This CAIIB Risk Management MCQ set is for bankers preparing for the IIBF CAIIB Risk Management paper. Attempt all 10 questions below—tap an option to see whether you are right, then read the short explanation. These are SimplifyingFin practice questions, not official IIBF questions.
Part of the CAIIB Risk Management MCQ practice series. Previous: Day 4
CAIIB Risk Management MCQ Day 5 quiz: 10 questions
Show answer
Answer: B — A fall of ₹1 crore.
The idea: More liabilities than assets reprice in the year, so when rates go up the bank’s interest cost rises faster than its interest income. A negative gap is a bet that rates will fall; a rise hurts earnings.
- Repricing gap = rate-sensitive assets (RSA) − rate-sensitive liabilities (RSL).
- Gap = 800 − 1,000 = −₹200 crore (a negative, liability-sensitive gap).
- Change in NII ≈ gap × change in rate.
- Change in NII ≈ −200 × 0.50% = −200 × 0.005 = −₹1 crore.
- So NII falls by about ₹1 crore for the year.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (An increase of ₹1 crore): +₹1 crore has the right size but the wrong sign: with a negative gap, a rate rise reduces NII.
- C (A fall of ₹10 crore): −₹10 crore is −200 × 5%: it reads 50 basis points as 5% instead of 0.50%.
- D (A fall of ₹5 crore): −₹5 crore is 1,000 × 0.50%: it counts only the extra cost on liabilities and ignores the extra income on the ₹800 crore of assets.
- E (An increase of ₹4 crore): +₹4 crore is 800 × 0.50%: it counts only the extra income on assets and ignores the higher cost of liabilities.
Check:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| RSA | ₹800 crore |
| RSL | ₹1,000 crore |
| Gap = RSA − RSL | −₹200 crore |
| ΔNII = −200 × 0.005 | −₹1 crore |
Extra income 800 × 0.5% = ₹4 crore; extra cost 1,000 × 0.5% = ₹5 crore; net −₹1 crore.
Memory tip: Negative gap + rates up = NII down. Positive gap + rates up = NII up.
Answer: B — A fall of ₹1 crore.
The idea: More liabilities than assets reprice in the year, so when rates go up the bank’s interest cost rises faster than its interest income. A negative gap is a bet that rates will fall; a rise hurts earnings.
- Repricing gap = rate-sensitive assets (RSA) − rate-sensitive liabilities (RSL).
- Gap = 800 − 1,000 = −₹200 crore (a negative, liability-sensitive gap).
- Change in NII ≈ gap × change in rate.
- Change in NII ≈ −200 × 0.50% = −200 × 0.005 = −₹1 crore.
- So NII falls by about ₹1 crore for the year.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (An increase of ₹1 crore): +₹1 crore has the right size but the wrong sign: with a negative gap, a rate rise reduces NII.
- C (A fall of ₹10 crore): −₹10 crore is −200 × 5%: it reads 50 basis points as 5% instead of 0.50%.
- D (A fall of ₹5 crore): −₹5 crore is 1,000 × 0.50%: it counts only the extra cost on liabilities and ignores the extra income on the ₹800 crore of assets.
- E (An increase of ₹4 crore): +₹4 crore is 800 × 0.50%: it counts only the extra income on assets and ignores the higher cost of liabilities.
Check:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| RSA | ₹800 crore |
| RSL | ₹1,000 crore |
| Gap = RSA − RSL | −₹200 crore |
| ΔNII = −200 × 0.005 | −₹1 crore |
Extra income 800 × 0.5% = ₹4 crore; extra cost 1,000 × 0.5% = ₹5 crore; net −₹1 crore.
Memory tip: Negative gap + rates up = NII down. Positive gap + rates up = NII up.
Show answer
Answer: D — 46.28%.
The idea: ₹70 lakh received two years later, after paying ₹5 lakh to get it, is worth much less than ₹70 lakh today. Economic LGD counts both the recovery costs and the time value of money, so it is higher than the simple ‘30% shortfall’.
- Net recovery at year 2 = 70 − 5 = ₹65 lakh.
- Present value of net recovery = 65 ÷ (1.10)² = 65 ÷ 1.21 = ₹53.72 lakh.
- Recovery rate (economic) = 53.72 ÷ 100 = 53.72%.
- Economic LGD = 1 − recovery rate = 100% − 53.72% = 46.28%.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (30.00%): 30.00% is 1 − 70/100: it ignores both the ₹5 lakh costs and the two-year delay.
- B (35.00%): 35.00% is 1 − 65/100: it deducts the costs but does not discount the recovery for two years.
- C (42.15%): 42.15% is 1 − (70 ÷ 1.21)/100: it discounts the recovery but forgets the ₹5 lakh recovery costs.
- E (53.72%): 53.72% is the present value of the net recovery as a share of EAD, i.e. the recovery rate, not the loss rate.
Check:
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| Net recovery 70 − 5 | ₹65 lakh |
| Discount factor 1.10² | 1.21 |
| PV 65 ÷ 1.21 | ₹53.72 lakh |
| LGD 1 − 0.5372 | 46.28% |
Memory tip: Economic LGD = 1 − PV(recoveries − costs) ÷ EAD. Late, costly recoveries push LGD up.
Answer: D — 46.28%.
The idea: ₹70 lakh received two years later, after paying ₹5 lakh to get it, is worth much less than ₹70 lakh today. Economic LGD counts both the recovery costs and the time value of money, so it is higher than the simple ‘30% shortfall’.
- Net recovery at year 2 = 70 − 5 = ₹65 lakh.
- Present value of net recovery = 65 ÷ (1.10)² = 65 ÷ 1.21 = ₹53.72 lakh.
- Recovery rate (economic) = 53.72 ÷ 100 = 53.72%.
- Economic LGD = 1 − recovery rate = 100% − 53.72% = 46.28%.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (30.00%): 30.00% is 1 − 70/100: it ignores both the ₹5 lakh costs and the two-year delay.
- B (35.00%): 35.00% is 1 − 65/100: it deducts the costs but does not discount the recovery for two years.
- C (42.15%): 42.15% is 1 − (70 ÷ 1.21)/100: it discounts the recovery but forgets the ₹5 lakh recovery costs.
- E (53.72%): 53.72% is the present value of the net recovery as a share of EAD, i.e. the recovery rate, not the loss rate.
Check:
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| Net recovery 70 − 5 | ₹65 lakh |
| Discount factor 1.10² | 1.21 |
| PV 65 ÷ 1.21 | ₹53.72 lakh |
| LGD 1 − 0.5372 | 46.28% |
Memory tip: Economic LGD = 1 − PV(recoveries − costs) ÷ EAD. Late, costly recoveries push LGD up.
Show answer
Answer: A — Through-the-cycle (TTC) rating.
The idea: A TTC rating looks past the current boom or slump and asks how the borrower would cope over a whole cycle, so grades move slowly. A PIT rating reacts to today’s conditions, so grades move up and down with the economy.
- Point-in-time ratings estimate default risk over the next year using current conditions; they rise and fall with the cycle.
- Through-the-cycle ratings estimate default risk over a full business cycle, including a downturn; they stay fairly stable.
- The stem says grades barely moved in a temporary slowdown because the model looks over a full cycle → TTC.
- TTC ratings reduce swings in capital (less procyclical); PIT ratings give earlier warning of deterioration.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Point-in-time (PIT) rating): A PIT rating would have downgraded the steel companies during the slowdown because it is based on current conditions.
- C (Behavioural scoring): Behavioural scoring uses the borrower’s account conduct (for example, overdrawing, late payments); it is mainly for retail portfolios, not a cycle philosophy.
- D (Mark-to-market rating): Mark-to-market refers to valuing positions at current market prices, not to a rating philosophy.
- E (Shadow rating): A shadow rating is an internal estimate of what an agency rating would be; the stem describes how the rating treats the cycle.
Memory tip: TTC = steady through the cycle. PIT = moves with today’s economy.
Answer: A — Through-the-cycle (TTC) rating.
The idea: A TTC rating looks past the current boom or slump and asks how the borrower would cope over a whole cycle, so grades move slowly. A PIT rating reacts to today’s conditions, so grades move up and down with the economy.
- Point-in-time ratings estimate default risk over the next year using current conditions; they rise and fall with the cycle.
- Through-the-cycle ratings estimate default risk over a full business cycle, including a downturn; they stay fairly stable.
- The stem says grades barely moved in a temporary slowdown because the model looks over a full cycle → TTC.
- TTC ratings reduce swings in capital (less procyclical); PIT ratings give earlier warning of deterioration.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Point-in-time (PIT) rating): A PIT rating would have downgraded the steel companies during the slowdown because it is based on current conditions.
- C (Behavioural scoring): Behavioural scoring uses the borrower’s account conduct (for example, overdrawing, late payments); it is mainly for retail portfolios, not a cycle philosophy.
- D (Mark-to-market rating): Mark-to-market refers to valuing positions at current market prices, not to a rating philosophy.
- E (Shadow rating): A shadow rating is an internal estimate of what an agency rating would be; the stem describes how the rating treats the cycle.
Memory tip: TTC = steady through the cycle. PIT = moves with today’s economy.
Show answer
Answer: C — It makes no assumption about the shape of the return distribution, but depends on the chosen past window.
The idea: Historical simulation simply replays the past on today’s positions. Whatever happened in the window, including fat tails, is captured; whatever did not happen in the window is missed.
- Method described: revalue today’s portfolio under each of the last 500 days’ actual market moves.
- Rank the 500 profit-and-loss outcomes; the 99% VaR is the loss at the 1% tail (around the 5th worst).
- No normal distribution or correlation matrix is assumed; actual past co-movements are used directly.
- Weakness: results depend on the look-back window; a calm window can understate risk.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (It assumes portfolio returns follow a normal distribution): Assuming normal returns is a feature of the parametric (variance-covariance) method, not historical simulation.
- B (It needs a variance-covariance matrix of all risk factors): A variance-covariance matrix is the input to the parametric method; historical simulation uses actual past moves.
- D (It generates thousands of random scenarios from an assumed model): Generating random scenarios from an assumed model is Monte Carlo simulation.
- E (It ignores fat tails present in the historical data): Because it uses real past data, historical simulation captures any fat tails that occurred in the window.
Memory tip: Parametric = formula + normal; Historical = replay the past; Monte Carlo = random scenarios from a model.
Answer: C — It makes no assumption about the shape of the return distribution, but depends on the chosen past window.
The idea: Historical simulation simply replays the past on today’s positions. Whatever happened in the window, including fat tails, is captured; whatever did not happen in the window is missed.
- Method described: revalue today’s portfolio under each of the last 500 days’ actual market moves.
- Rank the 500 profit-and-loss outcomes; the 99% VaR is the loss at the 1% tail (around the 5th worst).
- No normal distribution or correlation matrix is assumed; actual past co-movements are used directly.
- Weakness: results depend on the look-back window; a calm window can understate risk.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (It assumes portfolio returns follow a normal distribution): Assuming normal returns is a feature of the parametric (variance-covariance) method, not historical simulation.
- B (It needs a variance-covariance matrix of all risk factors): A variance-covariance matrix is the input to the parametric method; historical simulation uses actual past moves.
- D (It generates thousands of random scenarios from an assumed model): Generating random scenarios from an assumed model is Monte Carlo simulation.
- E (It ignores fat tails present in the historical data): Because it uses real past data, historical simulation captures any fat tails that occurred in the window.
Memory tip: Parametric = formula + normal; Historical = replay the past; Monte Carlo = random scenarios from a model.
Show answer
Answer: E — ₹3.00 crore.
The idea: A beta above 1 means the portfolio tends to move more than the market. With beta 1.2, a 5% market fall is expected to pull the portfolio down by about 6%.
- Expected portfolio return = beta × market return.
- Expected portfolio fall = 1.2 × 5% = 6%.
- Expected loss = ₹50 crore × 6% = ₹3.00 crore.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹2.50 crore): ₹2.50 crore is 50 × 5%: it ignores beta and assumes the portfolio moves exactly with the index.
- B (₹2.08 crore): ₹2.08 crore is 50 × 5% ÷ 1.2: it divides by beta instead of multiplying.
- C (₹0.60 crore): ₹0.60 crore is 50 × 1.2%: it treats beta itself as the percentage fall and ignores the 5% index move.
- D (₹6.00 crore): ₹6.00 crore is 50 × 1.2 × 10%: it doubles the 5% index fall.
Memory tip: Portfolio move ≈ beta × market move. Beta 1.2 → 20% bigger swings than the index.
Answer: E — ₹3.00 crore.
The idea: A beta above 1 means the portfolio tends to move more than the market. With beta 1.2, a 5% market fall is expected to pull the portfolio down by about 6%.
- Expected portfolio return = beta × market return.
- Expected portfolio fall = 1.2 × 5% = 6%.
- Expected loss = ₹50 crore × 6% = ₹3.00 crore.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹2.50 crore): ₹2.50 crore is 50 × 5%: it ignores beta and assumes the portfolio moves exactly with the index.
- B (₹2.08 crore): ₹2.08 crore is 50 × 5% ÷ 1.2: it divides by beta instead of multiplying.
- C (₹0.60 crore): ₹0.60 crore is 50 × 1.2%: it treats beta itself as the percentage fall and ignores the 5% index move.
- D (₹6.00 crore): ₹6.00 crore is 50 × 1.2 × 10%: it doubles the 5% index fall.
Memory tip: Portfolio move ≈ beta × market move. Beta 1.2 → 20% bigger swings than the index.
Show answer
Answer: A — Recovery Time Objective (RTO).
The idea: The plan is fixing how long the service may stay down before it must be restored. That is a time-to-restore target, which is the RTO.
- Business continuity planning sets targets for restoring critical services after a disruption.
- Recovery Time Objective (RTO) = the maximum acceptable time to restore a process or system after an outage.
- Recovery Point Objective (RPO) = the maximum acceptable data loss, measured as time since the last good backup.
- ‘Running again within 2 hours’ is a restore-time target → RTO.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Recovery Point Objective (RPO)): RPO is about how much data (in time) may be lost, for example ‘no more than 15 minutes of transactions’; the stem is about downtime.
- C (Mean time between failures): Mean time between failures measures how often a system fails, not how fast it must be restored.
- D (Risk appetite limit): A risk appetite limit is a board-approved level of risk the bank will accept, not a recovery target for one system.
- E (Key risk indicator threshold): A KRI threshold is a trigger level on a risk metric; the stem sets a recovery time.
Memory tip: RTO = how long down. RPO = how much data lost.
Answer: A — Recovery Time Objective (RTO).
The idea: The plan is fixing how long the service may stay down before it must be restored. That is a time-to-restore target, which is the RTO.
- Business continuity planning sets targets for restoring critical services after a disruption.
- Recovery Time Objective (RTO) = the maximum acceptable time to restore a process or system after an outage.
- Recovery Point Objective (RPO) = the maximum acceptable data loss, measured as time since the last good backup.
- ‘Running again within 2 hours’ is a restore-time target → RTO.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Recovery Point Objective (RPO)): RPO is about how much data (in time) may be lost, for example ‘no more than 15 minutes of transactions’; the stem is about downtime.
- C (Mean time between failures): Mean time between failures measures how often a system fails, not how fast it must be restored.
- D (Risk appetite limit): A risk appetite limit is a board-approved level of risk the bank will accept, not a recovery target for one system.
- E (Key risk indicator threshold): A KRI threshold is a trigger level on a risk metric; the stem sets a recovery time.
Memory tip: RTO = how long down. RPO = how much data lost.
Show answer
Answer: B — No, outsourcing does not reduce the bank’s responsibility to its customers and the regulator for the outsourced activity.
The idea: A bank can hand over the work but not the accountability. Customers deal with the bank’s name, so the bank must choose, monitor and control its service providers and answer for their conduct.
- RBI’s outsourcing guidelines state that outsourcing does not diminish the bank’s obligations or those of its board and senior management.
- The bank remains responsible for the actions of its service provider, including recovery agents, towards customers and the regulator.
- It must do due diligence, put controls in the contract, monitor conduct and have a grievance redress mechanism.
- Harassment by recovery agents is treated as the bank’s conduct problem, so the bank’s reply is wrong.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Yes, because the service-level agreement transfers all liability to the agency): A contract can let the bank claim compensation from the agency, but it cannot transfer the bank’s responsibility to customers and the regulator.
- C (Yes, if the agency is registered with the police): Police verification of agents is a good practice, but it does not shift responsibility away from the bank.
- D (No, but only the agency’s staff can be penalised): The bank itself can face regulatory action for its agents’ conduct, not only the agency’s staff.
- E (Yes, because recovery is not a banking activity): Recovery of the bank’s own loans is part of its business; outsourcing it does not take it outside the bank’s responsibility.
Memory tip: Outsource the task, never the accountability.
Answer: B — No, outsourcing does not reduce the bank’s responsibility to its customers and the regulator for the outsourced activity.
The idea: A bank can hand over the work but not the accountability. Customers deal with the bank’s name, so the bank must choose, monitor and control its service providers and answer for their conduct.
- RBI’s outsourcing guidelines state that outsourcing does not diminish the bank’s obligations or those of its board and senior management.
- The bank remains responsible for the actions of its service provider, including recovery agents, towards customers and the regulator.
- It must do due diligence, put controls in the contract, monitor conduct and have a grievance redress mechanism.
- Harassment by recovery agents is treated as the bank’s conduct problem, so the bank’s reply is wrong.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Yes, because the service-level agreement transfers all liability to the agency): A contract can let the bank claim compensation from the agency, but it cannot transfer the bank’s responsibility to customers and the regulator.
- C (Yes, if the agency is registered with the police): Police verification of agents is a good practice, but it does not shift responsibility away from the bank.
- D (No, but only the agency’s staff can be penalised): The bank itself can face regulatory action for its agents’ conduct, not only the agency’s staff.
- E (Yes, because recovery is not a banking activity): Recovery of the bank’s own loans is part of its business; outsourcing it does not take it outside the bank’s responsibility.
Memory tip: Outsource the task, never the accountability.
Show answer
Answer: E — Perpetual non-cumulative preference shares (PNCPS).
The idea: CET1 is the purest loss-absorbing capital: common shares and the reserves built from profits. Preference shares are not common equity, but if they are perpetual and their dividend can be skipped without building arrears, they can count as AT1.
- CET1 includes common shares, share premium on them, statutory reserves, other disclosed free reserves and retained earnings, less regulatory adjustments.
- AT1 includes perpetual non-cumulative preference shares (PNCPS) and perpetual debt instruments that meet RBI’s criteria.
- ‘Non-cumulative’ means skipped dividends are not owed later; ‘perpetual’ means no maturity — both needed for going-concern loss absorption.
- Of the items listed, only PNCPS is AT1.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Paid-up equity shares): Paid-up equity shares are the core of CET1.
- B (Statutory reserves): Statutory reserves are part of CET1.
- C (Share premium on equity shares): Share premium arising on issue of common shares is part of CET1.
- D (Balance in the profit and loss account): The balance in the profit and loss account (retained earnings) is part of CET1.
Memory tip: Common shares + reserves = CET1. Perpetual + non-cumulative instruments = AT1. Dated/subordinated debt = Tier 2.
Answer: E — Perpetual non-cumulative preference shares (PNCPS).
The idea: CET1 is the purest loss-absorbing capital: common shares and the reserves built from profits. Preference shares are not common equity, but if they are perpetual and their dividend can be skipped without building arrears, they can count as AT1.
- CET1 includes common shares, share premium on them, statutory reserves, other disclosed free reserves and retained earnings, less regulatory adjustments.
- AT1 includes perpetual non-cumulative preference shares (PNCPS) and perpetual debt instruments that meet RBI’s criteria.
- ‘Non-cumulative’ means skipped dividends are not owed later; ‘perpetual’ means no maturity — both needed for going-concern loss absorption.
- Of the items listed, only PNCPS is AT1.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Paid-up equity shares): Paid-up equity shares are the core of CET1.
- B (Statutory reserves): Statutory reserves are part of CET1.
- C (Share premium on equity shares): Share premium arising on issue of common shares is part of CET1.
- D (Balance in the profit and loss account): The balance in the profit and loss account (retained earnings) is part of CET1.
Memory tip: Common shares + reserves = CET1. Perpetual + non-cumulative instruments = AT1. Dated/subordinated debt = Tier 2.
Show answer
Answer: C — An additional Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirement, depending on its systemic-importance bucket.
The idea: If a very large bank failed, the damage to the whole system would be serious, so it is asked to hold more of the best-quality capital to make failure less likely. That extra cushion is the D-SIB surcharge.
- RBI assesses banks on size, interconnectedness, substitutability and complexity to identify D-SIBs.
- Identified D-SIBs are placed in buckets according to their systemic importance score.
- Each bucket carries an additional CET1 requirement over the normal capital requirements, including the conservation buffer.
- Purpose: lower the chance of failure of banks seen as ‘too big to fail’ and offset the implicit support they enjoy.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (A ban on lending to large corporates): D-SIB status does not ban lending to any borrower group; it raises capital requirements.
- B (A higher cash reserve ratio than other banks): CRR is a monetary policy tool applied uniformly to banks, not a D-SIB surcharge.
- D (A lower leverage ratio requirement): D-SIBs are expected to be more resilient, so a lower leverage requirement would contradict the purpose.
- E (Exemption from the capital conservation buffer): D-SIBs are not exempt from the conservation buffer; the surcharge comes on top of it.
Memory tip: D-SIB = ‘too big to fail’ → extra CET1 by bucket.
Answer: C — An additional Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirement, depending on its systemic-importance bucket.
The idea: If a very large bank failed, the damage to the whole system would be serious, so it is asked to hold more of the best-quality capital to make failure less likely. That extra cushion is the D-SIB surcharge.
- RBI assesses banks on size, interconnectedness, substitutability and complexity to identify D-SIBs.
- Identified D-SIBs are placed in buckets according to their systemic importance score.
- Each bucket carries an additional CET1 requirement over the normal capital requirements, including the conservation buffer.
- Purpose: lower the chance of failure of banks seen as ‘too big to fail’ and offset the implicit support they enjoy.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (A ban on lending to large corporates): D-SIB status does not ban lending to any borrower group; it raises capital requirements.
- B (A higher cash reserve ratio than other banks): CRR is a monetary policy tool applied uniformly to banks, not a D-SIB surcharge.
- D (A lower leverage ratio requirement): D-SIBs are expected to be more resilient, so a lower leverage requirement would contradict the purpose.
- E (Exemption from the capital conservation buffer): D-SIBs are not exempt from the conservation buffer; the surcharge comes on top of it.
Memory tip: D-SIB = ‘too big to fail’ → extra CET1 by bucket.
Show answer
Answer: D — Buy a USD call option (right to buy USD at a fixed rate).
The idea: The importer’s risk is that dollars become dearer. A call option on USD fixes a ceiling on the rupee cost, but if the dollar becomes cheaper the importer simply lets the option lapse and buys in the market. The price of this flexibility is the premium.
- Exposure: a future USD payment → loses if USD/INR rises (rupee weakens).
- Buying a USD call gives the right, not the obligation, to buy USD at the strike rate.
- If USD/INR rises above the strike, the importer exercises and the cost is capped at the strike (plus premium).
- If USD/INR falls, the importer lets the option lapse and buys cheaper USD in the market, keeping the benefit.
- Cost: the upfront option premium.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Sell a USD/INR forward contract): Selling USD forward suits an exporter receiving dollars; an importer needs to buy USD. A forward would also lock the rate and give up any benefit.
- B (Buy a USD put option (right to sell USD)): A USD put protects a holder of USD receivables against a falling dollar; the importer’s risk is a rising dollar.
- C (Sell a USD call option): Selling a call earns a premium but creates an obligation to sell USD if the dollar rises, which adds to the importer’s risk.
- E (Do nothing and keep the exposure open): Leaving the exposure open gives the upside but no protection against a weaker rupee.
Memory tip: Payables → buy call. Receivables → buy put. Options = protection + upside, for a premium.
Answer: D — Buy a USD call option (right to buy USD at a fixed rate).
The idea: The importer’s risk is that dollars become dearer. A call option on USD fixes a ceiling on the rupee cost, but if the dollar becomes cheaper the importer simply lets the option lapse and buys in the market. The price of this flexibility is the premium.
- Exposure: a future USD payment → loses if USD/INR rises (rupee weakens).
- Buying a USD call gives the right, not the obligation, to buy USD at the strike rate.
- If USD/INR rises above the strike, the importer exercises and the cost is capped at the strike (plus premium).
- If USD/INR falls, the importer lets the option lapse and buys cheaper USD in the market, keeping the benefit.
- Cost: the upfront option premium.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Sell a USD/INR forward contract): Selling USD forward suits an exporter receiving dollars; an importer needs to buy USD. A forward would also lock the rate and give up any benefit.
- B (Buy a USD put option (right to sell USD)): A USD put protects a holder of USD receivables against a falling dollar; the importer’s risk is a rising dollar.
- C (Sell a USD call option): Selling a call earns a premium but creates an obligation to sell USD if the dollar rises, which adds to the importer’s risk.
- E (Do nothing and keep the exposure open): Leaving the exposure open gives the upside but no protection against a weaker rupee.
Memory tip: Payables → buy call. Receivables → buy put. Options = protection + upside, for a premium.
Topics covered today
- Module A — Risk and Risk Management Framework: ALM and interest rate risk in the banking book — Repricing gap and NII
- Module B — Credit Risk: Measurement of credit risk — Economic LGD with workout costs; Credit rating systems — Through-the-cycle vs point-in-time
- Module C — Market Risk: Value at Risk — Historical simulation method; Market risk — Equity beta and systematic risk
- Module D — Operational Risk: Operational risk — Business continuity planning; Operational risk — Outsourcing risk
- Module E — Basel and RBI Guidelines on Risk Management: Regulatory capital — Components of Additional Tier 1; Basel III — Domestic systemically important banks
- Module F — Derivatives and Risk Management: Options — Hedging foreign currency payables with options
Tomorrow’s post continues the series with another fresh set of 10 CAIIB Risk Management practice questions. Bookmark SimplifyingFin and revise one set a day.
Disclaimer: This quiz is an independent practice aid for educational purposes. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or published by IIBF. Always cross-check regulations and circulars from official RBI/IIBF sources before relying on any figure in an exam or at work.

