This CAIIB Risk Management MCQ set is for bankers preparing for the IIBF CAIIB Risk Management paper. Attempt all 10 questions below—tap an option to see whether you are right, then read the short explanation. These are SimplifyingFin practice questions, not official IIBF questions.
Part of the CAIIB Risk Management MCQ practice series. Previous: Day 3
CAIIB Risk Management MCQ Day 4 quiz: 10 questions
Show answer
Answer: C — Residual risk.
The idea: The first look asks “how bad could this be if we did nothing?”. The second asks “how much is still left after everything we already do?”. That leftover exposure is what management must accept, reduce further or transfer.
- Inherent risk is the exposure before any controls or mitigants are considered.
- Controls (dual custody, CCTV, surprise checks) reduce likelihood; insurance reduces the financial impact.
- Residual risk is the exposure that remains after these controls and mitigants are taken into account.
- Here: inherent rating high → after controls → residual rating medium.
- Management then compares the residual risk with its risk appetite to decide whether more action is needed.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Inherent risk): Inherent risk is the first rating (high), made before any safeguards were counted.
- B (Risk capacity): Risk capacity is the maximum risk the bank can bear before breaching capital, liquidity or regulatory limits; it is a bank-wide ceiling, not the rating of one process.
- D (Systemic risk): Systemic risk is the risk of disruption to the whole financial system; cash shortages at one bank’s chests are not systemic.
- E (Risk appetite): Risk appetite is the amount of risk the board is willing to accept; it is the yardstick the residual rating is compared with, not the rating itself.
Memory tip: Inherent − effect of controls = residual. Residual is compared with appetite.
Answer: C — Residual risk.
The idea: The first look asks “how bad could this be if we did nothing?”. The second asks “how much is still left after everything we already do?”. That leftover exposure is what management must accept, reduce further or transfer.
- Inherent risk is the exposure before any controls or mitigants are considered.
- Controls (dual custody, CCTV, surprise checks) reduce likelihood; insurance reduces the financial impact.
- Residual risk is the exposure that remains after these controls and mitigants are taken into account.
- Here: inherent rating high → after controls → residual rating medium.
- Management then compares the residual risk with its risk appetite to decide whether more action is needed.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Inherent risk): Inherent risk is the first rating (high), made before any safeguards were counted.
- B (Risk capacity): Risk capacity is the maximum risk the bank can bear before breaching capital, liquidity or regulatory limits; it is a bank-wide ceiling, not the rating of one process.
- D (Systemic risk): Systemic risk is the risk of disruption to the whole financial system; cash shortages at one bank’s chests are not systemic.
- E (Risk appetite): Risk appetite is the amount of risk the board is willing to accept; it is the yardstick the residual rating is compared with, not the rating itself.
Memory tip: Inherent − effect of controls = residual. Residual is compared with appetite.
Show answer
Answer: D — ₹6.75 crore.
The idea: A good-quality borrower lets the bank count only half the loan as risk-weighted assets, so the capital it must set aside is half of what an unrated or 100%-weighted loan of the same size would need.
- Risk-weighted assets (RWA) = exposure × risk weight.
- RWA = 150 × 50% = ₹75 crore.
- Minimum capital = RWA × minimum total capital ratio.
- Capital = 75 × 9% = ₹6.75 crore.
- Shortcut: 150 × 0.50 × 0.09 = 150 × 0.045 = 6.75.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹13.50 crore): ₹13.50 crore is 150 × 9%: it treats the loan at a 100% risk weight and ignores the 50% weight given in the question.
- B (₹8.63 crore): ₹8.63 crore is 75 × 11.5%: it adds the 2.5% capital conservation buffer, which the question asks you to ignore.
- C (₹4.05 crore): ₹4.05 crore is 150 × 30% × 9%: it uses a 30% risk weight instead of 50%.
- E (₹75.00 crore): ₹75.00 crore is the risk-weighted asset amount itself, not the capital held against it.
Check:
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| Exposure | ₹150 crore |
| RWA = 150 × 50% | ₹75 crore |
| Capital = 75 × 9% | ₹6.75 crore |
With the 2.5% conservation buffer added (11.5%), the figure would be ₹8.63 crore.
Memory tip: Capital = Exposure × RW × CRAR. Keep RWA and capital separate in your head.
Answer: D — ₹6.75 crore.
The idea: A good-quality borrower lets the bank count only half the loan as risk-weighted assets, so the capital it must set aside is half of what an unrated or 100%-weighted loan of the same size would need.
- Risk-weighted assets (RWA) = exposure × risk weight.
- RWA = 150 × 50% = ₹75 crore.
- Minimum capital = RWA × minimum total capital ratio.
- Capital = 75 × 9% = ₹6.75 crore.
- Shortcut: 150 × 0.50 × 0.09 = 150 × 0.045 = 6.75.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹13.50 crore): ₹13.50 crore is 150 × 9%: it treats the loan at a 100% risk weight and ignores the 50% weight given in the question.
- B (₹8.63 crore): ₹8.63 crore is 75 × 11.5%: it adds the 2.5% capital conservation buffer, which the question asks you to ignore.
- C (₹4.05 crore): ₹4.05 crore is 150 × 30% × 9%: it uses a 30% risk weight instead of 50%.
- E (₹75.00 crore): ₹75.00 crore is the risk-weighted asset amount itself, not the capital held against it.
Check:
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| Exposure | ₹150 crore |
| RWA = 150 × 50% | ₹75 crore |
| Capital = 75 × 9% | ₹6.75 crore |
With the 2.5% conservation buffer added (11.5%), the figure would be ₹8.63 crore.
Memory tip: Capital = Exposure × RW × CRAR. Keep RWA and capital separate in your head.
Show answer
Answer: A — Migration (downgrade) risk.
The idea: Credit risk is not only about borrowers failing to pay. A weaker borrower is worth less to the market, so the price of its debt drops on the downgrade itself, well before any default.
- Credit risk can show up as default (the borrower does not pay) or as a deterioration in credit quality short of default.
- Loss from a change in credit quality, usually seen as a rating downgrade and a wider credit spread, is called migration or downgrade risk.
- Lower rating → investors demand a higher yield → bond price falls → mark-to-market loss.
- Rating transition (migration) matrices are used to estimate how often such moves happen.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Default risk): Default risk is the risk that the borrower fails to pay; the company is still paying on time.
- C (Settlement risk): Settlement risk is the risk that one side delivers in a trade while the other does not; no trade settlement is involved here.
- D (Recovery risk): Recovery risk is uncertainty about how much is recovered after a default (it drives LGD); there is no default here.
- E (Prepayment risk): Prepayment risk is the risk that a borrower repays early, cutting the lender’s future interest; nothing was repaid early.
Memory tip: Default = they stop paying. Migration = they still pay, but are worth less.
Answer: A — Migration (downgrade) risk.
The idea: Credit risk is not only about borrowers failing to pay. A weaker borrower is worth less to the market, so the price of its debt drops on the downgrade itself, well before any default.
- Credit risk can show up as default (the borrower does not pay) or as a deterioration in credit quality short of default.
- Loss from a change in credit quality, usually seen as a rating downgrade and a wider credit spread, is called migration or downgrade risk.
- Lower rating → investors demand a higher yield → bond price falls → mark-to-market loss.
- Rating transition (migration) matrices are used to estimate how often such moves happen.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Default risk): Default risk is the risk that the borrower fails to pay; the company is still paying on time.
- C (Settlement risk): Settlement risk is the risk that one side delivers in a trade while the other does not; no trade settlement is involved here.
- D (Recovery risk): Recovery risk is uncertainty about how much is recovered after a default (it drives LGD); there is no default here.
- E (Prepayment risk): Prepayment risk is the risk that a borrower repays early, cutting the lender’s future interest; nothing was repaid early.
Memory tip: Default = they stop paying. Migration = they still pay, but are worth less.
Show answer
Answer: B — ₹60.8 lakh.
The idea: Because the two desks do not always lose on the same day, the combined risk is less than the simple total of ₹70 lakh. The ₹9.2 lakh gap is the diversification benefit the bank gets from running both desks.
- Under a normal model, VaRs combine like standard deviations: VaR(P) = √(VaR₁² + VaR₂² + 2ρ × VaR₁ × VaR₂).
- VaR₁² = 30² = 900; VaR₂² = 40² = 1,600.
- 2ρ × VaR₁ × VaR₂ = 2 × 0.5 × 30 × 40 = 1,200.
- Sum = 900 + 1,600 + 1,200 = 3,700.
- VaR(P) = √3,700 ≈ 60.8 (since 61² = 3,721). Combined VaR ≈ ₹60.8 lakh.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹70.0 lakh): ₹70.0 lakh is 30 + 40, the answer only if correlation were +1 (no diversification at all).
- C (₹50.0 lakh): ₹50.0 lakh is √(900 + 1,600), the answer if correlation were 0; it drops the cross term.
- D (₹36.1 lakh): ₹36.1 lakh is √(900 + 1,600 − 1,200), the answer if correlation were −0.5 (sign of the cross term flipped).
- E (₹10.0 lakh): ₹10.0 lakh is 40 − 30, the answer only if correlation were −1 (a perfect hedge).
Check:
| Correlation ρ | Combined VaR (₹ lakh) |
|---|---|
| +1 | 70.0 |
| +0.5 | 60.8 |
| 0 | 50.0 |
| −0.5 | 36.1 |
| −1 | 10.0 |
Only ρ = 0.5 is given in the question.
Memory tip: ρ = 1 → add; ρ = 0 → Pythagoras (30-40-50); anything in between lands between the two.
Answer: B — ₹60.8 lakh.
The idea: Because the two desks do not always lose on the same day, the combined risk is less than the simple total of ₹70 lakh. The ₹9.2 lakh gap is the diversification benefit the bank gets from running both desks.
- Under a normal model, VaRs combine like standard deviations: VaR(P) = √(VaR₁² + VaR₂² + 2ρ × VaR₁ × VaR₂).
- VaR₁² = 30² = 900; VaR₂² = 40² = 1,600.
- 2ρ × VaR₁ × VaR₂ = 2 × 0.5 × 30 × 40 = 1,200.
- Sum = 900 + 1,600 + 1,200 = 3,700.
- VaR(P) = √3,700 ≈ 60.8 (since 61² = 3,721). Combined VaR ≈ ₹60.8 lakh.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹70.0 lakh): ₹70.0 lakh is 30 + 40, the answer only if correlation were +1 (no diversification at all).
- C (₹50.0 lakh): ₹50.0 lakh is √(900 + 1,600), the answer if correlation were 0; it drops the cross term.
- D (₹36.1 lakh): ₹36.1 lakh is √(900 + 1,600 − 1,200), the answer if correlation were −0.5 (sign of the cross term flipped).
- E (₹10.0 lakh): ₹10.0 lakh is 40 − 30, the answer only if correlation were −1 (a perfect hedge).
Check:
| Correlation ρ | Combined VaR (₹ lakh) |
|---|---|
| +1 | 70.0 |
| +0.5 | 60.8 |
| 0 | 50.0 |
| −0.5 | 36.1 |
| −1 | 10.0 |
Only ρ = 0.5 is given in the question.
Memory tip: ρ = 1 → add; ρ = 0 → Pythagoras (30-40-50); anything in between lands between the two.
Show answer
Answer: E — The actual gain will be larger and the actual loss smaller than estimated.
The idea: The price–yield curve of a plain bond bends upwards (it is convex). A straight-line duration estimate therefore sits below the true curve on both sides: it underplays the gain when yields fall and overplays the loss when yields rise.
- Duration gives a straight-line (first-order) approximation of the price–yield relationship.
- For an option-free bond the true relationship is convex, so the curve lies above the tangent line.
- Yields fall → true price rises more than the duration estimate.
- Yields rise → true price falls less than the duration estimate.
- The error grows with the size of the yield move, which is why a convexity adjustment is added for large shocks such as 150 bps.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (The actual gain and the actual loss will both be larger than estimated): Convexity helps on both sides: the actual loss is smaller, not larger, than the duration estimate.
- B (Both will match the estimates exactly, since duration is a precise measure): Duration is exact only for very small yield changes; a 150 bps move leaves a visible convexity effect.
- C (The actual gain will be smaller and the actual loss larger than estimated): This describes negative convexity (seen in bonds with call or prepayment options), not a plain government bond.
- D (Duration gives no estimate at all for moves above 100 bps): Duration still gives an estimate for large moves; it simply becomes less accurate, which convexity corrects.
Memory tip: Plain bond = positive convexity = “gain more, lose less” than duration says.
Answer: E — The actual gain will be larger and the actual loss smaller than estimated.
The idea: The price–yield curve of a plain bond bends upwards (it is convex). A straight-line duration estimate therefore sits below the true curve on both sides: it underplays the gain when yields fall and overplays the loss when yields rise.
- Duration gives a straight-line (first-order) approximation of the price–yield relationship.
- For an option-free bond the true relationship is convex, so the curve lies above the tangent line.
- Yields fall → true price rises more than the duration estimate.
- Yields rise → true price falls less than the duration estimate.
- The error grows with the size of the yield move, which is why a convexity adjustment is added for large shocks such as 150 bps.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (The actual gain and the actual loss will both be larger than estimated): Convexity helps on both sides: the actual loss is smaller, not larger, than the duration estimate.
- B (Both will match the estimates exactly, since duration is a precise measure): Duration is exact only for very small yield changes; a 150 bps move leaves a visible convexity effect.
- C (The actual gain will be smaller and the actual loss larger than estimated): This describes negative convexity (seen in bonds with call or prepayment options), not a plain government bond.
- D (Duration gives no estimate at all for moves above 100 bps): Duration still gives an estimate for large moves; it simply becomes less accurate, which convexity corrects.
Memory tip: Plain bond = positive convexity = “gain more, lose less” than duration says.
Show answer
Answer: A — Risk and Control Self-Assessment (RCSA).
The idea: The people who run a process usually know best where it can go wrong. RCSA asks them to assess their own risks and controls in a structured way, giving a forward-looking view before losses happen.
- Common operational risk tools are internal loss data, external loss data, RCSA, KRIs and scenario analysis.
- In RCSA, business units themselves identify risks, rate likelihood and impact, and assess control design and effectiveness.
- The output is a residual risk rating and action plans for weak controls.
- The second line (operational risk function) facilitates and challenges the assessments.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Internal loss data collection): Internal loss data records losses that have already happened; it looks back, while the workshop described is a forward-looking self-assessment.
- C (Key Risk Indicators (KRIs)): KRIs are metrics tracked against thresholds (for example, number of failed reconciliations); they are not workshops that rate risks and controls.
- D (Concurrent audit): Concurrent audit is an independent review by auditors; RCSA is done by the business units themselves.
- E (Backtesting): Backtesting compares model forecasts (such as VaR) with actual outcomes; it is a model validation tool.
Memory tip: Self-assessment by the owners = RCSA; numbers with thresholds = KRIs; past losses = loss data.
Answer: A — Risk and Control Self-Assessment (RCSA).
The idea: The people who run a process usually know best where it can go wrong. RCSA asks them to assess their own risks and controls in a structured way, giving a forward-looking view before losses happen.
- Common operational risk tools are internal loss data, external loss data, RCSA, KRIs and scenario analysis.
- In RCSA, business units themselves identify risks, rate likelihood and impact, and assess control design and effectiveness.
- The output is a residual risk rating and action plans for weak controls.
- The second line (operational risk function) facilitates and challenges the assessments.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Internal loss data collection): Internal loss data records losses that have already happened; it looks back, while the workshop described is a forward-looking self-assessment.
- C (Key Risk Indicators (KRIs)): KRIs are metrics tracked against thresholds (for example, number of failed reconciliations); they are not workshops that rate risks and controls.
- D (Concurrent audit): Concurrent audit is an independent review by auditors; RCSA is done by the business units themselves.
- E (Backtesting): Backtesting compares model forecasts (such as VaR) with actual outcomes; it is a model validation tool.
Memory tip: Self-assessment by the owners = RCSA; numbers with thresholds = KRIs; past losses = loss data.
Show answer
Answer: B — Scenario analysis.
The idea: When history is empty, the bank has to imagine plausible severe events. Experts build “what if” cases, such as a three-day outage of the core banking system, and estimate how often they might occur and what they would cost.
- Operational losses are often split into high-frequency/low-severity events and low-frequency/high-severity (tail) events.
- Internal loss data captures frequent small losses well but rarely contains tail events.
- Scenario analysis uses expert judgement, external loss data and business knowledge to estimate the frequency and severity of severe but plausible events.
- Its results feed capital planning, insurance decisions and business continuity planning.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Extrapolating the average of internal loss data): An average of past internal losses reflects small, frequent events; with no tail events in the data, it will badly understate a rare large loss.
- C (Key Risk Indicators): KRIs are early-warning metrics; they flag rising risk but do not estimate the size of a rare extreme loss.
- D (Gap analysis of rate-sensitive assets): Gap analysis measures interest rate risk from repricing mismatches; it is not an operational risk tool.
- E (Credit scoring): Credit scoring estimates a borrower’s chance of default; it has nothing to do with cyber or fire losses.
Memory tip: No data on rare disasters? Use expert “what if” scenarios.
Answer: B — Scenario analysis.
The idea: When history is empty, the bank has to imagine plausible severe events. Experts build “what if” cases, such as a three-day outage of the core banking system, and estimate how often they might occur and what they would cost.
- Operational losses are often split into high-frequency/low-severity events and low-frequency/high-severity (tail) events.
- Internal loss data captures frequent small losses well but rarely contains tail events.
- Scenario analysis uses expert judgement, external loss data and business knowledge to estimate the frequency and severity of severe but plausible events.
- Its results feed capital planning, insurance decisions and business continuity planning.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Extrapolating the average of internal loss data): An average of past internal losses reflects small, frequent events; with no tail events in the data, it will badly understate a rare large loss.
- C (Key Risk Indicators): KRIs are early-warning metrics; they flag rising risk but do not estimate the size of a rare extreme loss.
- D (Gap analysis of rate-sensitive assets): Gap analysis measures interest rate risk from repricing mismatches; it is not an operational risk tool.
- E (Credit scoring): Credit scoring estimates a borrower’s chance of default; it has nothing to do with cyber or fire losses.
Memory tip: No data on rare disasters? Use expert “what if” scenarios.
Show answer
Answer: E — 137.0%.
The idea: The bank holds enough top-quality liquid assets to cover the net cash it could lose in a 30-day stress about 1.37 times over, comfortably above the 100% minimum.
- LCR = stock of HQLA ÷ total net cash outflows over the next 30 days.
- Stock of HQLA = Level 1 + Level 2A after haircut = 6,000 + 1,000 × 0.85 = 6,000 + 850 = ₹6,850 crore.
- Inflows count only up to 75% of outflows: cap = 0.75 × 8,000 = 6,000. Actual inflows 3,000 are below the cap, so all 3,000 count.
- Net cash outflows = 8,000 − 3,000 = ₹5,000 crore.
- LCR = 6,850 ÷ 5,000 = 1.37 = 137.0%.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (140.0%): 140.0% is 7,000 ÷ 5,000: it forgets the 15% haircut on Level 2A assets.
- B (85.6%): 85.6% is 6,850 ÷ 8,000: it divides by gross outflows and ignores the inflows.
- C (62.3%): 62.3% is 6,850 ÷ 11,000: it adds inflows to outflows instead of subtracting them.
- D (120.0%): 120.0% is 6,000 ÷ 5,000: it counts only Level 1 assets and leaves out Level 2A altogether.
Check:
| Item | ₹ crore |
|---|---|
| Level 1 | 6,000 |
| Level 2A after 15% haircut | 850 |
| Stock of HQLA | 6,850 |
| Outflows − inflows | 8,000 − 3,000 = 5,000 |
| LCR | 6,850 ÷ 5,000 = 137.0% |
Level 2A share of HQLA = 850 ÷ 6,850 ≈ 12.4%, well within the 40% Level 2 cap.
Memory tip: HQLA after haircuts ÷ (outflows − inflows, inflows capped at 75% of outflows) ≥ 100%.
Answer: E — 137.0%.
The idea: The bank holds enough top-quality liquid assets to cover the net cash it could lose in a 30-day stress about 1.37 times over, comfortably above the 100% minimum.
- LCR = stock of HQLA ÷ total net cash outflows over the next 30 days.
- Stock of HQLA = Level 1 + Level 2A after haircut = 6,000 + 1,000 × 0.85 = 6,000 + 850 = ₹6,850 crore.
- Inflows count only up to 75% of outflows: cap = 0.75 × 8,000 = 6,000. Actual inflows 3,000 are below the cap, so all 3,000 count.
- Net cash outflows = 8,000 − 3,000 = ₹5,000 crore.
- LCR = 6,850 ÷ 5,000 = 1.37 = 137.0%.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (140.0%): 140.0% is 7,000 ÷ 5,000: it forgets the 15% haircut on Level 2A assets.
- B (85.6%): 85.6% is 6,850 ÷ 8,000: it divides by gross outflows and ignores the inflows.
- C (62.3%): 62.3% is 6,850 ÷ 11,000: it adds inflows to outflows instead of subtracting them.
- D (120.0%): 120.0% is 6,000 ÷ 5,000: it counts only Level 1 assets and leaves out Level 2A altogether.
Check:
| Item | ₹ crore |
|---|---|
| Level 1 | 6,000 |
| Level 2A after 15% haircut | 850 |
| Stock of HQLA | 6,850 |
| Outflows − inflows | 8,000 − 3,000 = 5,000 |
| LCR | 6,850 ÷ 5,000 = 137.0% |
Level 2A share of HQLA = 850 ÷ 6,850 ≈ 12.4%, well within the 40% Level 2 cap.
Memory tip: HQLA after haircuts ÷ (outflows − inflows, inflows capped at 75% of outflows) ≥ 100%.
Show answer
Answer: C — Pillar 3 — market discipline.
The idea: Investors, depositors and analysts can only reward safe banks and penalise risky ones if they can see the numbers. Standard public disclosures let the market do part of the supervisor’s job.
- Basel II introduced three pillars, carried forward in Basel III.
- Pillar 1 sets minimum capital for credit, market and operational risk.
- Pillar 2 covers the bank’s own capital assessment (ICAAP) and the supervisor’s review of it.
- Pillar 3 sets public disclosure requirements so that market participants can assess a bank’s capital, risk exposures and risk management.
- RBI requires Pillar 3 disclosures on banks’ websites in prescribed templates.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Pillar 1 — minimum capital requirements): Pillar 1 decides how much capital a bank must hold; it does not deal with what the bank must publish.
- B (Pillar 2 — supervisory review process): Pillar 2 is the internal assessment and supervisory dialogue, which is largely confidential, not public disclosure.
- D (The capital conservation buffer): The capital conservation buffer is extra capital above the minimum; it restricts payouts when breached and is not a disclosure rule.
- E (The large exposures framework): The large exposures framework caps exposure to single counterparties and groups; it is not about public reporting.
Memory tip: Pillar 1 = hold, Pillar 2 = review, Pillar 3 = reveal.
Answer: C — Pillar 3 — market discipline.
The idea: Investors, depositors and analysts can only reward safe banks and penalise risky ones if they can see the numbers. Standard public disclosures let the market do part of the supervisor’s job.
- Basel II introduced three pillars, carried forward in Basel III.
- Pillar 1 sets minimum capital for credit, market and operational risk.
- Pillar 2 covers the bank’s own capital assessment (ICAAP) and the supervisor’s review of it.
- Pillar 3 sets public disclosure requirements so that market participants can assess a bank’s capital, risk exposures and risk management.
- RBI requires Pillar 3 disclosures on banks’ websites in prescribed templates.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Pillar 1 — minimum capital requirements): Pillar 1 decides how much capital a bank must hold; it does not deal with what the bank must publish.
- B (Pillar 2 — supervisory review process): Pillar 2 is the internal assessment and supervisory dialogue, which is largely confidential, not public disclosure.
- D (The capital conservation buffer): The capital conservation buffer is extra capital above the minimum; it restricts payouts when breached and is not a disclosure rule.
- E (The large exposures framework): The large exposures framework caps exposure to single counterparties and groups; it is not about public reporting.
Memory tip: Pillar 1 = hold, Pillar 2 = review, Pillar 3 = reveal.
Show answer
Answer: D — The clearing house becomes the counterparty to both sides, and gains and losses are settled daily through margins.
The idea: With a forward, the treasurer depends on the bank honouring a possibly large gain at maturity. With futures, the clearing house steps in between the parties and settles profits and losses every day, so large unpaid amounts never build up.
- A forward is a private bilateral contract; credit exposure can build up until maturity.
- In futures, the exchange’s clearing house novates each trade and becomes buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer.
- Positions are marked to market daily; losses are paid in as variation margin and gains are credited.
- Initial margin acts as a buffer if a member fails to pay, so counterparty risk is much lower.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Futures can be tailored to any amount and any maturity date): Tailoring to any amount and date is a feature of forwards; futures are standardised.
- B (Futures always settle by physical delivery at maturity): Many futures are cash-settled or closed out before maturity; settlement method does not remove counterparty risk.
- C (Futures need no initial deposit from either party): Futures do require initial margin; that margin is part of how the exchange controls credit risk.
- E (Futures prices are fixed by the central bank each day): Futures prices are set by trading on the exchange, not fixed by the central bank.
Memory tip: Futures = standardised + clearing house + daily margin. Forwards = tailored + bilateral + settle at end.
Answer: D — The clearing house becomes the counterparty to both sides, and gains and losses are settled daily through margins.
The idea: With a forward, the treasurer depends on the bank honouring a possibly large gain at maturity. With futures, the clearing house steps in between the parties and settles profits and losses every day, so large unpaid amounts never build up.
- A forward is a private bilateral contract; credit exposure can build up until maturity.
- In futures, the exchange’s clearing house novates each trade and becomes buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer.
- Positions are marked to market daily; losses are paid in as variation margin and gains are credited.
- Initial margin acts as a buffer if a member fails to pay, so counterparty risk is much lower.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Futures can be tailored to any amount and any maturity date): Tailoring to any amount and date is a feature of forwards; futures are standardised.
- B (Futures always settle by physical delivery at maturity): Many futures are cash-settled or closed out before maturity; settlement method does not remove counterparty risk.
- C (Futures need no initial deposit from either party): Futures do require initial margin; that margin is part of how the exchange controls credit risk.
- E (Futures prices are fixed by the central bank each day): Futures prices are set by trading on the exchange, not fixed by the central bank.
Memory tip: Futures = standardised + clearing house + daily margin. Forwards = tailored + bilateral + settle at end.
Topics covered today
- Module A — Risk and Risk Management Framework: Risk management framework — Inherent and residual risk
- Module B — Credit Risk: Credit risk capital — Standardised approach risk weight; Credit risk — Rating migration (downgrade) risk
- Module C — Market Risk: Value at Risk — Aggregating VaR across desks; Market risk — Convexity of bond prices
- Module D — Operational Risk: Operational risk — Risk and Control Self-Assessment; Operational risk — Scenario analysis for tail events
- Module E — Basel and RBI Guidelines on Risk Management: Basel III liquidity standards — Liquidity Coverage Ratio; Basel framework — Pillar 3 market discipline
- Module F — Derivatives and Risk Management: Derivatives — Futures versus forwards
Tomorrow’s post continues the series with another fresh set of 10 CAIIB Risk Management practice questions. Bookmark SimplifyingFin and revise one set a day.
Disclaimer: This quiz is an independent practice aid for educational purposes. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or published by IIBF. Always cross-check regulations and circulars from official RBI/IIBF sources before relying on any figure in an exam or at work.

