This CAIIB Rural Banking MCQ set is for bankers preparing for the IIBF CAIIB Rural Banking paper. Attempt all 10 questions below—tap an option to see whether you are right, then read the short explanation. These are SimplifyingFin practice questions, not official IIBF questions.
Part of the CAIIB Rural Banking MCQ practice series.
CAIIB Rural Banking MCQ Day 1 quiz: 10 questions
Show answer
Answer: C — Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).
The idea: A branch manager reading a district profile should know that ‘poor’ can mean two different things: short of income/spending, or short of basic living conditions. The MPI counts the second kind — a household that lacks several basics at once is poor even if its cash spending looks just above the line.
- Note what the cell wants: a household-level count based on several non-income deprivations happening together (nutrition, schooling, cooking fuel, sanitation).
- The Multidimensional Poverty Index does exactly this: it scores each household across health, education and standard-of-living indicators and treats it as poor when its weighted deprivation score crosses a cut-off.
- In India, NITI Aayog’s National MPI follows this approach using household-survey (NFHS) data.
- An income or consumption line, by contrast, looks at one money number only — the thing the cell explicitly does not want.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Head-count ratio against a consumption-expenditure poverty line): The head-count ratio is the share of people below a single consumption-expenditure poverty line; it uses one money measure, not several overlapping deprivations.
- B (Gini coefficient of household consumption): The Gini coefficient measures how unequally consumption is spread across households; it says nothing about which household is deprived.
- D (Poverty gap index): The poverty gap index measures how far, on average, the poor fall below the money poverty line (the depth of income shortfall), not multiple deprivations.
- E (Per-capita net state domestic product): Per-capita NSDP is an average output figure for the whole state; it cannot identify individual deprived households.
Check:
| Measure | What it captures |
|---|---|
| Head-count ratio | Share below one money line |
| Poverty gap index | Depth below the money line |
| Gini coefficient | Inequality of spending |
| MPI | Overlapping non-income deprivations per household |
Only the MPI looks at several deprivations at once.
Memory tip: ‘Many basics missing at once’ = Multidimensional. ‘Below one rupee line’ = head-count ratio.
Answer: C — Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).
The idea: A branch manager reading a district profile should know that ‘poor’ can mean two different things: short of income/spending, or short of basic living conditions. The MPI counts the second kind — a household that lacks several basics at once is poor even if its cash spending looks just above the line.
- Note what the cell wants: a household-level count based on several non-income deprivations happening together (nutrition, schooling, cooking fuel, sanitation).
- The Multidimensional Poverty Index does exactly this: it scores each household across health, education and standard-of-living indicators and treats it as poor when its weighted deprivation score crosses a cut-off.
- In India, NITI Aayog’s National MPI follows this approach using household-survey (NFHS) data.
- An income or consumption line, by contrast, looks at one money number only — the thing the cell explicitly does not want.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Head-count ratio against a consumption-expenditure poverty line): The head-count ratio is the share of people below a single consumption-expenditure poverty line; it uses one money measure, not several overlapping deprivations.
- B (Gini coefficient of household consumption): The Gini coefficient measures how unequally consumption is spread across households; it says nothing about which household is deprived.
- D (Poverty gap index): The poverty gap index measures how far, on average, the poor fall below the money poverty line (the depth of income shortfall), not multiple deprivations.
- E (Per-capita net state domestic product): Per-capita NSDP is an average output figure for the whole state; it cannot identify individual deprived households.
Check:
| Measure | What it captures |
|---|---|
| Head-count ratio | Share below one money line |
| Poverty gap index | Depth below the money line |
| Gini coefficient | Inequality of spending |
| MPI | Overlapping non-income deprivations per household |
Only the MPI looks at several deprivations at once.
Memory tip: ‘Many basics missing at once’ = Multidimensional. ‘Below one rupee line’ = head-count ratio.
Show answer
Answer: A — Interlocked (tied) credit and produce-market transactions.
The idea: The farmer is not just paying interest — he is also giving up the right to sell where the price is best. That hidden cost (a lower crop price) is why tied loans from traders keep many small farmers in debt even when the ‘interest’ looks small.
- Spot the two deals bundled together: a loan, and a promise to sell the whole crop to the lender.
- When one contract is made conditional on another (credit tied to output sale), economists call it an interlocked or interlinked market transaction.
- The lender recovers the loan from the sale proceeds and also gains through the price he sets — so the farmer’s true cost of credit is higher than any stated rate.
- This is a classic feature of informal rural money markets and a key reason banks push KCC and formal crop credit.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Credit rationing by a commercial bank to meet priority sector targets): Credit rationing by a bank is a formal-sector supply limit; here the lender is an informal commission agent, and PSL targets push banks to lend more, not less, to farmers.
- C (A Joint Liability Group financed under bank linkage): A Joint Liability Group is a small group of borrowers who mutually guarantee bank loans; there is no group or bank in this story.
- D (Warehouse-receipt financing against a negotiable receipt): Warehouse-receipt finance lends against produce stored in an accredited warehouse; here the loan is given before sowing and tied to a forced sale, not secured by a receipt.
- E (Microfinance lending by a regulated NBFC-MFI): An NBFC-MFI is a regulated formal lender giving collateral-free loans to low-income households without tying them to crop sales.
Check: Two contracts, one condition: ‘I lend you money if you sell me your crop at my price’ → interlocked market.
Memory tip: Loan + forced sale to the lender = interlocked credit; the real interest is hidden in the low crop price.
Answer: A — Interlocked (tied) credit and produce-market transactions.
The idea: The farmer is not just paying interest — he is also giving up the right to sell where the price is best. That hidden cost (a lower crop price) is why tied loans from traders keep many small farmers in debt even when the ‘interest’ looks small.
- Spot the two deals bundled together: a loan, and a promise to sell the whole crop to the lender.
- When one contract is made conditional on another (credit tied to output sale), economists call it an interlocked or interlinked market transaction.
- The lender recovers the loan from the sale proceeds and also gains through the price he sets — so the farmer’s true cost of credit is higher than any stated rate.
- This is a classic feature of informal rural money markets and a key reason banks push KCC and formal crop credit.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (Credit rationing by a commercial bank to meet priority sector targets): Credit rationing by a bank is a formal-sector supply limit; here the lender is an informal commission agent, and PSL targets push banks to lend more, not less, to farmers.
- C (A Joint Liability Group financed under bank linkage): A Joint Liability Group is a small group of borrowers who mutually guarantee bank loans; there is no group or bank in this story.
- D (Warehouse-receipt financing against a negotiable receipt): Warehouse-receipt finance lends against produce stored in an accredited warehouse; here the loan is given before sowing and tied to a forced sale, not secured by a receipt.
- E (Microfinance lending by a regulated NBFC-MFI): An NBFC-MFI is a regulated formal lender giving collateral-free loans to low-income households without tying them to crop sales.
Check: Two contracts, one condition: ‘I lend you money if you sell me your crop at my price’ → interlocked market.
Memory tip: Loan + forced sale to the lender = interlocked credit; the real interest is hidden in the low crop price.
Show answer
Answer: D — ₹2,34,000.
The idea: ₹2,34,000 is the farmer’s working purse for the season: enough to grow 5 acres of cotton, keep the household running till the crop is sold, and keep the pump and bullock cart in repair. It is 1.3 times the bare crop cost.
- Basic crop cost = scale of finance × area = ₹36,000 × 5 = ₹1,80,000.
- Post-harvest and household component = 10% of ₹1,80,000 = ₹18,000.
- Farm-asset repair and maintenance component = 20% of ₹1,80,000 = ₹36,000.
- Add them: ₹1,80,000 + ₹18,000 + ₹36,000 = ₹2,34,000 (already a multiple of ₹1,000, so no rounding needed).
- Shortcut: both add-ons are on the same base, so multiply once — ₹1,80,000 × 1.30 = ₹2,34,000.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹1,80,000): ₹1,80,000 is only scale of finance × area — the bare crop cost without the 10% and 20% components.
- B (₹1,98,000): ₹1,98,000 is the crop cost plus only the 10% post-harvest/household component (₹1,80,000 × 1.10); the 20% farm-asset component is missing.
- C (₹2,16,000): ₹2,16,000 is the crop cost plus only the 20% farm-asset component (₹1,80,000 × 1.20); the 10% household component is missing.
- E (₹54,000): ₹54,000 is just the two add-ons together (₹18,000 + ₹36,000 = 30% of ₹1,80,000), leaving out the crop cost itself.
Check:
| Component | ₹ |
|---|---|
| Scale of finance × area (36,000 × 5) | 1,80,000 |
| 10% post-harvest / household | 18,000 |
| 20% repairs & maintenance of farm assets | 36,000 |
| Short-term drawing limit | 2,34,000 |
Crop insurance premium, if any, is added on top; it is excluded here as stated.
Memory tip: KCC crop limit = crop cost × 1.3 (plus insurance). ‘1 + 0.1 + 0.2’.
Answer: D — ₹2,34,000.
The idea: ₹2,34,000 is the farmer’s working purse for the season: enough to grow 5 acres of cotton, keep the household running till the crop is sold, and keep the pump and bullock cart in repair. It is 1.3 times the bare crop cost.
- Basic crop cost = scale of finance × area = ₹36,000 × 5 = ₹1,80,000.
- Post-harvest and household component = 10% of ₹1,80,000 = ₹18,000.
- Farm-asset repair and maintenance component = 20% of ₹1,80,000 = ₹36,000.
- Add them: ₹1,80,000 + ₹18,000 + ₹36,000 = ₹2,34,000 (already a multiple of ₹1,000, so no rounding needed).
- Shortcut: both add-ons are on the same base, so multiply once — ₹1,80,000 × 1.30 = ₹2,34,000.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹1,80,000): ₹1,80,000 is only scale of finance × area — the bare crop cost without the 10% and 20% components.
- B (₹1,98,000): ₹1,98,000 is the crop cost plus only the 10% post-harvest/household component (₹1,80,000 × 1.10); the 20% farm-asset component is missing.
- C (₹2,16,000): ₹2,16,000 is the crop cost plus only the 20% farm-asset component (₹1,80,000 × 1.20); the 10% household component is missing.
- E (₹54,000): ₹54,000 is just the two add-ons together (₹18,000 + ₹36,000 = 30% of ₹1,80,000), leaving out the crop cost itself.
Check:
| Component | ₹ |
|---|---|
| Scale of finance × area (36,000 × 5) | 1,80,000 |
| 10% post-harvest / household | 18,000 |
| 20% repairs & maintenance of farm assets | 36,000 |
| Short-term drawing limit | 2,34,000 |
Crop insurance premium, if any, is added on top; it is excluded here as stated.
Memory tip: KCC crop limit = crop cost × 1.3 (plus insurance). ‘1 + 0.1 + 0.2’.
Show answer
Answer: E — Opening savings accounts for village households and giving them crop loans through its own retail branches.
The idea: Think of NABARD as the ‘bank behind the rural banks’: it refinances, supervises, funds infrastructure and builds institutions, but the farmer walks into a cooperative bank, RRB or commercial bank branch — not a NABARD counter.
- Refinance: NABARD refinances cooperative banks and RRBs for crop production and term lending — a core function (A is a role).
- RIDF: banks that fall short of priority sector targets place the shortfall in funds such as RIDF with NABARD, which lends to State Governments for rural roads, irrigation and similar projects (B is a role).
- Supervision: NABARD inspects RRBs and State/District Central Cooperative Banks (C is a role).
- Development: NABARD pioneered and still promotes the SHG–Bank Linkage Programme (D is a role).
- NABARD is an apex development finance institution; it does not run a retail branch network taking savings deposits from village households. So E is the odd one out.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Providing refinance to cooperative banks and RRBs for seasonal crop loans): Refinance to cooperative banks and RRBs for seasonal agricultural operations is one of NABARD’s main financial functions.
- B (Managing the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund and lending from it to State Governments for rural infrastructure): NABARD manages RIDF, which is funded by banks’ priority-sector shortfall deposits, and lends from it to States for rural infrastructure.
- C (Carrying out statutory inspection of RRBs and of State and District Central Cooperative Banks): Statutory inspection of RRBs and of State and District Central Cooperative Banks is part of NABARD’s supervisory role.
- D (Promoting the SHG–Bank Linkage Programme and funding capacity building of groups and bankers): NABARD launched the SHG–Bank Linkage Programme and funds promotion, training and capacity building — a developmental role.
Check:
| NABARD role | Example |
|---|---|
| Financial | Refinance to RRBs / cooperative banks; RIDF loans to States |
| Supervisory | Inspection of RRBs, StCBs, DCCBs |
| Developmental | SHG–Bank Linkage, capacity building, PLPs |
| Not a role | Retail savings accounts for villagers |
Memory tip: NABARD = Refinance, Supervise, Develop. It is a bank for banks in rural credit, not a village branch.
Answer: E — Opening savings accounts for village households and giving them crop loans through its own retail branches.
The idea: Think of NABARD as the ‘bank behind the rural banks’: it refinances, supervises, funds infrastructure and builds institutions, but the farmer walks into a cooperative bank, RRB or commercial bank branch — not a NABARD counter.
- Refinance: NABARD refinances cooperative banks and RRBs for crop production and term lending — a core function (A is a role).
- RIDF: banks that fall short of priority sector targets place the shortfall in funds such as RIDF with NABARD, which lends to State Governments for rural roads, irrigation and similar projects (B is a role).
- Supervision: NABARD inspects RRBs and State/District Central Cooperative Banks (C is a role).
- Development: NABARD pioneered and still promotes the SHG–Bank Linkage Programme (D is a role).
- NABARD is an apex development finance institution; it does not run a retail branch network taking savings deposits from village households. So E is the odd one out.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Providing refinance to cooperative banks and RRBs for seasonal crop loans): Refinance to cooperative banks and RRBs for seasonal agricultural operations is one of NABARD’s main financial functions.
- B (Managing the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund and lending from it to State Governments for rural infrastructure): NABARD manages RIDF, which is funded by banks’ priority-sector shortfall deposits, and lends from it to States for rural infrastructure.
- C (Carrying out statutory inspection of RRBs and of State and District Central Cooperative Banks): Statutory inspection of RRBs and of State and District Central Cooperative Banks is part of NABARD’s supervisory role.
- D (Promoting the SHG–Bank Linkage Programme and funding capacity building of groups and bankers): NABARD launched the SHG–Bank Linkage Programme and funds promotion, training and capacity building — a developmental role.
Check:
| NABARD role | Example |
|---|---|
| Financial | Refinance to RRBs / cooperative banks; RIDF loans to States |
| Supervisory | Inspection of RRBs, StCBs, DCCBs |
| Developmental | SHG–Bank Linkage, capacity building, PLPs |
| Not a role | Retail savings accounts for villagers |
Memory tip: NABARD = Refinance, Supervise, Develop. It is a bank for banks in rural credit, not a village branch.
Show answer
Answer: B — Potential Linked Credit Plan (PLP).
The idea: Before a district decides how much each bank should lend to dairy or irrigation, someone must estimate how much lending the district can actually absorb. NABARD’s PLP does that groundwork, and the lead bank turns it into bank-wise and block-wise targets.
- Note the level: the document is for one district, prepared by NABARD.
- Note the content: block-wise and sector-wise credit potential, adjusted for infrastructure gaps.
- That is the Potential Linked Credit Plan, which NABARD prepares for each district every year.
- Under the Lead Bank Scheme, the Annual Credit Plan for the district is built on the PLP and then allocated to banks and branches.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (State Focus Paper): The State Focus Paper is NABARD’s state-level document that consolidates the district PLPs; it is not the district-level base.
- C (Service Area credit plan of each branch): A service area plan allocated villages to individual branches for credit planning; it is a branch-level allocation, not NABARD’s district potential assessment.
- D (Agenda note of the State Level Bankers’ Committee): The SLBC agenda note is a state-level review document for bankers’ meetings, not a district credit-potential study.
- E (The lead bank’s own annual business budget): A bank’s business budget sets its own deposit and advance targets; it is not NABARD’s assessment of district-wide potential.
Check: District potential (PLP, NABARD) → District Annual Credit Plan (lead bank) → State Focus Paper aggregates PLPs at state level.
Memory tip: PLP = Potential at district level; ACP is built on it.
Answer: B — Potential Linked Credit Plan (PLP).
The idea: Before a district decides how much each bank should lend to dairy or irrigation, someone must estimate how much lending the district can actually absorb. NABARD’s PLP does that groundwork, and the lead bank turns it into bank-wise and block-wise targets.
- Note the level: the document is for one district, prepared by NABARD.
- Note the content: block-wise and sector-wise credit potential, adjusted for infrastructure gaps.
- That is the Potential Linked Credit Plan, which NABARD prepares for each district every year.
- Under the Lead Bank Scheme, the Annual Credit Plan for the district is built on the PLP and then allocated to banks and branches.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (State Focus Paper): The State Focus Paper is NABARD’s state-level document that consolidates the district PLPs; it is not the district-level base.
- C (Service Area credit plan of each branch): A service area plan allocated villages to individual branches for credit planning; it is a branch-level allocation, not NABARD’s district potential assessment.
- D (Agenda note of the State Level Bankers’ Committee): The SLBC agenda note is a state-level review document for bankers’ meetings, not a district credit-potential study.
- E (The lead bank’s own annual business budget): A bank’s business budget sets its own deposit and advance targets; it is not NABARD’s assessment of district-wide potential.
Check: District potential (PLP, NABARD) → District Annual Credit Plan (lead bank) → State Focus Paper aggregates PLPs at state level.
Memory tip: PLP = Potential at district level; ACP is built on it.
Show answer
Answer: A — ₹840 crore.
The idea: ₹840 crore is the floor for loans to farmers holding up to 2 hectares (plus eligible landless labourers, tenants and their groups). It sits inside the agriculture target, which in turn sits inside the overall priority sector target — so the bank cannot meet it by lending to large farmers or agri-corporates.
- Every priority sector target and sub-target is applied to ANBC or CEOBSE, whichever is higher.
- Compare the two bases: ANBC ₹8,400 crore > CEOBSE ₹7,900 crore, so the base is ₹8,400 crore.
- Small and marginal farmers sub-target = 10% of ₹8,400 crore = ₹840 crore.
- Shortcut: 10% just moves the decimal one place — 8,400 → 840.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (₹790 crore): ₹790 crore is 10% of CEOBSE (₹7,900 crore); it uses the smaller base instead of the higher of the two.
- C (₹1,176 crore): ₹1,176 crore is 14% of ₹8,400 crore — the sub-target for all non-corporate farmers, of which the SMF sub-target is a part.
- D (₹1,512 crore): ₹1,512 crore is 18% of ₹8,400 crore — the full agriculture target, not the SMF sub-target.
- E (₹3,360 crore): ₹3,360 crore is 40% of ₹8,400 crore — the overall priority sector target for domestic commercial banks.
Check:
| Layer | % of base | ₹ crore (base 8,400) |
|---|---|---|
| Overall priority sector | 40% | 3,360 |
| Agriculture | 18% | 1,512 |
| Non-corporate farmers | 14% | 1,176 |
| Small & marginal farmers | 10% | 840 |
Base = higher of ANBC (8,400) and CEOBSE (7,900).
Memory tip: Nested PSL layers 40 → 18 → 14 → 10, all on the bigger of ANBC and CEOBSE.
Answer: A — ₹840 crore.
The idea: ₹840 crore is the floor for loans to farmers holding up to 2 hectares (plus eligible landless labourers, tenants and their groups). It sits inside the agriculture target, which in turn sits inside the overall priority sector target — so the bank cannot meet it by lending to large farmers or agri-corporates.
- Every priority sector target and sub-target is applied to ANBC or CEOBSE, whichever is higher.
- Compare the two bases: ANBC ₹8,400 crore > CEOBSE ₹7,900 crore, so the base is ₹8,400 crore.
- Small and marginal farmers sub-target = 10% of ₹8,400 crore = ₹840 crore.
- Shortcut: 10% just moves the decimal one place — 8,400 → 840.
Why the others are wrong:
- B (₹790 crore): ₹790 crore is 10% of CEOBSE (₹7,900 crore); it uses the smaller base instead of the higher of the two.
- C (₹1,176 crore): ₹1,176 crore is 14% of ₹8,400 crore — the sub-target for all non-corporate farmers, of which the SMF sub-target is a part.
- D (₹1,512 crore): ₹1,512 crore is 18% of ₹8,400 crore — the full agriculture target, not the SMF sub-target.
- E (₹3,360 crore): ₹3,360 crore is 40% of ₹8,400 crore — the overall priority sector target for domestic commercial banks.
Check:
| Layer | % of base | ₹ crore (base 8,400) |
|---|---|---|
| Overall priority sector | 40% | 3,360 |
| Agriculture | 18% | 1,512 |
| Non-corporate farmers | 14% | 1,176 |
| Small & marginal farmers | 10% | 840 |
Base = higher of ANBC (8,400) and CEOBSE (7,900).
Memory tip: Nested PSL layers 40 → 18 → 14 → 10, all on the bigger of ANBC and CEOBSE.
Show answer
Answer: C — ₹9,600.
The idea: A farmer who repays on time effectively borrows at 4% a year — ₹9,600 on ₹2.4 lakh, or about ₹800 a month. The bank’s 1.5% subvention is what makes the 7% rate viable for the bank; it does not reduce the farmer’s bill further.
- Interest charged at 7%: 0.07 × 2,40,000 = ₹16,800.
- Prompt-repayment incentive at 3%: 0.03 × 2,40,000 = ₹7,200, credited back because the loan was repaid on the due date.
- Net cost to the farmer: ₹16,800 − ₹7,200 = ₹9,600.
- The 1.5% subvention (₹3,600) is paid by the Government to the bank; it is already built into the 7% rate and is not deducted again from the farmer’s cost.
- Shortcut: effective rate = 7% − 3% = 4%; 4% of ₹2,40,000 = ₹9,600.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹16,800): ₹16,800 is the gross interest at 7% before the 3% prompt-repayment incentive is credited.
- B (₹7,200): ₹7,200 is the prompt-repayment incentive itself (3% of ₹2,40,000), not the farmer’s net cost.
- D (₹3,600): ₹3,600 is the 1.5% subvention the bank receives from the Government (0.015 × 2,40,000).
- E (₹13,200): ₹13,200 is interest at 5.5% (7% − 1.5%): it wrongly deducts the bank’s subvention from the farmer’s rate and ignores the farmer’s 3% incentive.
Check:
| Item | Rate | ₹ |
|---|---|---|
| Interest charged to farmer | 7% | 16,800 |
| Less prompt-repayment incentive | 3% | 7,200 |
| Net cost to farmer | 4% | 9,600 |
| Subvention to bank (not farmer) | 1.5% | 3,600 |
Rates are exercise assumptions; scheme rates and loan caps are notified by Government from time to time.
Memory tip: Farmer’s rate = charged rate − prompt-repayment incentive. Bank’s subvention never reaches the farmer’s bill.
Answer: C — ₹9,600.
The idea: A farmer who repays on time effectively borrows at 4% a year — ₹9,600 on ₹2.4 lakh, or about ₹800 a month. The bank’s 1.5% subvention is what makes the 7% rate viable for the bank; it does not reduce the farmer’s bill further.
- Interest charged at 7%: 0.07 × 2,40,000 = ₹16,800.
- Prompt-repayment incentive at 3%: 0.03 × 2,40,000 = ₹7,200, credited back because the loan was repaid on the due date.
- Net cost to the farmer: ₹16,800 − ₹7,200 = ₹9,600.
- The 1.5% subvention (₹3,600) is paid by the Government to the bank; it is already built into the 7% rate and is not deducted again from the farmer’s cost.
- Shortcut: effective rate = 7% − 3% = 4%; 4% of ₹2,40,000 = ₹9,600.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (₹16,800): ₹16,800 is the gross interest at 7% before the 3% prompt-repayment incentive is credited.
- B (₹7,200): ₹7,200 is the prompt-repayment incentive itself (3% of ₹2,40,000), not the farmer’s net cost.
- D (₹3,600): ₹3,600 is the 1.5% subvention the bank receives from the Government (0.015 × 2,40,000).
- E (₹13,200): ₹13,200 is interest at 5.5% (7% − 1.5%): it wrongly deducts the bank’s subvention from the farmer’s rate and ignores the farmer’s 3% incentive.
Check:
| Item | Rate | ₹ |
|---|---|---|
| Interest charged to farmer | 7% | 16,800 |
| Less prompt-repayment incentive | 3% | 7,200 |
| Net cost to farmer | 4% | 9,600 |
| Subvention to bank (not farmer) | 1.5% | 3,600 |
Rates are exercise assumptions; scheme rates and loan caps are notified by Government from time to time.
Memory tip: Farmer’s rate = charged rate − prompt-repayment incentive. Bank’s subvention never reaches the farmer’s bill.
Show answer
Answer: D — Enrolment is voluntary, his share is capped at 1.5% of the sum insured, and the rest of the premium is subsidised by the Centre and the State.
The idea: For a wheat farmer, PMFBY means paying a small, fixed slice of the cover — for example ₹1,500 on a sum insured of ₹1 lakh — while governments pick up the rest of the actuarial cost. Since 2020 the bank must also respect his choice to opt out.
- Identify the crop class: wheat is a Rabi food-grain crop.
- Farmer’s maximum premium under PMFBY: 2% for Kharif food-grain and oilseed crops, 1.5% for Rabi food-grain and oilseed crops, 5% for annual commercial/horticultural crops (or the actuarial rate, if lower).
- So his share is 1.5% of the sum insured.
- The gap between the actuarial premium and the farmer’s share is premium subsidy, shared by Centre and State (50:50 generally; 90:10 in North-Eastern and Himalayan States).
- Since the revamp from Kharif 2020, enrolment is voluntary for all farmers, including loanee farmers; branches record opt-out declarations.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Enrolment is compulsory for every loanee farmer, and he must pay the full actuarial premium): This describes the original 2016 design (compulsory for loanee farmers) and wrongly loads the full actuarial premium on the farmer; enrolment is now voluntary and the farmer’s share is capped.
- B (He pays 2% of the sum insured, because 2% applies to every crop in every season): 2% is the farmer’s cap for Kharif food-grain and oilseed crops only, not a single rate for all crops and seasons.
- C (He pays 5% of the sum insured, because wheat is treated as a commercial crop): 5% is the cap for annual commercial and horticultural crops; wheat is a food-grain crop, not a commercial crop.
- E (The premium is split 50:50 between the farmer and the insurance company): The subsidy is shared between the Central and State Governments, not between the farmer and the insurer.
Check:
| Crop class | Farmer’s max premium (% of sum insured) |
|---|---|
| Kharif food grains & oilseeds | 2% |
| Rabi food grains & oilseeds | 1.5% |
| Annual commercial / horticultural | 5% |
Balance of actuarial premium: Centre–State subsidy.
Memory tip: Kharif 2, Rabi 1.5, Commercial 5 — and opting in is the farmer’s choice.
Answer: D — Enrolment is voluntary, his share is capped at 1.5% of the sum insured, and the rest of the premium is subsidised by the Centre and the State.
The idea: For a wheat farmer, PMFBY means paying a small, fixed slice of the cover — for example ₹1,500 on a sum insured of ₹1 lakh — while governments pick up the rest of the actuarial cost. Since 2020 the bank must also respect his choice to opt out.
- Identify the crop class: wheat is a Rabi food-grain crop.
- Farmer’s maximum premium under PMFBY: 2% for Kharif food-grain and oilseed crops, 1.5% for Rabi food-grain and oilseed crops, 5% for annual commercial/horticultural crops (or the actuarial rate, if lower).
- So his share is 1.5% of the sum insured.
- The gap between the actuarial premium and the farmer’s share is premium subsidy, shared by Centre and State (50:50 generally; 90:10 in North-Eastern and Himalayan States).
- Since the revamp from Kharif 2020, enrolment is voluntary for all farmers, including loanee farmers; branches record opt-out declarations.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (Enrolment is compulsory for every loanee farmer, and he must pay the full actuarial premium): This describes the original 2016 design (compulsory for loanee farmers) and wrongly loads the full actuarial premium on the farmer; enrolment is now voluntary and the farmer’s share is capped.
- B (He pays 2% of the sum insured, because 2% applies to every crop in every season): 2% is the farmer’s cap for Kharif food-grain and oilseed crops only, not a single rate for all crops and seasons.
- C (He pays 5% of the sum insured, because wheat is treated as a commercial crop): 5% is the cap for annual commercial and horticultural crops; wheat is a food-grain crop, not a commercial crop.
- E (The premium is split 50:50 between the farmer and the insurance company): The subsidy is shared between the Central and State Governments, not between the farmer and the insurer.
Check:
| Crop class | Farmer’s max premium (% of sum insured) |
|---|---|
| Kharif food grains & oilseeds | 2% |
| Rabi food grains & oilseeds | 1.5% |
| Annual commercial / horticultural | 5% |
Balance of actuarial premium: Centre–State subsidy.
Memory tip: Kharif 2, Rabi 1.5, Commercial 5 — and opting in is the farmer’s choice.
Show answer
Answer: E — Joint Liability Group (JLG) financing.
The idea: For a branch, a JLG turns ‘no land papers, no security’ into a bankable proposal: the peer guarantee of 4–10 similar cultivators replaces collateral, so tenant farmers and sharecroppers can borrow from the bank instead of the village moneylender.
- Note the profile: oral lessees — cultivators without title to the land, so no mortgage and often no land-based KCC.
- Note the security offered: mutual guarantee among a small group of similar borrowers.
- Note the loan design: each member borrows for his own activity, with joint and several liability.
- That is the Joint Liability Group model promoted by NABARD for tenant farmers, oral lessees and sharecroppers (usually 4–10 members).
Why the others are wrong:
- A (A savings-led thrift group that must first build a corpus for internal lending): A savings-led thrift group (SHG) starts with regular saving and internal lending before bank credit; these lessees want crop loans now on peer guarantee, without a savings phase.
- B (Loan against gold ornaments pledged by each lessee): A gold loan needs ornaments to pledge; the stem says none of them can offer collateral.
- C (An agricultural term loan secured by mortgage of the cultivated land): A mortgage-backed term loan needs title to the land, which oral lessees do not have.
- D (A Kisan Credit Card issued only in the name of the landowner): A KCC in the landowner’s name finances the owner, not the lessees who actually cultivate the plots.
Check: Tenant / oral lessee + no collateral + small group mutual guarantee + individual loans → JLG.
Memory tip: JLG = ‘Join, guarantee each other, get credit’ — the route for landless cultivators.
Answer: E — Joint Liability Group (JLG) financing.
The idea: For a branch, a JLG turns ‘no land papers, no security’ into a bankable proposal: the peer guarantee of 4–10 similar cultivators replaces collateral, so tenant farmers and sharecroppers can borrow from the bank instead of the village moneylender.
- Note the profile: oral lessees — cultivators without title to the land, so no mortgage and often no land-based KCC.
- Note the security offered: mutual guarantee among a small group of similar borrowers.
- Note the loan design: each member borrows for his own activity, with joint and several liability.
- That is the Joint Liability Group model promoted by NABARD for tenant farmers, oral lessees and sharecroppers (usually 4–10 members).
Why the others are wrong:
- A (A savings-led thrift group that must first build a corpus for internal lending): A savings-led thrift group (SHG) starts with regular saving and internal lending before bank credit; these lessees want crop loans now on peer guarantee, without a savings phase.
- B (Loan against gold ornaments pledged by each lessee): A gold loan needs ornaments to pledge; the stem says none of them can offer collateral.
- C (An agricultural term loan secured by mortgage of the cultivated land): A mortgage-backed term loan needs title to the land, which oral lessees do not have.
- D (A Kisan Credit Card issued only in the name of the landowner): A KCC in the landowner’s name finances the owner, not the lessees who actually cultivate the plots.
Check: Tenant / oral lessee + no collateral + small group mutual guarantee + individual loans → JLG.
Memory tip: JLG = ‘Join, guarantee each other, get credit’ — the route for landless cultivators.
Show answer
Answer: B — Aadhaar Enabled Payment System (AePS).
The idea: AePS turns the customer’s Aadhaar number plus fingerprint into her ‘card and PIN’. That is why a BC can serve card-less, PIN-less rural customers at their doorstep — a key tool for last-mile financial inclusion and for drawing DBT benefits.
- List the inputs: Aadhaar number, choice of bank, fingerprint — no card, no PIN, no mobile.
- The device is a micro-ATM at a Business Correspondent point.
- Biometric authentication against Aadhaar for an interoperable cash withdrawal is the Aadhaar Enabled Payment System run by NPCI.
- AePS supports balance enquiry, cash withdrawal, cash deposit and Aadhaar-to-Aadhaar fund transfer at BC points.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (UPI payment from a feature phone): UPI, even on a feature phone, needs a mobile phone and a UPI PIN; the pensioner uses neither.
- C (National Electronic Funds Transfer (NEFT)): NEFT is an account-to-account transfer system for remittances; it does not dispense cash at a BC point using a fingerprint.
- D (Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS)): RTGS is a high-value real-time account transfer system, not a cash-withdrawal channel at a village BC.
- E (Bharat Bill Payment System (BBPS)): BBPS is a platform for paying bills such as electricity or water; it is not used to withdraw cash from one’s own account.
Check: No card + no PIN + Aadhaar number + fingerprint at a micro-ATM → AePS.
Memory tip: AePS = Aadhaar + bank + fingerprint; the thumb is the PIN.
Answer: B — Aadhaar Enabled Payment System (AePS).
The idea: AePS turns the customer’s Aadhaar number plus fingerprint into her ‘card and PIN’. That is why a BC can serve card-less, PIN-less rural customers at their doorstep — a key tool for last-mile financial inclusion and for drawing DBT benefits.
- List the inputs: Aadhaar number, choice of bank, fingerprint — no card, no PIN, no mobile.
- The device is a micro-ATM at a Business Correspondent point.
- Biometric authentication against Aadhaar for an interoperable cash withdrawal is the Aadhaar Enabled Payment System run by NPCI.
- AePS supports balance enquiry, cash withdrawal, cash deposit and Aadhaar-to-Aadhaar fund transfer at BC points.
Why the others are wrong:
- A (UPI payment from a feature phone): UPI, even on a feature phone, needs a mobile phone and a UPI PIN; the pensioner uses neither.
- C (National Electronic Funds Transfer (NEFT)): NEFT is an account-to-account transfer system for remittances; it does not dispense cash at a BC point using a fingerprint.
- D (Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS)): RTGS is a high-value real-time account transfer system, not a cash-withdrawal channel at a village BC.
- E (Bharat Bill Payment System (BBPS)): BBPS is a platform for paying bills such as electricity or water; it is not used to withdraw cash from one’s own account.
Check: No card + no PIN + Aadhaar number + fingerprint at a micro-ATM → AePS.
Memory tip: AePS = Aadhaar + bank + fingerprint; the thumb is the PIN.
Topics covered today
- Module A — Rural India: Rural poverty measurement; Rural money markets
- Module B — Financing Rural Development: Kisan Credit Card limit; NABARD functions; Lead Bank Scheme
- Module C — Priority Sector Financing and Govt. Initiatives: Priority sector lending targets; Interest subvention on crop loans; Crop insurance — PMFBY
- Module D — Problems and Prospects in Rural Banking: Joint Liability Groups; Technology in financial inclusion
Tomorrow’s post continues the series with another fresh set of 10 CAIIB Rural Banking practice questions. Bookmark SimplifyingFin and revise one set a day.
Disclaimer: This quiz is an independent practice aid for educational purposes. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or published by IIBF. Always cross-check regulations and circulars from official RBI/IIBF sources before relying on any figure in an exam or at work.

