This CAIIB Risk Management MCQ set is for bankers preparing for the IIBF CAIIB Risk Management paper. Attempt all 10 questions below—tap an option to see whether you are right, then read the short explanation. These are SimplifyingFin practice questions, not official IIBF questions.
Part of the CAIIB Risk Management MCQ practice series. Previous: Day 1
CAIIB Risk Management MCQ Day 2 quiz: 10 questions
Show answer
Answer: B — Internal audit, which reports to the Audit Committee of the Board and is independent of both business and risk management.
The idea: The board wants someone who is not part of making or controlling the risk to check whether the system works. That ‘checker of the checkers’ is internal audit, the third line.
- First line: business units and branches own the risk they take and run day-to-day controls.
- Second line: risk management and compliance set policy, limits and frameworks, and monitor the first line.
- Third line: internal audit gives independent assurance to the board (through the Audit Committee) that the first two lines are working.
- Independence is the key word in the stem, so the answer is internal audit.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (The business units and branches that originate loans and run trading positions): Business units are the first line: they own and manage the risk, so they cannot independently assure the board about their own compliance.
- C (The Chief Risk Officer’s department that frames risk policies and monitors limits): The risk department is the second line: it sets the limits and monitors them, so it cannot give an independent opinion on its own framework.
- D (The compliance department that tracks adherence to regulatory instructions): Compliance is also a second-line function: it oversees regulatory adherence but is part of the control framework being assessed.
- E (The statutory central auditor appointed for the annual financial statements): The statutory auditor is an external party focused on the true and fair view of the accounts; it is outside the bank’s internal three-lines structure.
Memory tip: Own it (business) → oversee it (risk, compliance) → assure it (internal audit).
Answer: B — Internal audit, which reports to the Audit Committee of the Board and is independent of both business and risk management.
The idea: The board wants someone who is not part of making or controlling the risk to check whether the system works. That ‘checker of the checkers’ is internal audit, the third line.
- First line: business units and branches own the risk they take and run day-to-day controls.
- Second line: risk management and compliance set policy, limits and frameworks, and monitor the first line.
- Third line: internal audit gives independent assurance to the board (through the Audit Committee) that the first two lines are working.
- Independence is the key word in the stem, so the answer is internal audit.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (The business units and branches that originate loans and run trading positions): Business units are the first line: they own and manage the risk, so they cannot independently assure the board about their own compliance.
- C (The Chief Risk Officer’s department that frames risk policies and monitors limits): The risk department is the second line: it sets the limits and monitors them, so it cannot give an independent opinion on its own framework.
- D (The compliance department that tracks adherence to regulatory instructions): Compliance is also a second-line function: it oversees regulatory adherence but is part of the control framework being assessed.
- E (The statutory central auditor appointed for the annual financial statements): The statutory auditor is an external party focused on the true and fair view of the accounts; it is outside the bank’s internal three-lines structure.
Memory tip: Own it (business) → oversee it (risk, compliance) → assure it (internal audit).
Show answer
Answer: D — 20.00%.
The idea: RAROC tells the pricing committee what the deal earns on the capital put at risk, after charging the normal credit loss. A 20% RAROC means every ₹100 of economic capital earns ₹20 a year; the deal clears a 15% hurdle rate, for example, but would fail a 25% hurdle.
- RAROC = (income − expected loss) ÷ economic capital (with income already net of funding and operating costs).
- Risk-adjusted income = 3.2 − 0.8 = ₹2.4 crore.
- RAROC = 2.4 ÷ 12 = 0.20 = 20.00%.
- Hand check: 12 × 0.2 = 2.4, so the ratio is exactly 20%.
- Shortcut: expected loss is the cost of doing business and is subtracted from income; unexpected loss is what economic capital is held for, so it goes in the denominator.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (26.67%): 26.67% is 3.2 ÷ 12: return on economic capital before charging the ₹0.8 crore expected loss, so it is not risk-adjusted.
- B (2.40%): 2.40% is 2.4 ÷ 100: risk-adjusted income over the ₹100 crore loan amount, i.e. a return on assets, not on capital.
- C (33.33%): 33.33% is (3.2 + 0.8) ÷ 12: it adds the expected loss to income instead of deducting it.
- E (3.20%): 3.20% is 3.2 ÷ 100: the unadjusted return on the loan amount, ignoring both expected loss and capital.
Check:
| Item | ₹ crore |
|---|---|
| Income after funding and operating cost | 3.2 |
| Less: expected loss | 0.8 |
| Risk-adjusted income | 2.4 |
| Economic capital | 12 |
| RAROC = 2.4 ÷ 12 | 20.00% |
Memory tip: RAROC = (net income − EL) ÷ economic capital. EL goes up top as a cost; capital at the bottom.
Answer: D — 20.00%.
The idea: RAROC tells the pricing committee what the deal earns on the capital put at risk, after charging the normal credit loss. A 20% RAROC means every ₹100 of economic capital earns ₹20 a year; the deal clears a 15% hurdle rate, for example, but would fail a 25% hurdle.
- RAROC = (income − expected loss) ÷ economic capital (with income already net of funding and operating costs).
- Risk-adjusted income = 3.2 − 0.8 = ₹2.4 crore.
- RAROC = 2.4 ÷ 12 = 0.20 = 20.00%.
- Hand check: 12 × 0.2 = 2.4, so the ratio is exactly 20%.
- Shortcut: expected loss is the cost of doing business and is subtracted from income; unexpected loss is what economic capital is held for, so it goes in the denominator.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (26.67%): 26.67% is 3.2 ÷ 12: return on economic capital before charging the ₹0.8 crore expected loss, so it is not risk-adjusted.
- B (2.40%): 2.40% is 2.4 ÷ 100: risk-adjusted income over the ₹100 crore loan amount, i.e. a return on assets, not on capital.
- C (33.33%): 33.33% is (3.2 + 0.8) ÷ 12: it adds the expected loss to income instead of deducting it.
- E (3.20%): 3.20% is 3.2 ÷ 100: the unadjusted return on the loan amount, ignoring both expected loss and capital.
Check:
| Item | ₹ crore |
|---|---|
| Income after funding and operating cost | 3.2 |
| Less: expected loss | 0.8 |
| Risk-adjusted income | 2.4 |
| Economic capital | 12 |
| RAROC = 2.4 ÷ 12 | 20.00% |
Memory tip: RAROC = (net income − EL) ÷ economic capital. EL goes up top as a cost; capital at the bottom.
Show answer
Answer: A — Diversification reduces unsystematic (borrower- or industry-specific) risk, but systematic risk that affects all borrowers together, such as a recession, cannot be diversified away..
The idea: Spreading loans across many industries protects the bank if one sector or one borrower gets into trouble, but when the whole economy slows almost every borrower is hit at once. That common, economy-wide part of credit risk stays with the bank however well it diversifies.
- Unsystematic (idiosyncratic) risk comes from events specific to a borrower or an industry, for example a steel price crash or one company’s fraud.
- Holding many loans whose problems are not linked lets these specific shocks offset one another, so diversification reduces unsystematic and concentration risk.
- Systematic risk comes from common factors such as GDP growth, interest rates or a recession, which move many borrowers’ default rates together.
- Because defaults are correlated through these common factors, systematic risk remains after diversification and must be covered by capital and stress testing.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Diversification increases concentration risk, so losses in a recession will be higher than before.): This reverses the effect: spreading lending across unrelated sectors lowers concentration risk.
- C (Diversification removes systematic risk but leaves unsystematic risk unchanged.): This swaps the two terms: diversification works on unsystematic risk, not systematic risk.
- D (Recession losses arise only from operational risk, which is unaffected by loan diversification.): Recession losses on loans are credit losses; operational risk relates to failed processes, people, systems or external events.
- E (Once a portfolio is diversified, the probability of default of each borrower falls to zero.): Diversification does not change any single borrower’s PD; it only reduces how much specific defaults move the total portfolio loss.
Memory tip: Diversify away the specific; you can’t diversify away the economy.
Answer: A — Diversification reduces unsystematic (borrower- or industry-specific) risk, but systematic risk that affects all borrowers together, such as a recession, cannot be diversified away..
The idea: Spreading loans across many industries protects the bank if one sector or one borrower gets into trouble, but when the whole economy slows almost every borrower is hit at once. That common, economy-wide part of credit risk stays with the bank however well it diversifies.
- Unsystematic (idiosyncratic) risk comes from events specific to a borrower or an industry, for example a steel price crash or one company’s fraud.
- Holding many loans whose problems are not linked lets these specific shocks offset one another, so diversification reduces unsystematic and concentration risk.
- Systematic risk comes from common factors such as GDP growth, interest rates or a recession, which move many borrowers’ default rates together.
- Because defaults are correlated through these common factors, systematic risk remains after diversification and must be covered by capital and stress testing.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Diversification increases concentration risk, so losses in a recession will be higher than before.): This reverses the effect: spreading lending across unrelated sectors lowers concentration risk.
- C (Diversification removes systematic risk but leaves unsystematic risk unchanged.): This swaps the two terms: diversification works on unsystematic risk, not systematic risk.
- D (Recession losses arise only from operational risk, which is unaffected by loan diversification.): Recession losses on loans are credit losses; operational risk relates to failed processes, people, systems or external events.
- E (Once a portfolio is diversified, the probability of default of each borrower falls to zero.): Diversification does not change any single borrower’s PD; it only reduces how much specific defaults move the total portfolio loss.
Memory tip: Diversify away the specific; you can’t diversify away the economy.
Show answer
Answer: E — ₹7.46 crore.
The idea: A 4-day 99% VaR of about ₹7.5 crore means that, in normal markets, the desk should lose more than ₹7.5 crore over a 4-trading-day stretch only about once in 100 such stretches. It is the figure risk control checks against the desk's approved limit.
- One-day VaR = portfolio value × daily volatility × z-value.
- 1-day VaR = 80 × 0.02 × 2.33. First 80 × 0.02 = 1.6; then 1.6 × 2.33 = 3.728, so about ₹3.73 crore.
- Scale to the horizon with the square-root-of-time rule: 4-day VaR = 1-day VaR × √4.
- √4 = 2, so 3.728 × 2 = 7.456 ≈ ₹7.46 crore.
- Shortcut: pick the horizon's square root first (√4 = 2, √9 = 3, √10 ≈ 3.16) and multiply once at the end.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹3.73 crore): ₹3.73 crore is the 1-day 99% VaR (80 × 0.02 × 2.33); it stops before scaling to the 4-day horizon.
- B (₹14.91 crore): ₹14.91 crore multiplies the 1-day VaR by 4 instead of √4 = 2; risk grows with the square root of time, not linearly.
- C (₹5.26 crore): ₹5.26 crore is the 4-day VaR at 95% confidence (80 × 0.02 × 1.645 × 2); it uses the 95% z-value instead of 2.33.
- D (₹3.20 crore): ₹3.20 crore is 80 × 0.02 × 2: the 4-day standard deviation in rupees with no z-value applied, so it is not a 99% loss threshold.
Check:
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| Value × daily σ = 80 × 2% | ₹1.60 crore |
| × z (2.33) → 1-day VaR | ₹3.73 crore |
| × √4 (= 2) → 4-day VaR | ₹7.46 crore |
Square-root-of-time scaling assumes independent, identically distributed daily returns.
Memory tip: VaR = value × σ × z, then × √(days). Linear scaling (× days) overstates it.
Answer: E — ₹7.46 crore.
The idea: A 4-day 99% VaR of about ₹7.5 crore means that, in normal markets, the desk should lose more than ₹7.5 crore over a 4-trading-day stretch only about once in 100 such stretches. It is the figure risk control checks against the desk's approved limit.
- One-day VaR = portfolio value × daily volatility × z-value.
- 1-day VaR = 80 × 0.02 × 2.33. First 80 × 0.02 = 1.6; then 1.6 × 2.33 = 3.728, so about ₹3.73 crore.
- Scale to the horizon with the square-root-of-time rule: 4-day VaR = 1-day VaR × √4.
- √4 = 2, so 3.728 × 2 = 7.456 ≈ ₹7.46 crore.
- Shortcut: pick the horizon's square root first (√4 = 2, √9 = 3, √10 ≈ 3.16) and multiply once at the end.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹3.73 crore): ₹3.73 crore is the 1-day 99% VaR (80 × 0.02 × 2.33); it stops before scaling to the 4-day horizon.
- B (₹14.91 crore): ₹14.91 crore multiplies the 1-day VaR by 4 instead of √4 = 2; risk grows with the square root of time, not linearly.
- C (₹5.26 crore): ₹5.26 crore is the 4-day VaR at 95% confidence (80 × 0.02 × 1.645 × 2); it uses the 95% z-value instead of 2.33.
- D (₹3.20 crore): ₹3.20 crore is 80 × 0.02 × 2: the 4-day standard deviation in rupees with no z-value applied, so it is not a 99% loss threshold.
Check:
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| Value × daily σ = 80 × 2% | ₹1.60 crore |
| × z (2.33) → 1-day VaR | ₹3.73 crore |
| × √4 (= 2) → 4-day VaR | ₹7.46 crore |
Square-root-of-time scaling assumes independent, identically distributed daily returns.
Memory tip: VaR = value × σ × z, then × √(days). Linear scaling (× days) overstates it.
Show answer
Answer: C — Clients, products and business practices.
The idea: This is a classic mis-selling loss: staff failed in their duty to customers (suitability), not stole from the bank. Basel puts such losses in ‘Clients, products and business practices’.
- Basel lists seven level-1 operational loss event types: internal fraud; external fraud; employment practices and workplace safety; clients, products and business practices; damage to physical assets; business disruption and system failures; execution, delivery and process management.
- ‘Clients, products and business practices’ covers unintentional or negligent failure to meet a professional obligation to clients, including suitability and fiduciary breaches, aggressive sales and improper market practices.
- Selling unsuitable products to elderly depositors to meet targets is a suitability failure, and the compensation and penalty are losses arising from it.
- So the loss is recorded under clients, products and business practices.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Internal fraud): Internal fraud needs an intent to defraud, misappropriate property or get around the law or policy for personal gain involving an insider; here staff pushed sales to meet targets, with no theft from the bank or the customer.
- B (Execution, delivery and process management): Execution, delivery and process management covers failed transaction processing or process errors, such as a wrong data entry or a missed deadline, not a breach of duty to clients in selling products.
- D (Employment practices and workplace safety): Employment practices and workplace safety covers losses from employee relations, discrimination claims or health and safety; the claimants here are customers, not employees.
- E (External fraud): External fraud is committed by a third party (for example card skimming or forged cheques); no outsider defrauded the bank here.
Memory tip: Customer harmed by how we sold it → CPBP. Someone stole → fraud. Process slipped → EDPM.
Answer: C — Clients, products and business practices.
The idea: This is a classic mis-selling loss: staff failed in their duty to customers (suitability), not stole from the bank. Basel puts such losses in ‘Clients, products and business practices’.
- Basel lists seven level-1 operational loss event types: internal fraud; external fraud; employment practices and workplace safety; clients, products and business practices; damage to physical assets; business disruption and system failures; execution, delivery and process management.
- ‘Clients, products and business practices’ covers unintentional or negligent failure to meet a professional obligation to clients, including suitability and fiduciary breaches, aggressive sales and improper market practices.
- Selling unsuitable products to elderly depositors to meet targets is a suitability failure, and the compensation and penalty are losses arising from it.
- So the loss is recorded under clients, products and business practices.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Internal fraud): Internal fraud needs an intent to defraud, misappropriate property or get around the law or policy for personal gain involving an insider; here staff pushed sales to meet targets, with no theft from the bank or the customer.
- B (Execution, delivery and process management): Execution, delivery and process management covers failed transaction processing or process errors, such as a wrong data entry or a missed deadline, not a breach of duty to clients in selling products.
- D (Employment practices and workplace safety): Employment practices and workplace safety covers losses from employee relations, discrimination claims or health and safety; the claimants here are customers, not employees.
- E (External fraud): External fraud is committed by a third party (for example card skimming or forged cheques); no outsider defrauded the bank here.
Memory tip: Customer harmed by how we sold it → CPBP. Someone stole → fraud. Process slipped → EDPM.
Show answer
Answer: C — A key risk indicator (KRI).
The idea: The team is watching a number that tends to rise before losses happen, and it has set thresholds that trigger action. A measurable, regularly tracked early-warning metric with triggers is a key risk indicator.
- A KRI is a quantitative metric, tracked regularly, that signals a change in the level of a risk before losses occur.
- Good KRIs have thresholds (green, amber, red) and an escalation path when a threshold is crossed.
- Aging of unreconciled entries is a classic leading indicator: a rising count signals growing risk of error or fraud in cash handling.
- So the monthly count with amber and red triggers is a KRI.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (An internal loss data record): An internal loss data record captures losses that have already happened (amount, date, event type), not a forward-looking warning metric.
- B (A risk and control self-assessment (RCSA) rating): An RCSA rating is a periodic, workshop-based judgment by business owners of inherent risk and control effectiveness, not a monthly count with triggers.
- D (A scenario analysis estimate): Scenario analysis is an expert estimate of the frequency and severity of rare, severe events (for example a major cyber-attack), not a routine monthly metric.
- E (A near-miss report): A near-miss report records a specific event that could have caused a loss but did not; it is an event record, not an ongoing indicator.
Memory tip: KRI = a number you watch monthly, with amber and red lines that make you act before the loss.
Answer: C — A key risk indicator (KRI).
The idea: The team is watching a number that tends to rise before losses happen, and it has set thresholds that trigger action. A measurable, regularly tracked early-warning metric with triggers is a key risk indicator.
- A KRI is a quantitative metric, tracked regularly, that signals a change in the level of a risk before losses occur.
- Good KRIs have thresholds (green, amber, red) and an escalation path when a threshold is crossed.
- Aging of unreconciled entries is a classic leading indicator: a rising count signals growing risk of error or fraud in cash handling.
- So the monthly count with amber and red triggers is a KRI.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (An internal loss data record): An internal loss data record captures losses that have already happened (amount, date, event type), not a forward-looking warning metric.
- B (A risk and control self-assessment (RCSA) rating): An RCSA rating is a periodic, workshop-based judgment by business owners of inherent risk and control effectiveness, not a monthly count with triggers.
- D (A scenario analysis estimate): Scenario analysis is an expert estimate of the frequency and severity of rare, severe events (for example a major cyber-attack), not a routine monthly metric.
- E (A near-miss report): A near-miss report records a specific event that could have caused a loss but did not; it is an event record, not an ongoing indicator.
Memory tip: KRI = a number you watch monthly, with amber and red lines that make you act before the loss.
Show answer
Answer: A — ₹23.20 crore.
The idea: The bank cannot count the full ₹80 crore of collateral, because bond prices can fall before it is able to sell them. After a 4% haircut the collateral is worth ₹76.8 crore for capital purposes, so ₹23.2 crore of the loan is treated as unsecured and attracts the borrower’s risk weight.
- Under the comprehensive approach, exposure after mitigation E* = max{0, E × (1 + He) − C × (1 − Hc − Hfx)}.
- Here E = 100, He = 0, C = 80, Hc = 4%, Hfx = 0.
- Adjusted collateral = 80 × (1 − 0.04) = 80 × 0.96 = 76.8.
- E* = 100 × 1 − 76.8 = ₹23.20 crore.
- Shortcut: the haircut amount is 4% of 80 = 3.2, so E* = (100 − 80) + 3.2 = 23.2 — the uncovered part plus the haircut.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (₹20.00 crore): ₹20.00 crore is 100 − 80: it gives full credit for the collateral and ignores the 4% haircut.
- C (₹96.80 crore): ₹96.80 crore is 100 − 3.2: it subtracts only the haircut amount from the loan instead of the haircut-adjusted collateral value.
- D (₹16.80 crore): ₹16.80 crore is 100 − 80 × 1.04: it grosses the collateral up by the haircut instead of reducing it, which overstates the mitigation.
- E (₹76.80 crore): ₹76.80 crore is 80 × 0.96: the haircut-adjusted value of the collateral, not the exposure remaining after it.
Check:
| Item | ₹ crore |
|---|---|
| Loan (E) | 100.0 |
| Collateral market value (C) | 80.0 |
| Haircut 4% on C | 3.2 |
| Adjusted collateral C × 0.96 | 76.8 |
| E* = 100 − 76.8 | 23.2 |
Memory tip: Haircut the collateral down (and the exposure up, if any), then subtract: E* = E(1+He) − C(1−Hc−Hfx).
Answer: A — ₹23.20 crore.
The idea: The bank cannot count the full ₹80 crore of collateral, because bond prices can fall before it is able to sell them. After a 4% haircut the collateral is worth ₹76.8 crore for capital purposes, so ₹23.2 crore of the loan is treated as unsecured and attracts the borrower’s risk weight.
- Under the comprehensive approach, exposure after mitigation E* = max{0, E × (1 + He) − C × (1 − Hc − Hfx)}.
- Here E = 100, He = 0, C = 80, Hc = 4%, Hfx = 0.
- Adjusted collateral = 80 × (1 − 0.04) = 80 × 0.96 = 76.8.
- E* = 100 × 1 − 76.8 = ₹23.20 crore.
- Shortcut: the haircut amount is 4% of 80 = 3.2, so E* = (100 − 80) + 3.2 = 23.2 — the uncovered part plus the haircut.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (₹20.00 crore): ₹20.00 crore is 100 − 80: it gives full credit for the collateral and ignores the 4% haircut.
- C (₹96.80 crore): ₹96.80 crore is 100 − 3.2: it subtracts only the haircut amount from the loan instead of the haircut-adjusted collateral value.
- D (₹16.80 crore): ₹16.80 crore is 100 − 80 × 1.04: it grosses the collateral up by the haircut instead of reducing it, which overstates the mitigation.
- E (₹76.80 crore): ₹76.80 crore is 80 × 0.96: the haircut-adjusted value of the collateral, not the exposure remaining after it.
Check:
| Item | ₹ crore |
|---|---|
| Loan (E) | 100.0 |
| Collateral market value (C) | 80.0 |
| Haircut 4% on C | 3.2 |
| Adjusted collateral C × 0.96 | 76.8 |
| E* = 100 − 76.8 | 23.2 |
Memory tip: Haircut the collateral down (and the exposure up, if any), then subtract: E* = E(1+He) − C(1−Hc−Hfx).
Show answer
Answer: D — Probability of default only.
The idea: Foundation IRB is the halfway house: the bank trusts its own rating model to say how likely each borrower is to default, but uses the regulator’s numbers for how much would be lost and how much would be outstanding at default.
- The IRB risk-weight function uses four components: probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and effective maturity (M).
- Foundation IRB: the bank supplies its own PD estimates; LGD, EAD (through supervisory conversion factors) and, generally, M are supervisory values.
- Advanced IRB: the bank also supplies its own LGD, EAD and M, subject to minimum standards.
- So under the foundation approach the bank estimates PD only.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Loss given default only): Own LGD estimates are allowed only under the advanced IRB approach, not the foundation approach.
- B (Exposure at default only): Own EAD (credit conversion factor) estimates also belong to the advanced IRB approach.
- C (Loss given default, exposure at default and effective maturity, but not probability of default): This is the reverse of foundation IRB: PD is the one input the bank must estimate itself; own LGD, EAD and M estimates describe advanced IRB.
- E (None — all inputs are prescribed by the supervisor, as under the standardised approach): That describes the standardised approach, where risk weights come from external ratings or regulatory tables; IRB by definition uses at least the bank’s own PD.
Memory tip: Foundation = own PD. Advanced = own PD + LGD + EAD + M.
Answer: D — Probability of default only.
The idea: Foundation IRB is the halfway house: the bank trusts its own rating model to say how likely each borrower is to default, but uses the regulator’s numbers for how much would be lost and how much would be outstanding at default.
- The IRB risk-weight function uses four components: probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and effective maturity (M).
- Foundation IRB: the bank supplies its own PD estimates; LGD, EAD (through supervisory conversion factors) and, generally, M are supervisory values.
- Advanced IRB: the bank also supplies its own LGD, EAD and M, subject to minimum standards.
- So under the foundation approach the bank estimates PD only.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Loss given default only): Own LGD estimates are allowed only under the advanced IRB approach, not the foundation approach.
- B (Exposure at default only): Own EAD (credit conversion factor) estimates also belong to the advanced IRB approach.
- C (Loss given default, exposure at default and effective maturity, but not probability of default): This is the reverse of foundation IRB: PD is the one input the bank must estimate itself; own LGD, EAD and M estimates describe advanced IRB.
- E (None — all inputs are prescribed by the supervisor, as under the standardised approach): That describes the standardised approach, where risk weights come from external ratings or regulatory tables; IRB by definition uses at least the bank’s own PD.
Memory tip: Foundation = own PD. Advanced = own PD + LGD + EAD + M.
Show answer
Answer: E — Curbs on dividends, buybacks and discretionary bonuses, tightening the nearer CET1 gets to the floor, until the buffer is refilled..
The idea: The conservation buffer is a cushion the bank is allowed to dip into in bad times. Dipping in is not a breach of minimum capital, but the bank must hold back profits (cut dividends and bonuses) to rebuild the cushion.
- Basel III sets a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, met with CET1, above the minimum CET1 requirement.
- If the CET1 ratio falls into the buffer range, the bank remains above the regulatory minimum, so this is not a minimum-capital breach.
- Instead, constraints apply on discretionary distributions (dividends, share buybacks, discretionary bonuses).
- The constraints are graded: the lower the CET1 ratio within the buffer range, the higher the minimum share of earnings that must be conserved.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (The bank’s licence is cancelled because it has breached the minimum capital requirement.): The bank is still above the minimum capital requirement; licence cancellation is not the buffer consequence.
- B (The bank must immediately stop accepting fresh deposits until the buffer is rebuilt.): A deposit ban is not the Basel III consequence of using the buffer; the restriction is on payouts of earnings.
- C (The bank must convert all its Tier 2 bonds into equity.): Conversion or write-down of capital instruments is linked to the point of non-viability or specific trigger levels, not automatically to entering the buffer range.
- D (Nothing: the conservation buffer is only a disclosure item with no consequences.): The buffer has real consequences: using it triggers mandatory limits on distributions.
Memory tip: Inside the buffer = still legal, but no generous payouts until it is refilled.
Answer: E — Curbs on dividends, buybacks and discretionary bonuses, tightening the nearer CET1 gets to the floor, until the buffer is refilled..
The idea: The conservation buffer is a cushion the bank is allowed to dip into in bad times. Dipping in is not a breach of minimum capital, but the bank must hold back profits (cut dividends and bonuses) to rebuild the cushion.
- Basel III sets a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, met with CET1, above the minimum CET1 requirement.
- If the CET1 ratio falls into the buffer range, the bank remains above the regulatory minimum, so this is not a minimum-capital breach.
- Instead, constraints apply on discretionary distributions (dividends, share buybacks, discretionary bonuses).
- The constraints are graded: the lower the CET1 ratio within the buffer range, the higher the minimum share of earnings that must be conserved.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (The bank’s licence is cancelled because it has breached the minimum capital requirement.): The bank is still above the minimum capital requirement; licence cancellation is not the buffer consequence.
- B (The bank must immediately stop accepting fresh deposits until the buffer is rebuilt.): A deposit ban is not the Basel III consequence of using the buffer; the restriction is on payouts of earnings.
- C (The bank must convert all its Tier 2 bonds into equity.): Conversion or write-down of capital instruments is linked to the point of non-viability or specific trigger levels, not automatically to entering the buffer range.
- D (Nothing: the conservation buffer is only a disclosure item with no consequences.): The buffer has real consequences: using it triggers mandatory limits on distributions.
Memory tip: Inside the buffer = still legal, but no generous payouts until it is refilled.
Show answer
Answer: B — Vega.
The idea: A desk that has sold options loses when the market starts expecting bigger swings, because the options it owes become more valuable. The Greek that measures how much an option’s value changes when implied volatility changes is vega.
- Delta: change in option value for a small change in the underlying price.
- Gamma: change in delta for a change in the underlying price (curvature).
- Vega: change in option value for a 1 percentage point change in implied volatility.
- Theta: change in option value as time passes (time decay); Rho: change in option value for a change in interest rates.
- The stem holds spot constant and changes implied volatility, so the sensitivity is vega; a short option book has negative vega.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Delta): Delta measures sensitivity to the spot price of the underlying; the stem says spot does not change.
- C (Theta): Theta measures loss or gain in option value from the passage of time, not from a change in volatility.
- D (Gamma): Gamma measures how fast delta changes when spot moves; it is a second-order price sensitivity, not a volatility sensitivity.
- E (Rho): Rho measures sensitivity to interest rates.
Memory tip: Vega ↔ Volatility (both start with V). Short options = short vega.
Answer: B — Vega.
The idea: A desk that has sold options loses when the market starts expecting bigger swings, because the options it owes become more valuable. The Greek that measures how much an option’s value changes when implied volatility changes is vega.
- Delta: change in option value for a small change in the underlying price.
- Gamma: change in delta for a change in the underlying price (curvature).
- Vega: change in option value for a 1 percentage point change in implied volatility.
- Theta: change in option value as time passes (time decay); Rho: change in option value for a change in interest rates.
- The stem holds spot constant and changes implied volatility, so the sensitivity is vega; a short option book has negative vega.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Delta): Delta measures sensitivity to the spot price of the underlying; the stem says spot does not change.
- C (Theta): Theta measures loss or gain in option value from the passage of time, not from a change in volatility.
- D (Gamma): Gamma measures how fast delta changes when spot moves; it is a second-order price sensitivity, not a volatility sensitivity.
- E (Rho): Rho measures sensitivity to interest rates.
Memory tip: Vega ↔ Volatility (both start with V). Short options = short vega.
Topics covered today
- Module A — Risk and Risk Management Framework: Risk management framework — Three lines of defence
- Module B — Credit Risk: Measurement of credit risk — RAROC; Portfolio credit risk — Systematic vs unsystematic risk
- Module C — Market Risk: Value at Risk — Parametric VaR and time scaling
- Module D — Operational Risk: Operational risk — Basel loss event types; Operational risk — Key Risk Indicators
- Module E — Basel and RBI Guidelines on Risk Management: Credit risk mitigation — Comprehensive approach haircuts; Internal ratings-based approach — Foundation vs advanced IRB; Basel III buffers — Capital conservation buffer
- Module F — Derivatives and Risk Management: Options — Option Greeks
Tomorrow’s post continues the series with another fresh set of 10 CAIIB Risk Management practice questions. Bookmark SimplifyingFin and revise one set a day.
Disclaimer: This quiz is an independent practice aid for educational purposes. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or published by IIBF. Always cross-check regulations and circulars from official RBI/IIBF sources before relying on any figure in an exam or at work.

