This CAIIB Rural Banking MCQ set is for bankers preparing for the IIBF CAIIB Rural Banking paper. Attempt all 10 questions below—tap an option to see whether you are right, then read the short explanation. These are SimplifyingFin practice questions, not official IIBF questions.
Part of the CAIIB Rural Banking MCQ practice series. Previous: Day 4
CAIIB Rural Banking MCQ Day 5 quiz: 10 questions
Show answer
Answer: C — 22.5%.
The idea: The head-count ratio answers a simple question: out of every 100 people in the village, how many are poor? Here it is about 22 or 23 people in every 100.
- Head-count ratio (HCR) = number of persons below the poverty line ÷ total population × 100.
- Persons below the line = 540; total population = 2,400.
- HCR = 540 ÷ 2,400 × 100 = 22.5%.
- Shortcut: 540 ÷ 24 = 22.5.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (25.0%): 25.0% is 120 ÷ 480 households: the share of poor households, not persons. Poor households here are larger than average, so the two ratios differ.
- B (77.5%): 77.5% is (2,400 − 540) ÷ 2,400: the share of people above the poverty line.
- D (5.0%): 5.0% is 120 ÷ 2,400: it divides poor households by persons, mixing two units.
- E (75.0%): 75.0% is (480 − 120) ÷ 480: the share of non-poor households.
Memory tip: HCR counts heads (persons), not households: poor persons ÷ population.
Answer: C — 22.5%.
The idea: The head-count ratio answers a simple question: out of every 100 people in the village, how many are poor? Here it is about 22 or 23 people in every 100.
- Head-count ratio (HCR) = number of persons below the poverty line ÷ total population × 100.
- Persons below the line = 540; total population = 2,400.
- HCR = 540 ÷ 2,400 × 100 = 22.5%.
- Shortcut: 540 ÷ 24 = 22.5.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (25.0%): 25.0% is 120 ÷ 480 households: the share of poor households, not persons. Poor households here are larger than average, so the two ratios differ.
- B (77.5%): 77.5% is (2,400 − 540) ÷ 2,400: the share of people above the poverty line.
- D (5.0%): 5.0% is 120 ÷ 2,400: it divides poor households by persons, mixing two units.
- E (75.0%): 75.0% is (480 − 120) ÷ 480: the share of non-poor households.
Memory tip: HCR counts heads (persons), not households: poor persons ÷ population.
Show answer
Answer: A — Recommended by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP); final decision by the Government of India.
The idea: MSP is a price floor that tells farmers, before they sow, the least they can expect for the crop. An expert body works it out from costs and market conditions, and the Union Government decides.
- The Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) studies cost of cultivation, demand-supply, price trends and other factors.
- It sends crop-wise MSP recommendations for kharif and rabi seasons to the Government of India.
- The Union Government (Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs) takes the final decision and announces the MSP.
- Procurement at MSP is carried out through agencies such as FCI and state agencies.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Recommended by NABARD; final decision by RBI): NABARD is a development finance institution for refinance and rural development; RBI does not fix crop prices.
- C (Recommended by the Food Corporation of India; final decision by State Governments): FCI procures and stores grain at MSP; it does not recommend the MSP, and states do not take the final decision.
- D (Fixed by each APMC market committee): APMC committees regulate trade in their market yards; they do not fix MSP.
- E (Recommended by NITI Aayog; final decision by Parliament): NITI Aayog is a policy think tank and Parliament does not approve each crop’s MSP.
Memory tip: CACP recommends, Centre decides, FCI and state agencies procure.
Answer: A — Recommended by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP); final decision by the Government of India.
The idea: MSP is a price floor that tells farmers, before they sow, the least they can expect for the crop. An expert body works it out from costs and market conditions, and the Union Government decides.
- The Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) studies cost of cultivation, demand-supply, price trends and other factors.
- It sends crop-wise MSP recommendations for kharif and rabi seasons to the Government of India.
- The Union Government (Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs) takes the final decision and announces the MSP.
- Procurement at MSP is carried out through agencies such as FCI and state agencies.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Recommended by NABARD; final decision by RBI): NABARD is a development finance institution for refinance and rural development; RBI does not fix crop prices.
- C (Recommended by the Food Corporation of India; final decision by State Governments): FCI procures and stores grain at MSP; it does not recommend the MSP, and states do not take the final decision.
- D (Fixed by each APMC market committee): APMC committees regulate trade in their market yards; they do not fix MSP.
- E (Recommended by NITI Aayog; final decision by Parliament): NITI Aayog is a policy think tank and Parliament does not approve each crop’s MSP.
Memory tip: CACP recommends, Centre decides, FCI and state agencies procure.
Show answer
Answer: E — 3.5 years.
The idea: Payback tells the banker how long it takes for the unit’s own earnings to return the money put in. Here the farmer gets the full ₹6 lakh back halfway through the fourth year.
- Cumulative inflows: year 1 = 1.2; year 2 = 1.2 + 1.6 = 2.8; year 3 = 2.8 + 2.0 = 4.8 (₹ lakh).
- Still to recover after year 3 = 6.0 − 4.8 = ₹1.2 lakh.
- Year 4 inflow = ₹2.4 lakh, so the fraction of year 4 needed = 1.2 ÷ 2.4 = 0.5.
- Payback period = 3 + 0.5 = 3.5 years.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (3.0 years): 3.0 years ignores the ₹1.2 lakh still unrecovered at the end of year 3 (only ₹4.8 lakh is back by then).
- B (3.1 years): 3.1 years is 6.0 ÷ 1.92, using the average yearly inflow (9.6 ÷ 5); with uneven flows the cumulative method is needed.
- C (4.0 years): 4.0 years rounds up to the end of year 4, though the investment is fully recovered by the middle of that year.
- D (2.5 years): 2.5 years is 6.0 ÷ 2.4, as if every year earned the highest inflow of ₹2.4 lakh.
Check:
| Year | Inflow (₹ lakh) | Cumulative (₹ lakh) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| 2 | 1.6 | 2.8 |
| 3 | 2.0 | 4.8 |
| 4 | 2.4 | 7.2 |
Cost ₹6.0 lakh is crossed in year 4: 3 + 1.2/2.4 = 3.5 years.
Memory tip: Uneven cash flows: add them up year by year, then take the fraction of the year in which you cross the cost.
Answer: E — 3.5 years.
The idea: Payback tells the banker how long it takes for the unit’s own earnings to return the money put in. Here the farmer gets the full ₹6 lakh back halfway through the fourth year.
- Cumulative inflows: year 1 = 1.2; year 2 = 1.2 + 1.6 = 2.8; year 3 = 2.8 + 2.0 = 4.8 (₹ lakh).
- Still to recover after year 3 = 6.0 − 4.8 = ₹1.2 lakh.
- Year 4 inflow = ₹2.4 lakh, so the fraction of year 4 needed = 1.2 ÷ 2.4 = 0.5.
- Payback period = 3 + 0.5 = 3.5 years.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (3.0 years): 3.0 years ignores the ₹1.2 lakh still unrecovered at the end of year 3 (only ₹4.8 lakh is back by then).
- B (3.1 years): 3.1 years is 6.0 ÷ 1.92, using the average yearly inflow (9.6 ÷ 5); with uneven flows the cumulative method is needed.
- C (4.0 years): 4.0 years rounds up to the end of year 4, though the investment is fully recovered by the middle of that year.
- D (2.5 years): 2.5 years is 6.0 ÷ 2.4, as if every year earned the highest inflow of ₹2.4 lakh.
Check:
| Year | Inflow (₹ lakh) | Cumulative (₹ lakh) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| 2 | 1.6 | 2.8 |
| 3 | 2.0 | 4.8 |
| 4 | 2.4 | 7.2 |
Cost ₹6.0 lakh is crossed in year 4: 3 + 1.2/2.4 = 3.5 years.
Memory tip: Uneven cash flows: add them up year by year, then take the fraction of the year in which you cross the cost.
Show answer
Answer: B — The District Collector.
The idea: The DCC brings banks and government departments to one table. Many of the issues (land records, sponsoring agencies, recovery support) need the district administration, so the District Collector chairs it while the lead bank runs it.
- The DCC is the district-level forum under the Lead Bank Scheme for coordinating credit and development work.
- It is chaired by the District Collector.
- The Lead District Manager of the lead bank convenes the meeting and coordinates follow-up.
- RBI’s Lead District Officer and NABARD’s DDM attend and guide; members include banks and line departments.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (The Lead District Manager (LDM) of the lead bank): The LDM convenes and coordinates the DCC but does not chair it.
- C (The Lead District Officer (LDO) of RBI): RBI’s Lead District Officer attends and monitors; RBI does not chair the DCC.
- D (The District Development Manager (DDM) of NABARD): NABARD’s DDM prepares the Potential Linked Credit Plan and participates, but does not chair.
- E (The Regional Manager of the largest Regional Rural Bank): RRBs are members like other banks; their officers do not chair the DCC.
Memory tip: DCC: Collector chairs, LDM convenes, RBI LDO and NABARD DDM guide.
Answer: B — The District Collector.
The idea: The DCC brings banks and government departments to one table. Many of the issues (land records, sponsoring agencies, recovery support) need the district administration, so the District Collector chairs it while the lead bank runs it.
- The DCC is the district-level forum under the Lead Bank Scheme for coordinating credit and development work.
- It is chaired by the District Collector.
- The Lead District Manager of the lead bank convenes the meeting and coordinates follow-up.
- RBI’s Lead District Officer and NABARD’s DDM attend and guide; members include banks and line departments.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (The Lead District Manager (LDM) of the lead bank): The LDM convenes and coordinates the DCC but does not chair it.
- C (The Lead District Officer (LDO) of RBI): RBI’s Lead District Officer attends and monitors; RBI does not chair the DCC.
- D (The District Development Manager (DDM) of NABARD): NABARD’s DDM prepares the Potential Linked Credit Plan and participates, but does not chair.
- E (The Regional Manager of the largest Regional Rural Bank): RRBs are members like other banks; their officers do not chair the DCC.
Memory tip: DCC: Collector chairs, LDM convenes, RBI LDO and NABARD DDM guide.
Show answer
Answer: D — Credit guarantee cover from the Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro and Small Enterprises (CGTMSE).
The idea: The bank’s worry is ‘what if the unit fails and there is no security to fall back on?’. A credit guarantee answers that: if the loan defaults, the guarantee trust pays the bank an agreed share of the loss.
- CGTMSE was set up by the Government of India and SIDBI to guarantee credit to micro and small enterprises.
- Lending institutions get guarantee cover for eligible loans given without collateral security or third-party guarantee.
- The bank pays a guarantee fee; on default it can claim the guaranteed share of the amount in default as per scheme rules.
- This encourages banks to finance first-generation and small entrepreneurs who lack collateral.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Refinance from NABARD under the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund): RIDF lends to state governments for rural infrastructure; it does not guarantee individual MSE loans.
- B (Deposit insurance cover from DICGC): DICGC insures bank deposits for depositors; it does not guarantee loans given by banks.
- C (Crop insurance under PMFBY): PMFBY insures crops against yield and weather losses; it does not cover a food-processing unit’s loan.
- E (Interest subvention under the Modified Interest Subvention Scheme): MISS gives interest subvention on short-term crop loans to farmers, not a guarantee on MSE loans.
Memory tip: No collateral for a micro/small unit → think CGTMSE guarantee.
Answer: D — Credit guarantee cover from the Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro and Small Enterprises (CGTMSE).
The idea: The bank’s worry is ‘what if the unit fails and there is no security to fall back on?’. A credit guarantee answers that: if the loan defaults, the guarantee trust pays the bank an agreed share of the loss.
- CGTMSE was set up by the Government of India and SIDBI to guarantee credit to micro and small enterprises.
- Lending institutions get guarantee cover for eligible loans given without collateral security or third-party guarantee.
- The bank pays a guarantee fee; on default it can claim the guaranteed share of the amount in default as per scheme rules.
- This encourages banks to finance first-generation and small entrepreneurs who lack collateral.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Refinance from NABARD under the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund): RIDF lends to state governments for rural infrastructure; it does not guarantee individual MSE loans.
- B (Deposit insurance cover from DICGC): DICGC insures bank deposits for depositors; it does not guarantee loans given by banks.
- C (Crop insurance under PMFBY): PMFBY insures crops against yield and weather losses; it does not cover a food-processing unit’s loan.
- E (Interest subvention under the Modified Interest Subvention Scheme): MISS gives interest subvention on short-term crop loans to farmers, not a guarantee on MSE loans.
Memory tip: No collateral for a micro/small unit → think CGTMSE guarantee.
Show answer
Answer: A — Interest subvention of 3% a year on loans up to ₹2 crore, for a maximum of 7 years.
The idea: AIF makes medium- and long-term loans for post-harvest and farm-gate infrastructure cheaper. The support is capped, so on a ₹3 crore loan the subvention applies to ₹2 crore of it, and only for up to 7 years.
- AIF is a central-sector financing facility for post-harvest management infrastructure and community farming assets.
- Loans under AIF get interest subvention of 3% per annum.
- The subvention is limited to loans up to ₹2 crore per project and is available for a maximum of 7 years.
- Credit guarantee cover through CGTMSE is also available for eligible borrowers for loans up to ₹2 crore.
- Here the FPO gets 3% subvention on ₹2 crore of its ₹3 crore loan.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Interest subvention of 3% a year on the full ₹3 crore for the entire loan tenure): The subvention is capped at loans up to ₹2 crore and a maximum of 7 years; it does not extend to the full ₹3 crore or the full tenure.
- C (A zero-interest loan for the first 5 years): AIF does not give zero-interest loans; it reduces the rate through a 3% subvention.
- D (A one-time capital subsidy of 50% of project cost): AIF is an interest-subvention and guarantee scheme, not a 50% capital subsidy scheme.
- E (Interest subvention of 1.5% a year, only for crop loans): 1.5% interest subvention is linked to short-term crop loans under the interest subvention scheme; a warehouse loan is long-term infrastructure finance.
Memory tip: AIF = 3% subvention, up to ₹2 crore, up to 7 years.
Answer: A — Interest subvention of 3% a year on loans up to ₹2 crore, for a maximum of 7 years.
The idea: AIF makes medium- and long-term loans for post-harvest and farm-gate infrastructure cheaper. The support is capped, so on a ₹3 crore loan the subvention applies to ₹2 crore of it, and only for up to 7 years.
- AIF is a central-sector financing facility for post-harvest management infrastructure and community farming assets.
- Loans under AIF get interest subvention of 3% per annum.
- The subvention is limited to loans up to ₹2 crore per project and is available for a maximum of 7 years.
- Credit guarantee cover through CGTMSE is also available for eligible borrowers for loans up to ₹2 crore.
- Here the FPO gets 3% subvention on ₹2 crore of its ₹3 crore loan.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Interest subvention of 3% a year on the full ₹3 crore for the entire loan tenure): The subvention is capped at loans up to ₹2 crore and a maximum of 7 years; it does not extend to the full ₹3 crore or the full tenure.
- C (A zero-interest loan for the first 5 years): AIF does not give zero-interest loans; it reduces the rate through a 3% subvention.
- D (A one-time capital subsidy of 50% of project cost): AIF is an interest-subvention and guarantee scheme, not a 50% capital subsidy scheme.
- E (Interest subvention of 1.5% a year, only for crop loans): 1.5% interest subvention is linked to short-term crop loans under the interest subvention scheme; a warehouse loan is long-term infrastructure finance.
Memory tip: AIF = 3% subvention, up to ₹2 crore, up to 7 years.
Show answer
Answer: C — ₹4 lakh.
The idea: The two schemes cover different events. PMJJBY is life cover for death from any cause; PMSBY is accident cover. An accidental death meets both conditions, so both pay.
- PMJJBY: life cover of ₹2 lakh on death due to any cause (entry age 18–50).
- PMSBY: ₹2 lakh on accidental death or total permanent disability; ₹1 lakh on partial permanent disability (age 18–70).
- A road-accident death is death from any cause (PMJJBY) and an accidental death (PMSBY).
- Total claim = 2 + 2 = ₹4 lakh.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹1 lakh): ₹1 lakh is PMSBY’s partial permanent disability benefit, which does not apply to a death.
- B (₹2 lakh): ₹2 lakh counts only one scheme; both covers were in force and both apply to an accidental death.
- D (₹3 lakh): ₹3 lakh adds PMJJBY’s ₹2 lakh to PMSBY’s ₹1 lakh partial-disability benefit instead of the ₹2 lakh death benefit.
- E (₹6 lakh): ₹6 lakh has no basis: each scheme pays ₹2 lakh on death, so the total is ₹4 lakh.
Memory tip: PMJJBY = any death ₹2 lakh. PMSBY = accident ₹2 lakh. Accidental death → both.
Answer: C — ₹4 lakh.
The idea: The two schemes cover different events. PMJJBY is life cover for death from any cause; PMSBY is accident cover. An accidental death meets both conditions, so both pay.
- PMJJBY: life cover of ₹2 lakh on death due to any cause (entry age 18–50).
- PMSBY: ₹2 lakh on accidental death or total permanent disability; ₹1 lakh on partial permanent disability (age 18–70).
- A road-accident death is death from any cause (PMJJBY) and an accidental death (PMSBY).
- Total claim = 2 + 2 = ₹4 lakh.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹1 lakh): ₹1 lakh is PMSBY’s partial permanent disability benefit, which does not apply to a death.
- B (₹2 lakh): ₹2 lakh counts only one scheme; both covers were in force and both apply to an accidental death.
- D (₹3 lakh): ₹3 lakh adds PMJJBY’s ₹2 lakh to PMSBY’s ₹1 lakh partial-disability benefit instead of the ₹2 lakh death benefit.
- E (₹6 lakh): ₹6 lakh has no basis: each scheme pays ₹2 lakh on death, so the total is ₹4 lakh.
Memory tip: PMJJBY = any death ₹2 lakh. PMSBY = accident ₹2 lakh. Accidental death → both.
Show answer
Answer: E — The holder must keep a minimum average monthly balance or pay a penalty.
The idea: PMJDY was designed so that the poorest household could open and keep an account without fear of charges. A minimum-balance penalty would defeat that purpose.
- PMJDY accounts are basic savings bank deposit (BSBD) accounts: no minimum balance needs to be maintained.
- Interest is earned on the balance like any savings account.
- A RuPay debit card is issued, with in-built accident insurance cover.
- Eligible account holders can get an overdraft facility.
- So a minimum-balance requirement with a penalty is not a PMJDY feature.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (It is a basic savings bank deposit account with no minimum balance requirement): No minimum balance is a key PMJDY feature.
- B (A RuPay debit card is issued with built-in accident insurance cover): A RuPay card with accident insurance is a PMJDY feature.
- C (Interest is paid on the deposit balance): PMJDY accounts are savings accounts and earn interest.
- D (Eligible account holders can get an overdraft facility): An overdraft facility for eligible account holders is a PMJDY feature.
Memory tip: PMJDY = zero balance + RuPay with accident cover + overdraft + interest.
Answer: E — The holder must keep a minimum average monthly balance or pay a penalty.
The idea: PMJDY was designed so that the poorest household could open and keep an account without fear of charges. A minimum-balance penalty would defeat that purpose.
- PMJDY accounts are basic savings bank deposit (BSBD) accounts: no minimum balance needs to be maintained.
- Interest is earned on the balance like any savings account.
- A RuPay debit card is issued, with in-built accident insurance cover.
- Eligible account holders can get an overdraft facility.
- So a minimum-balance requirement with a penalty is not a PMJDY feature.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (It is a basic savings bank deposit account with no minimum balance requirement): No minimum balance is a key PMJDY feature.
- B (A RuPay debit card is issued with built-in accident insurance cover): A RuPay card with accident insurance is a PMJDY feature.
- C (Interest is paid on the deposit balance): PMJDY accounts are savings accounts and earn interest.
- D (Eligible account holders can get an overdraft facility): An overdraft facility for eligible account holders is a PMJDY feature.
Memory tip: PMJDY = zero balance + RuPay with accident cover + overdraft + interest.
Show answer
Answer: B — Rural Self Employment Training Institute (RSETI).
The idea: RSETIs turn training into self-employment: they teach a trade, help the trainee prepare a project, link them to bank credit and follow up. Because banks run them, the link between training and credit is direct.
- RSETIs are set up in districts, with the lead bank of the district responsible for running them.
- The Ministry of Rural Development and State Governments support them.
- They give free, short-term, mostly residential training to rural youth for self-employment.
- After training they help with credit linkage and follow up with trainees for about two years.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Krishi Vigyan Kendra (KVK)): KVKs are agricultural science centres (under ICAR) for farm technology demonstration, not bank-run self-employment institutes.
- C (Financial Literacy Centre (FLC)): FLCs run financial literacy camps; they do not give trade training for self-employment.
- D (Industrial Training Institute (ITI)): ITIs are vocational training institutes under the skill development framework, not run by lead banks.
- E (Farmers’ Club): Farmers’ Clubs are village-level grassroots groups promoted through NABARD, not training institutes.
Memory tip: Bank-run, free, residential, self-employment training + credit link → RSETI.
Answer: B — Rural Self Employment Training Institute (RSETI).
The idea: RSETIs turn training into self-employment: they teach a trade, help the trainee prepare a project, link them to bank credit and follow up. Because banks run them, the link between training and credit is direct.
- RSETIs are set up in districts, with the lead bank of the district responsible for running them.
- The Ministry of Rural Development and State Governments support them.
- They give free, short-term, mostly residential training to rural youth for self-employment.
- After training they help with credit linkage and follow up with trainees for about two years.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Krishi Vigyan Kendra (KVK)): KVKs are agricultural science centres (under ICAR) for farm technology demonstration, not bank-run self-employment institutes.
- C (Financial Literacy Centre (FLC)): FLCs run financial literacy camps; they do not give trade training for self-employment.
- D (Industrial Training Institute (ITI)): ITIs are vocational training institutes under the skill development framework, not run by lead banks.
- E (Farmers’ Club): Farmers’ Clubs are village-level grassroots groups promoted through NABARD, not training institutes.
Memory tip: Bank-run, free, residential, self-employment training + credit link → RSETI.
Show answer
Answer: D — Moral hazard that weakens the repayment (credit) culture.
The idea: When borrowers believe debts may be written off, the reason to repay on time weakens, even for those who can pay. Banks then see rising overdues and become cautious about new lending, which hurts the honest farmer most.
- A loan waiver pays off or writes off eligible farm loans, usually as of a cut-off date.
- Borrowers who expect future waivers may deliberately delay repayment: this change in behaviour is moral hazard.
- RBI’s Internal Working Group on Agricultural Credit (2019) noted that loan waivers can hurt credit culture and state finances.
- The result is higher overdues, lower fresh lending and a weaker repayment ethic in the area.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Adverse selection in deposit mobilisation): Adverse selection is about the wrong type of customers coming in before a contract; the stem describes a change in repayment behaviour after the waiver.
- B (Seasonal unemployment): Seasonal unemployment is lack of work in lean months; it does not explain wilful delay by farmers who can repay.
- C (Disguised unemployment): Disguised unemployment is surplus labour on farms; it is unrelated to repayment behaviour.
- E (Financial exclusion of tenant farmers): Financial exclusion is lack of access to banking; these farmers already have bank loans.
Memory tip: Waiver expected → repayment delayed → moral hazard → weaker credit culture.
Answer: D — Moral hazard that weakens the repayment (credit) culture.
The idea: When borrowers believe debts may be written off, the reason to repay on time weakens, even for those who can pay. Banks then see rising overdues and become cautious about new lending, which hurts the honest farmer most.
- A loan waiver pays off or writes off eligible farm loans, usually as of a cut-off date.
- Borrowers who expect future waivers may deliberately delay repayment: this change in behaviour is moral hazard.
- RBI’s Internal Working Group on Agricultural Credit (2019) noted that loan waivers can hurt credit culture and state finances.
- The result is higher overdues, lower fresh lending and a weaker repayment ethic in the area.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Adverse selection in deposit mobilisation): Adverse selection is about the wrong type of customers coming in before a contract; the stem describes a change in repayment behaviour after the waiver.
- B (Seasonal unemployment): Seasonal unemployment is lack of work in lean months; it does not explain wilful delay by farmers who can repay.
- C (Disguised unemployment): Disguised unemployment is surplus labour on farms; it is unrelated to repayment behaviour.
- E (Financial exclusion of tenant farmers): Financial exclusion is lack of access to banking; these farmers already have bank loans.
Memory tip: Waiver expected → repayment delayed → moral hazard → weaker credit culture.
Topics covered today
- Module A — Rural India: Rural poverty measurement — Head-count ratio; Agricultural prices — Minimum Support Price
- Module B — Financing Rural Development: Project appraisal — Payback period; Lead Bank Scheme — District Consultative Committee
- Module C — Priority Sector Financing and Govt. Initiatives: Credit guarantee schemes — CGTMSE; Government schemes — Agriculture Infrastructure Fund; Social security schemes — PMJJBY and PMSBY
- Module D — Problems and Prospects in Rural Banking: Financial inclusion — PMJDY accounts; Skill development — Rural Self Employment Training Institutes; Problems in rural banking — Farm loan waivers and credit culture
Tomorrow’s post continues the series with another fresh set of 10 CAIIB Rural Banking practice questions. Bookmark SimplifyingFin and revise one set a day.
Disclaimer: This quiz is an independent practice aid for educational purposes. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or published by IIBF. Always cross-check regulations and circulars from official RBI/IIBF sources before relying on any figure in an exam or at work.

