Payment system? RBI authorisation first, launch later.
Show answer
Answer: B — For five years after the business relationship ended or the account was closed, whichever is later.
The idea: Investigators may come asking about a customer long after she leaves, so the identity file has to outlive the account.
- Section 12(1)(e) PMLA: reporting entities must keep records of documents evidencing the identity of clients and beneficial owners, account files and business correspondence.
- Section 12(4): these records must be kept for five years after the business relationship has ended or the account has been closed, whichever is later.
- Separately, section 12(3) requires transaction records to be kept for five years from the date of the transaction.
- So the identity file is kept for five years after the March closure.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Until the account is closed, after which they may be destroyed): Closing the account starts the five-year retention period; it does not end it.
- C (For eight years from the date the account was opened): Eight years from account opening is not the PMLA rule; the clock runs from the end of the relationship.
- D (For three years from the last transaction in the account): Three years from the last transaction is shorter than, and measured differently from, the statutory period.
- E (For ten years after the customer’s death): Ten years after death is not a PMLA period at all.
Memory tip: PMLA: five years — identity records from the end of the relationship, transaction records from the transaction date.
Answer: B — For five years after the business relationship ended or the account was closed, whichever is later.
The idea: Investigators may come asking about a customer long after she leaves, so the identity file has to outlive the account.
- Section 12(1)(e) PMLA: reporting entities must keep records of documents evidencing the identity of clients and beneficial owners, account files and business correspondence.
- Section 12(4): these records must be kept for five years after the business relationship has ended or the account has been closed, whichever is later.
- Separately, section 12(3) requires transaction records to be kept for five years from the date of the transaction.
- So the identity file is kept for five years after the March closure.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Until the account is closed, after which they may be destroyed): Closing the account starts the five-year retention period; it does not end it.
- C (For eight years from the date the account was opened): Eight years from account opening is not the PMLA rule; the clock runs from the end of the relationship.
- D (For three years from the last transaction in the account): Three years from the last transaction is shorter than, and measured differently from, the statutory period.
- E (For ten years after the customer’s death): Ten years after death is not a PMLA period at all.
Memory tip: PMLA: five years — identity records from the end of the relationship, transaction records from the transaction date.
Show answer
Answer: D — It may sue on the debt and keep the goods as collateral, or sell the goods after giving the pawnor reasonable notice of the sale..
The idea: A pledge gives the lender possession of the goods as security, and the law lets the lender realise them after fair warning.
- Section 172 defines a pledge as bailment of goods as security for payment of a debt; the bank is the pawnee.
- Section 176: if the pawnor defaults, the pawnee may sue on the debt and retain the goods as collateral security, or sell the goods after giving the pawnor reasonable notice of the sale.
- If the sale proceeds are less than the dues, the pawnor remains liable for the balance; any surplus must be paid to the pawnor.
- No court decree is needed, but reasonable notice is.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (It becomes the owner of the ornaments automatically on default without any notice.): A pawnee does not become owner on default; the pawnee’s right is to sell after notice.
- B (It may only keep the ornaments and can never sell them without a court decree.): Section 176 permits sale after reasonable notice without first obtaining a decree.
- C (It must return the ornaments once the loan becomes overdue for 90 days.): Overdue status does not oblige the pawnee to return the security while the debt is unpaid.
- E (It may sell the ornaments but must pay the whole sale price to the pawnor, even if the debt is not cleared.): The pawnee can apply the proceeds to the debt; only the surplus goes to the pawnor.
Memory tip: Pledge default: sue and hold, or notify and sell — section 176.
Answer: D — It may sue on the debt and keep the goods as collateral, or sell the goods after giving the pawnor reasonable notice of the sale..
The idea: A pledge gives the lender possession of the goods as security, and the law lets the lender realise them after fair warning.
- Section 172 defines a pledge as bailment of goods as security for payment of a debt; the bank is the pawnee.
- Section 176: if the pawnor defaults, the pawnee may sue on the debt and retain the goods as collateral security, or sell the goods after giving the pawnor reasonable notice of the sale.
- If the sale proceeds are less than the dues, the pawnor remains liable for the balance; any surplus must be paid to the pawnor.
- No court decree is needed, but reasonable notice is.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (It becomes the owner of the ornaments automatically on default without any notice.): A pawnee does not become owner on default; the pawnee’s right is to sell after notice.
- B (It may only keep the ornaments and can never sell them without a court decree.): Section 176 permits sale after reasonable notice without first obtaining a decree.
- C (It must return the ornaments once the loan becomes overdue for 90 days.): Overdue status does not oblige the pawnee to return the security while the debt is unpaid.
- E (It may sell the ornaments but must pay the whole sale price to the pawnor, even if the debt is not cleared.): The pawnee can apply the proceeds to the debt; only the surplus goes to the pawnor.
Memory tip: Pledge default: sue and hold, or notify and sell — section 176.
Show answer
Answer: B — Ravi sends a written demand within 30 days of learning of the bounce; the drawer has 15 days from getting that letter to pay; Ravi files within one month of the drawer’s failure.
The idea: Section 138 gives the drawer a last chance to pay before prosecution, and each step has its own clock.
- Proviso (b) to section 138: the payee must make a written demand for payment within 30 days of receiving information from the bank about the dishonour.
- Proviso (c): the offence is complete only if the drawer fails to pay within 15 days of receiving that notice.
- Section 142(1)(b): the complaint must be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises (that is, after the 15 days lapse).
- Courts may condone delay in filing the complaint for sufficient cause (proviso to section 142(1)(b)).
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Ravi writes within 15 days of the memo; the drawer has 30 days to settle; Ravi files within 3 months): This swaps the 30-day notice and 15-day payment windows and stretches the filing period to 3 months.
- C (Ravi may go straight to court, with no demand letter, any time within 6 months of the date on the instrument): A demand notice is a precondition to the offence; without it, section 138 cannot be invoked.
- D (Ravi writes within 90 days; the drawer has 7 days; Ravi files within one year): These periods are not found in section 138 or section 142.
- E (Ravi writes within 30 days; the drawer has 15 days; Ravi may file only after 3 years have passed): The complaint period is one month, not 3 years.
Check:
| Step | Time limit |
|---|---|
| Demand notice by payee | 30 days from information of dishonour |
| Payment by drawer | 15 days from receipt of notice |
| Complaint | 1 month from cause of action |
Memory tip: 30 → 15 → 1: notice in 30 days, pay in 15 days, file in 1 month.
Answer: B — Ravi sends a written demand within 30 days of learning of the bounce; the drawer has 15 days from getting that letter to pay; Ravi files within one month of the drawer’s failure.
The idea: Section 138 gives the drawer a last chance to pay before prosecution, and each step has its own clock.
- Proviso (b) to section 138: the payee must make a written demand for payment within 30 days of receiving information from the bank about the dishonour.
- Proviso (c): the offence is complete only if the drawer fails to pay within 15 days of receiving that notice.
- Section 142(1)(b): the complaint must be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises (that is, after the 15 days lapse).
- Courts may condone delay in filing the complaint for sufficient cause (proviso to section 142(1)(b)).
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Ravi writes within 15 days of the memo; the drawer has 30 days to settle; Ravi files within 3 months): This swaps the 30-day notice and 15-day payment windows and stretches the filing period to 3 months.
- C (Ravi may go straight to court, with no demand letter, any time within 6 months of the date on the instrument): A demand notice is a precondition to the offence; without it, section 138 cannot be invoked.
- D (Ravi writes within 90 days; the drawer has 7 days; Ravi files within one year): These periods are not found in section 138 or section 142.
- E (Ravi writes within 30 days; the drawer has 15 days; Ravi may file only after 3 years have passed): The complaint period is one month, not 3 years.
Check:
| Step | Time limit |
|---|---|
| Demand notice by payee | 30 days from information of dishonour |
| Payment by drawer | 15 days from receipt of notice |
| Complaint | 1 month from cause of action |
Memory tip: 30 → 15 → 1: notice in 30 days, pay in 15 days, file in 1 month.
Show answer
Answer: A — SARFAESI does not apply to security interest created in agricultural land, so the bank must use other recovery routes such as a civil suit, DRT (if eligible) or state recovery laws..
The idea: Parliament kept farmland outside the fast-track enforcement law, so a bank cannot use SARFAESI to take over agricultural land.
- Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 says the Act does not apply to any security interest created in agricultural land.
- This exclusion applies whatever the loan size or NPA age.
- The bank must therefore use other lawful remedies (civil suit, DRT where the debt qualifies, or state recovery legislation).
- The security interest itself remains valid; only the SARFAESI enforcement route is unavailable.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (SARFAESI applies to agricultural land only if the loan exceeds ₹1 lakh.): The section 31(i) exclusion has no loan-size condition.
- C (The bank may take possession under SARFAESI if the district collector consents.): No collector consent can override the statutory exclusion.
- D (SARFAESI applies only to agricultural land and not to urban property.): This reverses the position: SARFAESI covers non-agricultural secured assets and excludes agricultural land.
- E (The bank may enforce under SARFAESI once the account has been NPA for three years.): NPA age does not matter; the exclusion is absolute for security interest in agricultural land.
Memory tip: SARFAESI section 31(i): farmland is out of bounds.
Answer: A — SARFAESI does not apply to security interest created in agricultural land, so the bank must use other recovery routes such as a civil suit, DRT (if eligible) or state recovery laws..
The idea: Parliament kept farmland outside the fast-track enforcement law, so a bank cannot use SARFAESI to take over agricultural land.
- Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 says the Act does not apply to any security interest created in agricultural land.
- This exclusion applies whatever the loan size or NPA age.
- The bank must therefore use other lawful remedies (civil suit, DRT where the debt qualifies, or state recovery legislation).
- The security interest itself remains valid; only the SARFAESI enforcement route is unavailable.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (SARFAESI applies to agricultural land only if the loan exceeds ₹1 lakh.): The section 31(i) exclusion has no loan-size condition.
- C (The bank may take possession under SARFAESI if the district collector consents.): No collector consent can override the statutory exclusion.
- D (SARFAESI applies only to agricultural land and not to urban property.): This reverses the position: SARFAESI covers non-agricultural secured assets and excludes agricultural land.
- E (The bank may enforce under SARFAESI once the account has been NPA for three years.): NPA age does not matter; the exclusion is absolute for security interest in agricultural land.
Memory tip: SARFAESI section 31(i): farmland is out of bounds.
Show answer
Answer: E — The officer is not compellable to produce the books in such a case unless the court orders it for special cause; a certified copy of the entry is received as prima facie evidence..
The idea: Banks should not have to carry original ledgers into every private dispute, so the law accepts certified copies instead.
- Section 4: a certified copy of an entry in a banker’s book is received in all legal proceedings as prima facie evidence of the entry and of the matters recorded.
- Section 5: in a legal proceeding to which the bank is not a party, no bank officer is compellable to produce the books or appear as a witness to prove the entries, unless the court or a judge orders it for special cause.
- Here the bank is not a party, so the brother should ask for a certified copy, or seek a court order for special cause.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (The manager must always produce the original ledger whenever any party summons it.): Section 5 protects the officer from routine compulsion where the bank is not a party.
- B (Bank records can never be used as evidence in a case to which the bank is not a party.): Bank records are admissible through certified copies under section 4.
- C (Only the RBI can permit the production of bank records in court.): The court, not RBI, decides whether special cause exists.
- D (Entries in bankers’ books can be proved only by oral evidence of the customer.): The Act provides proof by certified copies; customer testimony is not the only route.
Memory tip: Bank not a party? Certified copy (section 4), not the ledger (section 5).
Answer: E — The officer is not compellable to produce the books in such a case unless the court orders it for special cause; a certified copy of the entry is received as prima facie evidence..
The idea: Banks should not have to carry original ledgers into every private dispute, so the law accepts certified copies instead.
- Section 4: a certified copy of an entry in a banker’s book is received in all legal proceedings as prima facie evidence of the entry and of the matters recorded.
- Section 5: in a legal proceeding to which the bank is not a party, no bank officer is compellable to produce the books or appear as a witness to prove the entries, unless the court or a judge orders it for special cause.
- Here the bank is not a party, so the brother should ask for a certified copy, or seek a court order for special cause.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (The manager must always produce the original ledger whenever any party summons it.): Section 5 protects the officer from routine compulsion where the bank is not a party.
- B (Bank records can never be used as evidence in a case to which the bank is not a party.): Bank records are admissible through certified copies under section 4.
- C (Only the RBI can permit the production of bank records in court.): The court, not RBI, decides whether special cause exists.
- D (Entries in bankers’ books can be proved only by oral evidence of the customer.): The Act provides proof by certified copies; customer testimony is not the only route.
Memory tip: Bank not a party? Certified copy (section 4), not the ledger (section 5).
Show answer
Answer: C — Yes, because a written promise signed by the debtor to pay a time-barred debt, wholly or in part, is a valid exception to the rule that an agreement without consideration is void..
The idea: Normally a promise needs something in return, but the law makes a few exceptions, one of them a signed written promise to pay an old, time-barred debt.
- Section 25 says an agreement made without consideration is void, except in the listed cases.
- Section 25(3): a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged (or his authorised agent), to pay wholly or in part a debt that the creditor could have enforced but for the law of limitation, is valid.
- The letter is written, signed and covers part of a time-barred debt, so it fits section 25(3).
- Contrast this with section 18 of the Limitation Act, where an acknowledgment must be made before the limitation period expires.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (No, because an agreement without consideration is always void.): Section 25 itself lists exceptions; the time-barred debt promise is one of them.
- B (No, because a time-barred debt can never be revived.): Section 25(3) allows a fresh, enforceable promise even after limitation has expired.
- D (Yes, but only if the promise is registered with the sub-registrar.): Registration is required for the natural-love-and-affection exception (section 25(1)), not for a promise to pay a time-barred debt.
- E (Yes, but only if the promise is made orally before two witnesses.): The exception needs a written and signed promise; an oral promise does not qualify.
Memory tip: Time-barred debt + written signed promise = enforceable (section 25(3)).
Answer: C — Yes, because a written promise signed by the debtor to pay a time-barred debt, wholly or in part, is a valid exception to the rule that an agreement without consideration is void..
The idea: Normally a promise needs something in return, but the law makes a few exceptions, one of them a signed written promise to pay an old, time-barred debt.
- Section 25 says an agreement made without consideration is void, except in the listed cases.
- Section 25(3): a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged (or his authorised agent), to pay wholly or in part a debt that the creditor could have enforced but for the law of limitation, is valid.
- The letter is written, signed and covers part of a time-barred debt, so it fits section 25(3).
- Contrast this with section 18 of the Limitation Act, where an acknowledgment must be made before the limitation period expires.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (No, because an agreement without consideration is always void.): Section 25 itself lists exceptions; the time-barred debt promise is one of them.
- B (No, because a time-barred debt can never be revived.): Section 25(3) allows a fresh, enforceable promise even after limitation has expired.
- D (Yes, but only if the promise is registered with the sub-registrar.): Registration is required for the natural-love-and-affection exception (section 25(1)), not for a promise to pay a time-barred debt.
- E (Yes, but only if the promise is made orally before two witnesses.): The exception needs a written and signed promise; an oral promise does not qualify.
Memory tip: Time-barred debt + written signed promise = enforceable (section 25(3)).
Show answer
Answer: D — His implied authority does not extend to opening a bank account on behalf of the firm in his own name; the bank should seek authority from all partners or the deed..
The idea: A partner can bind the firm in ordinary business, but some acts are too risky to rest on implied authority, and one of them is putting firm money in an account in his own name.
- Section 19(1): an act of a partner done to carry on, in the usual way, business of the kind carried on by the firm binds the firm (implied authority).
- Section 19(2)(b): in the absence of usage or custom of trade to the contrary, implied authority does not empower a partner to open a banking account on behalf of the firm in his own name.
- Partners may extend authority by contract (section 20), but the deed here is silent.
- Bank practice: open a firm account in the firm’s name with a mandate signed by all partners.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Every partner’s implied authority covers opening any account in any name for the firm.): Section 19(2)(b) specifically excludes this act from implied authority.
- B (He may open it if the firm is registered, irrespective of the deed.): Registration of the firm does not widen a partner’s implied authority.
- C (He may open it only if he holds the largest capital share.): Size of capital share does not create additional implied authority.
- E (He may open it, but only the firm’s auditors can operate it.): Auditors have no role in operating a firm’s bank account; the issue is the partner’s authority.
Memory tip: Section 19(2): no arbitration, no own-name account, no compromise, and no buying or selling of immovable property on implied authority.
Answer: D — His implied authority does not extend to opening a bank account on behalf of the firm in his own name; the bank should seek authority from all partners or the deed..
The idea: A partner can bind the firm in ordinary business, but some acts are too risky to rest on implied authority, and one of them is putting firm money in an account in his own name.
- Section 19(1): an act of a partner done to carry on, in the usual way, business of the kind carried on by the firm binds the firm (implied authority).
- Section 19(2)(b): in the absence of usage or custom of trade to the contrary, implied authority does not empower a partner to open a banking account on behalf of the firm in his own name.
- Partners may extend authority by contract (section 20), but the deed here is silent.
- Bank practice: open a firm account in the firm’s name with a mandate signed by all partners.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Every partner’s implied authority covers opening any account in any name for the firm.): Section 19(2)(b) specifically excludes this act from implied authority.
- B (He may open it if the firm is registered, irrespective of the deed.): Registration of the firm does not widen a partner’s implied authority.
- C (He may open it only if he holds the largest capital share.): Size of capital share does not create additional implied authority.
- E (He may open it, but only the firm’s auditors can operate it.): Auditors have no role in operating a firm’s bank account; the issue is the partner’s authority.
Memory tip: Section 19(2): no arbitration, no own-name account, no compromise, and no buying or selling of immovable property on implied authority.
Topics covered today
- Module A — Regulations and Compliance: Reserve Requirements — SLR; Banking Regulation Act — Loans to directors
- Module B — Important Acts/Laws & Legal Aspects of Banking Operations – Part A: Payment & Settlement Systems Act — Authorisation; PMLA — Record retention; Pledge — Pawnee’s right of sale; Negotiable Instruments Act — Dishonour timeline
- Module C — Important Acts/Laws & Legal Aspects of Banking Operations – Part B: SARFAESI — Non-applicability; Bankers’ Books Evidence Act — Production of books
- Module D — Commercial & Other Laws with Reference to Banking Operations: Contract Act — Consideration exceptions; Partnership — Implied authority
Tomorrow’s post continues the series with another fresh set of 10 CAIIB Banking Regulations and Business Laws practice questions. Bookmark SimplifyingFin and revise one set a day.
Disclaimer: This quiz is an independent practice aid for educational purposes. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or published by IIBF. Always cross-check regulations and circulars from official RBI/IIBF sources before relying on any figure in an exam or at work.

